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I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research and contains, as its main 













This thesis argues that our culture is grounded in fundamental ontological error. This 
error posits human being as a form of being that is separate from the other-than-human 
world, its mortal and fleshy confines. Drawing on the insight of Gregory Bateson, I 
propose that insofar as ontology and epistemology are inextricably entwined, error in 
one implies error in the other. Thus the consequence of our faulty ontology is that 
epistemological error is built into the system.  
The danger of systemic epistemological error is that, as a culture, we rely on our ways of 
knowing to find solutions to cultural/social/ecological problems. Yet where our ways of 
knowing are themselves erroneous, recourse to these, simply further perpetuates 
problems and at the same time deepens error. This is particularly the case where 
recourse to systemic correctives to such error have been lost – where ethical knowing 
(at the level of culture) and a perspective giving and defining relationship with nature 
and the sacred are not available to the system.  Where these correctives are not available, 
the dominant knowing multiplies, a spreading pandemic across the landscape, 
suppressing and eradicating other ways of knowing and thus, other ways of being. A key 
result of this is the diminishing capacity, at the level of culture, to detect this 
epistemological (and ontological) error. The norm quickly overwrites difference, 
removing alternative knowing from the system. This has resulted in a condition in late 
modernity whereby the separation of ways of knowing and being from embededness in 
place are all but undetected in our cultural psyche.  
Ecological and epistemological destruction thus continue fundamentally unchecked. 
This thesis traces the loss of awareness of loss through shifts in, what I term, the 
epistemological baseline. An overlooked dimension of this ecological and 
epistemological change is the impact that loss of knowing has on the self. This loss, has, 
I propose, produced a collective and heightened existential anxiety, a loss of the sense 
that the self in any meaningful way exists. As a result, the late-modern self is caught in 
the endless search for proof – looking for evidence of existence through the given 
cultural form - material reflections, particularly images, of the self. Such evidence, 
however, merely reproduces the search for, and the dominance of, ‘objective’ 
knowledge and the reign of the object, ultimately producing the impermeable self. 
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This process of self-referencing has over the last thirty to forty years been a matter of 
some theoretical scrutiny. Yet this conversation is one that has, primarily, been 
separated from conversations surrounding ecological destruction and diminished 
relationship with the other-than-human world. The making and mapping of the self is 
seen to bear no inherent relation to the destruction of species and of place. Where a 
connection is made it is material. Further, this is a materiality that is stripped bare of all 
subjectivity and presence. Hence we find most of the mainstream discourse and much 
environmental and cultural theory linking our habits of consumption to ideas of 
unsustainability but not to the effects this has on ways of being or knowing oneself as 
human. In this, the other-than-human world as the core constituent of our human 
being, (and our potential to know of this being) is absent, forgotten, lost. 
In revealing the limitations of cultural and environmental theory and protest, due to  
their historical locatedness in (and thus tendency to reproduce) epistemological error, I 
draw attention to the way in which ecological destruction and the loss of subjectivity are 
caught in a self-reinforcing, positive feedback loop which is taking us towards 
epistemological crisis. In this crisis we are trapped in a systemic failure to know of error 
and thus a failure to know otherwise, and as a system, we are heading not towards 
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This thesis began a long time ago. It began when I rolled around delighted, in the cold, 
fresh snow, smelling its skyfulness, relishing its texture, shaping it into firm, pliant balls, 
to delightedly throw at my sister. It began when I, half the size of our Old English 
sheepdog Rachel, wrapped my arms around her woolly neck, united in safety, trust, 
togetherness. It began in my Nanna’s kitchen helping her make a weekly batch of 
chocolate chip cookies, patiently, methodically, with care. It continued, when, wrenched 
from New Zealand, I found myself studying philosophy at a West Australian university, 
asking questions about the nature of being. It moved forth, while, in seeking reprieve 
from my mind, the crowded, colliding space of ideas, and needing to get back in touch 
with the wide open skies, the breathing earth that I loved, the place where I felt 
grounded and connected, my life suitably in scale, I wandered, packing around Australia, 
Asia and Europe, traipsing towards homefulness, towards clarity, towards being. It took 
an important step forward when, arriving back on West Australian shores in 2000, I had 
the good fortune of stumbling upon a post graduate course that synthesised these parts 
of my world – of all our worlds – mind, place and being. This was a course called Eco-
philosophy and Earth Education, a key dimension of which was to go hiking for ten day 
intervals in the sublime landscapes of the Pilbara and the Fitzgerald National Park, all 
the while reading, thinking, conversing philosophy as it resides in place. This was 
transformative. And yet. 
And yet something still niggled. The closer I came to being connected, to my own 
thinking, to the culture of environmental protest I had long been part of, to the earth 
itself and my community of like-minded people who cared, the more I came to be 
disturbed, the farther the gulf yawned between a world that was at once so precious and 
sacred and a culture that was at once so aggressive and destructive. More troubling still 
was that no amount of theory, no amount of protest, no-thing seemed to bridge this gulf. 
Nothing made a difference. 
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This question that this thesis seeks to answer is, why? Why has a difference, which makes 
a difference, been lost to our system?1 Why are we moving in only one direction – towards 
destruction and death – despite the many voices crying out against this? 
It is a bleak reality to dwell on and explore. However it is necessary to dwell – as 
Gregory Bateson has us know - before anything else, before any action, we must seek 
understanding.2  For to search primarily for solution is a symptom of the pathology of 
our culture and one that, while embedded in the dominant epistemology, perpetuates 
patterns of destruction. My hope then is to develop a deeper understanding of the 
conditions that have produced crisis. In this I do not pretend that my explorations of 
the questions I pose are in any way comprehensive and neither do I purport to cover in 
requisite depth or scope all that has been said surrounding this issue. On the one hand 
this is impossible as this ‘issue’ speaks to so many aspects of our being, to the cultural, 
ecological, social, psychological, geographical and historical contours of our world. On 
the other hand to attempt to traverse all that has been said would disrupt my intention. 
Rather, my approach is to look at the patterns and tendencies in culture, in theory and in 
thought itself.  I am, as it were, looking from the corner of my eye to take in the warp 
and weave of the land rather than looking directly ahead at the view in front. In this 
kaleidoscopic approach I will inevitably overlook and leave out some important 
contributions to the landscape. I apologise for this at the forefront, and ask that the 
reader understand that this omission is in no way intentional but is inexorably linked to 
the nature of my analysis. I am also sure to gloss over certain distinctions when a more 
microscopic analysis could draw attention to much significant detail. However, again, to 
be immersed in this detail from the point at which I am standing is to lose sight of the 
land and it is the lay of the land that I wish to scrutinise.  
It is important to highlight that this scrutiny begins with my own epistemological 
location, my own sense of knowing and my own space of unknowing. My knowing, 
perhaps my insight, is the sense of something, some time ago, having gone very wrong. 
This is what I understand to be the ontological error that lies at the heart of our culture 
that at the deep core of our culture is the premise – born from a horror of mortality – 
                                                 
1 A difference which makes a difference, as the property of mental pattern and process is the 
insight of Gregory Bateson. Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity (New York: E. 
P. Dutton, 1979), 91-100. 
2 Mary Catherine Bateson, With a Daughter’s Eye: A Memoir of Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson 
(New York: William Morrow and Company, 1984), 181. 
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that the earth is not our rightful home. The error is the deep-seated belief that to be 
human is to be separate from the other than human world. It is the belief that the 
earth’s creatures, its changes, its rhythms and seasons, its vastness, dust and decay, are 
not in fact our own. The outcome of this thinking is of course that neither is the earth’s 
beauty, wonder and knowing our own.  
Tragically this idea is resilient, it has survived many millennia and taken on many 
instantiations. However, to call it a belief or an ‘idea’ is to somewhat misrepresent it. 
More correctly, I suggest it takes the shape of a cultural ‘will’ or ‘desire.’ As a feeling or 
sentiment it does not form part of the conscious cerebral realm, as ideas are mostly seen 
to do. Rather, this sentiment or will belongs to the non-conscious sphere, to the seat of 
anxiety from which it springs. This is important to note, for the non-conscious nature of 
this error implies that its address must also be at the non-conscious level, it must be 
sourced in ways of being and knowing that are outside the dictates and control of the 
conscious cultural mind. For some time, while theology was the conscious form through 
which this sentiment was expressed, address was available, through Nature, the ethical 
and the sacred. However the more dangerous form in which this sentiment is now 
embedded, the form of knowing itself as an objective system, means that these 
correctives have been both diminished and separated from the dominant form of 
knowing and being human.  
As a part of this system and as part of this culture that has lost vast and multiple ways 
and forms of knowing – and being - in place, I also inhabit a space of unknowing. I do 
not know what I do not know, I can only garner that I do not know. Here, in this thesis, 
this unknowing traps me in the language at our disposal and traps me in the limitations 
that this language suggests, caught as it is – and you and I are – in the unknowing that 
characterises our system. This makes for tricky conceptual territory as I try to move 
across ridges with a compass in hand, moving incrementally forward and at the same 
time referring back. One can discard the compass but only when one ‘knows’ 
differently, perhaps at the end of the journey, perhaps not. 
With this in mind, and with hope of crossing the ridges, I need to preface my use of two 
key terms; this is the nature and form of subjectivity, and the changing nature and form of 
the ecological, as used in this thesis. At the core of this thesis is the argument that the loss 
of subjectivity, as a form of knowing, is in late modernity deeply and systemically woven 
into ecological destruction. By subjectivity I do not mean a self, not in the conventional 
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understanding of the self as a discrete – and human – phenomena. This self is also in 
danger. But subjectivity is more precisely a property that inheres – or fails to inhere – in 
the world, one that emerges out of relationship with the other. The capacity for 
relationship, for intimacy and connection, is the space for subjectivity. Where this space 
is lost, so too is the capacity for being human, for being is only realised in the context of 
difference. Hence I suggest that the loss of subjectivity wired into ecological destruction, 
is the loss of being human wired into ecological destruction.  
When I speak of ‘ecological’ destruction in this thesis I speak of the damage to places that 
are already divorced from relationship with the (western) human world. This presents a 
conceptual trap. For to articulate the error in our culture I need to scrutinise the place 
where we stand. Yet this place itself reflects and reinforces error, and reflects and 
reinforces unknowing. I attempt, therefore, while speaking of ecology, to unpack and 
map its genealogy. In so doing I attempt to historically situate the term ‘ecology’ as a 
marker of lost relationship. In this process I look briefly at embededness as a (non-
western) cultural norm and the array of place descriptions, signifying a depth and detail 
of relationship, to which such embededness gives way. I then chart the evolution of 
ecology, from its earlier form in ‘oeconomy’ to its latter form in ‘environment.’ Key to 
my argument is the notion that the way we speak about place reflects a way of knowing 
place and a way of being in place. A failure to identify this rests in the failure to identify 
shifts in the epistemological baseline, to identify loss of knowing and loss of the capacity 
to know of this loss. This not-knowing, and the inability to name or express this not-
knowing, continues to build further lack of awareness into the system. From this 
perspective, I argue that it is a mistake to name the current crisis as ecological or 
environmental, insofar as ecology references other-than-human systems, for while the 
effects of the crisis are obviously and tragically devastating to place and its creatures – 
the point of crisis is not ecological in nature. This crisis point is epistemological and it is 
heading in the direction of not recovery but death – it is a failure to know (otherwise) 
locked into the system itself, a failure to know of error, to know that we do not know, 
and in this failure, a loss of knowing of what it is to be human – thus a loss of the hope 
for correctives at the level of culture. 
It must be stressed that this is a crisis locked into the patterns of knowing and being 
that define western culture. When speaking of human being, I do so to refer to the modes 
of being that characterise this culture. I do not intend to speak of all cultures and their 
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modes of being human, that unfortunately due to the pathology of our culture are also 
increasingly endangered, with many having become extinct over the preceding centuries. 
It is characteristic of our culture and its malformations that its spread and reach is wide. 
Thus while the particular forms of self-construction to which it gives rise rely on a level 
of material welfare particular to the consumer, the reach of its destruction is not 
localised to this space. To make possible the domination of the object this culture feeds 
on the diversity, integrity and beauty of the world. In this way we see the effects of 
climate change being global in scale, multi-national corporations reaching into the 
farthest flung, formerly pristine destinations to clear-fell, dragnet, mine, and detonate 
living landscapes for industrialised, mass-produced markets. 
In the first three chapters of this thesis I trace the historical changes that lead from the 
loss of consciousness-in-place to the rise of knowledge-of-place. Here I focus on the 
loss of (alternative) knowing that accompanies ecological destruction and the 
exponential emergence and domination of a certain way of knowing and being in place. 
I argue that from the loss of relationship with place comes a loss of knowing of what it 
is to be human. Accompanying each loss, due to shifts in the baseline (of knowing and 
being), is the loss of knowing of loss. The continuation of such destruction and loss 
means an entrapment in the search for environmental ‘solutions’ and a systemic failure 
to know otherwise; this is the point of epistemological crisis.  
In Chapter One, I chronicle and analyse the historical emergence of (environmental) 
protest and argue that, when the integrity of and relationship with place is taken into 
consideration, it is apparent that ecological consciousness and care is not increasing but 
diminishing over time. The failure to identify this reveals how far the baseline has 
shifted. I suggest that what is focused on in response to ecological (or social) 
destruction is the fact of destruction itself and how such destruction may be stymied by 
more knowledge – of a certain kind. In this, we fail to consider the loss of knowing, at 
the level of culture, that accompanies such destruction and that in turn further advances 
destruction. As a result we fail to consider the way loss of knowing breeds loss of 
knowing of loss, and where this cycle of loss may lead us. 
In Chapter Two, I consider further the loss of ecological consciousness (at the level of 
culture) and the loss of ethical knowing (at the level of culture).  Following Nash, I 
argue that the mything of nature as the wild perpetuates the story of culture and cannot 
therefore provide an alternative to the dominant way of knowing and being human. The 
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Romantics therefore, while attempting to stand alone on cultural shores, in their 
invocation of individual relationship with Wild nature, and as a precursor to the modern 
day environmental movement, function to reproduce the dominant culture. This is 
reinforced by the Romantics’, and subsequent modern environmentalists’, focus on the 
individual as the site of social and cultural change insofar as the very idea of the 
individual is one that emerges from the epistemological error defining our culture. 
Ecological consciousness (at the level of culture), I suggest, depends on intimate 
relationship with place (at the level of culture), and where this is diminished so too is the 
possibility for connection to and care for the other-than-human world. This is not to 
deny or diminish the discrete relationships that are available to any one person or 
community of people, rather it is to identify that such (irregular) difference is not a 
challenge or solution to the patterns of human being and knowing that dominate the 
modern world. However, we fail to identify this because from where we stand in late 
modernity our loss (like our error) is too far advanced, we fail to know what we do not 
know.  
In Chapter Three, I compare the early American conservationists, and the movement 
they were part of, to the latter day environmental movement. Here I argue that contrary 
to popular lore, the conservationists were more ecologically conscious than subsequent 
environmentalists. This is because of the level of intimacy - the relationship the 
conservationists had with the land they were conserving. Following Richard W. Judd, I 
suggest that, insofar as this is the case, they fit more precisely in the naturalist tradition 
rather than that of the Romantics from whom the modern environmental movement 
takes its epistemological cue. The time of the conservationists was also, I suggest, a 
more promising time for change because epistemological error was less advanced than it 
is today, due in part to alternative knowing in the form of ‘nature’ and ‘ethical knowing’ 
still being to some extent culturally present. Ecological destruction and the reign of the 
individual were yet to reach pathological proportions.  
However with the rise of modernity came the loss of alternative knowing, driven ever 
deeper by the incessant search to collect more and more knowledge of a certain type – 
objective, conscious ‘evidence’ … of species destruction, of eco-system management, of 
wise resource use … (non-consciously) produced as evidence to demonstrate our 
humanity. The environmental movement then began at a significant epistemological 
deficit and through no fault of its own is trapped in advanced epistemological error and 
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advanced epistemological loss. In the final section of this chapter I consider the school 
of thought called deep ecology and its attempts at cultural change. Deep ecology seeks to 
challenge the relationship the western self (or any self) has with the other-than-human 
world. It does so by suggesting the boundaries and extensions of this self can be 
variously re-mapped or dissolved to allow for a new consciousness of the world-as-self. 
I argue that, while deep ecology makes a viable and important attempt at cultural change 
it is ultimately not successful, for in its invocation of, and return to, the self as the site of 
change, it perpetuates the very notion of the separate self it seeks to challenge. It 
assumes that in a malformed and distorted world, the self while to some extent affected 
by this, is nonetheless fundamentally intact, and, in such, can renew relationship with a 
geographically and epistemologically remote, other-than-human world.   
However, in arguing that place-based theory and action has yielded little change, I do 
not intend to underestimate the valuable associations between place and person that are 
made by writers such as Edward Casey, Jeff Malpas, Freya Mathews, Eric Katz and 
Glenn Albrecht, to name but a few of the key theorists. Yet I diverge from these 
thinkers in a key respect. While the inclination in this literature is to focus on particular 
relationships with place (certainly an important focus) or the effects of the loss of place 
on the human, my focus is on the feedback relationship. I am particularly concerned 
with how loss of place perpetuates loss of knowing, and how this in turn perpetuates 
further ecological destruction. In this I am interested in the way human-being is shaped 
and misshapen by the places in which we dwell and the way possibilities for self-hood 
are closed down where place as a permeable, living, space is closed down. My focus is 
significantly on our cultural pattern (of thinking, theorizing and being) as one that exerts 
synergistic impacts on place and self. 
In Chapters Four and Five, I turn more precisely to culture itself, to analyse the loss of 
subjectivity that loss of relationship with place has produced. In Chapter Four I argue 
that the failure to identify the link between ecological destruction and the loss of 
subjectivity, (due to the ontological error at the heart of our culture and the nature of 
the shifting epistemological baseline), has produced a situation whereby the late-modern 
self, in not ‘knowing’ of her existence, is sent on an endless search for ‘proof.’ We 
search for proof in the form the culture makes available, the form of the object. The 
outcome is the crafting of the self, the subject, into object – resulting in the erasure of 
subjectivity for the western self. Herein we are trapped in a self-reinforcing system with 
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no way of knowing otherwise, destroying in the process the integrity, stability and beauty 
of the other-than-human world, the possibility for deep and abiding relationship with 
this world, and in such, knowledge of what it is to be human.  
In Chapter Five, I examine the pattern of thinking about the condition of the self in 
late-modernity, from the perspective of cultural theory. In this, what I wish to 
emphasise are the tendencies and patterns within cultural theory that marginalise and 
render insignificant the ecological and the material, when scrutinising the social and the 
self. Accordingly, while there are a vast number of theorists who have had, and continue 
to have, valuable insights surrounding the cultural changes that have ensued in the 
preceding centuries and in contemporary times, my focus is on three specific theorists as 
representative of those who consider place in the structure of the self and who diagnose 
and describe the crisis of subjectivity in late modernity. Yet, while the theorists I consider 
make important contributions to the analysis of the crisis-ridden self, they still reinforce 
the conditions of crisis by presenting this self as fundamentally separate - intact and open 
to change, irrespective of the state of the world within which she is placed. This self is, 
in a key sense, worldless. 
Finally in Chapter Six I reflect on the perpetuation of error from a systems perspective 
employing the insights of two systems theorists, Gregory Bateson and Donella 
Meadows. In particular, I focus on the theory of Gregory Bateson, who draws attention 
to the mistaken understanding and description of mind in western culture, one where 
mind is seen to be a property of the individual skinbound self. Conversely he suggests 
that mind – and thus - knowing is a property of a system, composed of difference – a 
difference that makes a difference travelling in a circuit. This, as he sees it, is an 
ecological system, and its stability and health is determined by feedback processes, that 
in a stable system, are maintained by stocks, flows, in-built flexibility and diversity to 
avoid pathology and oscillations, which, if unchecked, can result in chaos and the death 
of the system. And this indeed, is the direction to which we are heading. 
In light of such, this thesis is, above all, a plea to know otherwise, for slowly as our 
once-loved places are lost to the machines and the ways of knowing that they once 
harboured are destroyed, it seems to be apparent, after a time, that things could not be 
otherwise, surely?  
 
9 
But things, have, for the vast reach of time, been otherwise. I am reminded here of a 
complaint made to Gary Snyder, the eco-poet and activist, by a friend, who lamented 
that Snyder was always going against the ‘flow’, to which Snyder remarked that he was 
in fact going with the real ‘flow’ and that what his friend suggested was the flow was 
simply a two thousand year eddy. 
I think perhaps this eddy has been around for some time longer, somewhere in the 
nether reaches of the western mind. Yet ‘we’, have been around for longer still, this we, 
is all of us, moonlight, tadpoles, dingoes, grass trees, orang-utans, blowfish. We have 
persisted and we have known otherwise. The earth will, one should think, in some form 
persist, but we will miss the orang-utan, the moonlight, the green bellied tree-frog, we 













A working contradiction surrounding the ‘environmental crisis’1 is the fundamental 
inability of environmental protest to stem or significantly alter the tide of ecological 
destruction despite the apparent ubiquity of such protest and the ubiquity of knowledge 
surrounding the crisis. Why, may we ask, is this so? Particularly, why is this so given 
what seems to be the rise in ecological consciousness, the surge of environmental 
literature and the proliferation of widespread information networks that detail and 
attempt to mitigate against environmental destruction? And further, what may this 
inability reveal about our cultural texts and our particular mode of being human? What 
may it say about our practise of constructing self and our practise of destroying place? 
In this chapter I argue that this inefficacy persists because ecological consciousness has 
not risen but diminished over time. Key to my position, is the premise that what 
ecological consciousness requires is an intimate relationship with (and thus knowing of) 
place at the level of culture, not simply consciousness of a certain type of information 
surrounding environmental calamity. From the loss of ecological consciousness, and a 
loss of knowing of this loss, attempts to redress the crisis are inevitably distorted and 
limited. Such distortion and limitation can be easily seen in mainstream responses to the 
crisis, responses which perpetuate current modes of living and identify nature as a 
‘resource’ to be preserved or consumed.2 However, I propose that the responses of 
                                                 
1 I use the term ‘environmental crisis’ to indicate its conventional application. However, my 
thesis argument, as outlined in the introduction, is that the fundamental nature of this crisis is 
not environmental but epistemological, and thus to call it environmental is to engage in false 
description. Subsequently, the expression I will use to refer to this time, is ‘the crisis’. 
2 For discussion of nature as a resource, see: Michael Barratt Brown, Tony Emerson and Colin 
Stoneman, eds., Resources and the Environment: A Socialist Perspective (Nottingham, UK: Spokesman 
Books, 1976). Frederick Ferre and Peter Hartel, eds., Ethics and Environmental Policy: Theory Meets 
Practice (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1994). Garret Hardin, Living within Limits: 
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ecological protest and ecological science are also distorted insofar as they reproduce 
cultural assumptions and models of knowing, even while attempting to address 
ecological preservation and foster ecological knowledge. The outcome of such 
distortion is the failure to transform the patterns of human being and knowing that 
create the crisis.  
Part of the distortion is an incapacity, at the level of culture, to apprehend what the 
limitations of the modern nature of protest are and how these are linked to our 
knowledge and understanding of ‘ecology.’ The problem here is one not of degree but 
of kind. My proposition is that the type of knowledge accrued in late modernity cannot 
instigate change in relationship to place (at the level of culture) for the kind of 
knowledge accumulated is that which assumes and perpetuates ethical and existential 
distance from place. Opposition to environmental destruction based on such 
information, inevitably reproduces this ethical and existential distance and ecological 
consciousness further diminishes. The perpetuation of this distance in our forms of 
knowing is also part of the reason as to why, despite large realms of the public 
‘knowing’ about environmental destruction and the level of alarm this should raise, 
environmental protest, as a percentage of population, is not in fact very prevalent. 
The failure to understand such limits in turn clouds our perception of the crisis and 
perpetuates mistaken assumptions surrounding both descriptions of, and solutions to, 
the crisis. By unpacking and critiquing the idea of ecology as a fitting description of and 
solution to the crisis, I aim to reveal the deeper nature of the crisis and show both why 
and how neither environmental knowledge nor environmental protest have managed to 
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Part One – The Loss of Consciousness-in-Place 
Ecology as a Site of Change 
If ecological consciousness, as I propose, has over time not risen but fallen in 
proportion to the degradation of place this would suggest that the cultural pattern of 
knowing about and understanding place is not one that facilitates care and concern for 
place. I will argue that this is due to the fact that our current ways of being and ways of 
knowing fail to bear any inherent relationship to place; we exist, it would seem, in 
extrados. Where our ways of being and knowing are, or present as, (epistemologically) 
separate from place they do not offer an alternative to the ongoing destruction of place. 
Given that we name such destruction as ‘ecological’, what can an investigation into the 
changing meaning of ecology and the ‘ecological’ tell us about such capacity?  
In the naming of ‘ecological’ crisis and in the proffering of ecological fixes we neglect to 
consider what is meant and understood by the idea of ‘ecology.’ It is important to 
remember that language and specifically names bear cultural resonance, they both tell, 
and, in the telling, reinforce a story of culture. Ecology as a name is no different and the 
story it tells, if we mine deep enough, is one of change. Ecology has multiple meanings, 
ones which have morphed over time. What we name today as ecology refers to a current 
practise and way of investigating and understanding nature, where this nature is separate 
from the observer and the investigative community at large. This is something very 
different to what would have been so perceived and understood two hundred, five 
hundred or a thousand years ago. By extending our historical imagination and looking 
back in time we see that our current understanding of ecology and earlier mappings of 
the ecological, bear little resemblance. 
 
Ecology as Ontology to Ecology as Oeconomy 
For a vast part of our human history, to be human, was, to be in place. To know 
therefore was to know of place, a knowledge that came from and fed back into being in 
place. As Nabhan relates, being-in-place was the fundamental experience of child 
development for millions of years.3 This meant children [and adults] were ecologically 
                                                 
3 Gary Paul Nabhan and Stephen Trimble, The Geography of Childhood (Boston, MA: Beacon 
Press, 1994), 83.  
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literate about their home ground, knowing so well the “qualities of firewoods, the songs 
of birds, the identities of floral fragrances and mammalian musks,”4 and would express 
this kinship with the earth in songs and stories. The good and the right, what we today 
name as the ethical, emerged from these relations and the ways of knowing afforded by 
them. Shagbark Hickory and Vine Deloria both speak of the extent to which the natural 
world, was for the American Indians, a thoroughly moral world, within which one, as a 
participant, would find and understand the proper way to be human.5 Knowing as a 
property of relationship, included understanding of right and wrong relations. In this 
context, as Hughes observes: 
…primal people’s treatment of the natural environment showed care and was 
guided by attitudes that might today be called religious, but from the standpoint of 
their own cultures were simply an integral part of the whole pattern of life.6 
This pattern of person, place and creature as a co-evolving system formed the early 
sense of ecology. The form of knowing that emerged from such integration in reflecting 
this embededness meant that usually there was no singular term, such as ‘ecology’ or 
‘environment’, used to express this connection. Indeed this would hardly have made 
sense for one was embedded not in place as a category, certainly not in the 
‘environment’, but in particular places. Vine Deloria narrates the way in which the Plains 
Indians knowledge was circular, meaning there was: 
…no ultimate terms or constituents of their universe, only sets of relationships 
that sought to describe phenomena. No concept could stand alone in the way that 
time, space and matter once stood as absolute entities in Western science.7  
                                                 
4 Nabhan and Trimble, The Geography of Childhood, 90. It is interesting to contrast this with the 
parallel forms of knowing today- where the fragrances best known are synthetic and mass 
produced and the songs most easily identified are those sung by pop-stars about human love 
and loss, nearly always bearing little to no relation with the other-than-human world. Nabhan 
reflects on this change as identified in a 1992 survey taken of 52 Indian children who are mostly 
living on the land, not in or near urban centres, yet 52 percent of whom still listed media as their 
primary teacher about the environment, while 71 percent claimed they learned more about the 
environment from school, than anywhere else and only 9 percent claimed they were taught 
about the environment through lived experience or at home.  
5 Shagbark Hickory is the arborescent pseudonym of eco-philosopher Jim Cheney. Shagbark 
Hickory, “Environmental Etiquette/Environmental Practice: American Indian Challenges to 
Mainstream Environmental Ethics.” In The Company of Others: Essays in Celebration of Paul Shepard, 
edited by Max Oelschlaeger, 109-126 (Durango, CO: Kiuaki Press, 1995). Barbara Deloria, 
Kristen Foehner and Sam Scinta, eds., Spirit and Reason: The Vine Deloria, Jr., Reader (Golden, CO: 
Fulcrum Publishing, 1999). 
6 J. Donald Hughes, An Environmental History of the World: Humankind’s Changing Role in the 
Community of Life (London: Routledge, 2001), 21.  
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And we may add, neither could place have stood alone, in the way the environment now 
stands as a singular and defined object of scientific investigation. For this reason, 
belonging was expressed through a vast and detailed array of terms, of names and 
connections detailing a vast array of relationships. Echoing Deloria, Nabhan suggests 
that: 
… oral traditions about plants, animals, treacherous waters and complex 
topography depend upon special vocabularies that enact particularities which may 
not be recognised in the lexicon of commonly spoken and widespread language.8 
Expressing such particularity, the Plains Indians, had almost “limitless ways of 
describing snow, rain, wind or other natural phenomena,”9 reflecting the limitless 
potential for relationship with these phenomena. In such a setting ecology is not a 
science separate from geology, geography, biology, sociology and anthropology to name 
but a few investigations into knowing. Indeed the ‘biological knowledge’ of the 
Southwest Indians is embedded in stories, and these stories in turn are parts of 
innumerable other stories of which the Indian is an integral and inseparable part.10 
Ecology in such a setting is a relationship that speaks to and of place. More often than 
not, in indigenous culture, place does the speaking first and the self, as Mathews 
observes, “and hence the subject, is always already an emanation of land, of country, of 
world.”11 Ecology in this sense was the nature of being human as much as it was human 
being in nature. 
Obviously the transition from ecology as a mode of being to ecology as a mode of 
observation was a slow one that proceeded over millennia. In this procession ecological 
consciousness, I suggest, steadily declined as human embededness in place characteristic 
of hunter-gatherer populations shifted, giving way to a new distancing from place. This, 
while arguably abrupt at first,12 continued in incremental measures through antiquity and 
                                                                                                                                          
7 Deloria, Foehner and Scinta, eds., Spirit and Reason, 48. 
8 Nabhan and Trimble, The Geography of Childhood, 74. 
9 Deloria, Foehner and Scinta, eds., Spirit and Reason, 48. 
10 Leslie Silko, cited in Nabhan and Trimble, The Geography of Childhood, 84.  
11 Freya Mathews, Reinhabiting Reality: Toward a Recovery of Culture (Sydney, NSW: University of 
New South Wales Press, 2005), 103. 
12 Many theorists cite the Agricultural Revolution as the point of change. Yet they do so by 
emphasising the material changes this revolution brought about – changes in modes of food 
production, sedentary lifestyle, and forms of labour. Peter Bellwood, First Farmers: The Origins of 
Agricultural Societies (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 2005), Mark Nathan Cohen, The Food 
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medieval times, accelerating exponentially with the onset of modernity. Increasing 
detachment, Hughes suggests, was a result of an increase in ‘man’s’ (sic) abilities and a 
concomitant decrease in sensitivity to place: “finally a break with earlier thinking and 
doing occurred, which depended on environmental consciousness. It seems that at some 
time or other an ‘ecological sin-fall’ occurred.”13 While I disagree with Hughes’ 
speculation surrounding the cause of such detachment being a material one, it is clear 
that a defining moment was reached past which hunter and gatherer existence was no 
longer the primary mode of being in the world. After this, agrarian ways of life came to 
dominate. Nonetheless, for much of early antiquity and the medieval period, a relative 
proximity with nature persisted. This meant, that somewhat by default, ecological 
thinking continued as a form of being-in-world. Hughes writes that perception of the 
oneness of nature was apparent in early Greek society, even though, unsurprisingly, the 
term ‘ecology’ was not used to express this.14 Democritus, for example, wrote that 
“people learned to weave from spiders, to sing from songbirds, swans and nightingales,” 
for this reason he claimed that, “in the most important concerns we are the pupils of 
animals.”15 According to Hughes, belief in such connectivity was also expressed in 
Plato’s and the Pythagorean’s idea that the whole cosmos was alive, including all of its 
constituent parts, so one should not therefore hurt or disrespect any part, for to do so is 
to damage the whole.16 While nature continued to be a significant presence in everyday 
life this model of thinking and being in world largely continued, and according to Lewis, 
was the expected consequence of a life where, up to the end of the medieval period: 
…the percentage of the population who knew a great deal about certain animals 
must have been far larger … than in modern England. It could not have been 
otherwise in a society where everyone who could be was a horseman, hunter and 
                                                                                                                                          
Crisis in Prehistory: Overpopulation and the Origins of Agriculture (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1977), Jack R. Harlan, Crops and Man: Views on Agricultural Origins (Madison, WI: American 
Society of Agronomy, 1992). While the Agricultural Revolution is an important transition point, 
its significance in terms of my argument is the changes in modes of relating to place, and thus 
changes in human being and knowing, that its evolution signified.  
13 Hughes, An Environmental History of the World, 71. Hughes continues with the claim that the 
severity of current ecological conditions requires a return of environmental consciousness. He 
however suggests that this can be achieved through ‘intellectual reflection’ and ‘understanding 
the necessities.’ This is a position that is in stark opposition to my argument, to the extent that 
the kind of intellectual reflection available to the culture at large is one that reinforces the 
problem and the loss of ecological consciousness.  
14 Hughes, An Environmental History of the World, 54. 
15 Hughes, An Environmental History of the World, 16. 
16 Hughes, An Environmental History of the World, 55. 
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hawker, and everyone else a trapper, fisher, cowman, shepherd, swineherd, 
goosegirl, henwife, or beekeeper.17  
The ‘knowing’ of which Lewis speaks did not emerge from statistics or theory, but from 
experience of place, a place which was drenched in meaning, where “every word, action 
and thought had some impact on the world and in which every falling leaf or calling bird 
was a message to man.”18 At the same time, however, this period was also one that 
continued to produce a theologically sanctioned human separation from world and an 
incrementally increasing capacity to build that separation into the world.19 Over time 
people started to live more and more in urban centres and in such settings, as Hughes 
suggests, seemed to lose the ecological sense of the oneness of life, instead harbouring 
the belief that they could “change Earth for the better.”20 What such separation 
desensitized people to was the fate of other-than-human lives. Amidst a multitude of 
losses, this resulted in, hunters killing “the United Kingdom’s last native brown bear in 
the tenth century … [and] the last British beaver perish[ing],”21 by 1526. As such 
capacity for destruction advanced so did ecological consciousness steadily wane.22  
It was during the eighteenth century, as destruction of, and separation from, the other-
than-human world escalated alongside the dissolution of embededness as a cultural 
norm, that ecology emerged as a term to express the way in which things hang together. 
As Worster and Hughes suggest the term first came into popular vocabulary via the 
earlier expression, ‘oeconomy’, more specifically the ‘oeconomy of nature.’ In its earliest 
                                                 
17 Lewis, cited in Paul Shepard, Nature and Madness (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 
1997), 81. 
18 Shepard, Nature and Madness, 81-82. 
19 Shepard likewise argues that from the perspective of the Christian puritans from the sixteenth 
century on, the city had become an “arid pavement in which space was defined by human logic 
derived from celestial observation, a cultural nowhere that allowed the etherealised believers to 
disengage from paths across the earth and cults of the soil.” Shepard, Nature and Madness, 84. 
20 Hughes, An Environmental History of the World, 84. 
21 Hughes, An Environmental History of the World, 86.  
22 As Hughes writes of this time: “gazing down over the world from above in the Middle Ages, 
in AD 1300 perhaps, one … might have discerned changes since ancient times: swathes of 
forest removed; new machines being used, ploughing taking place faster over longer stretches of 
field … Built up areas were spreading, and with them, clearance, erosion and advancing desert. 
The Earth as a whole was, however, full of life in many thriving ecosystems. Parts of the 
continent were still covered with forests. Those places might have looked wild, but peoples had 
lived there for centuries or millennia and had learned to subsist within their local ecosystems. 
Elsewhere the rate at which humans were altering the face of the Earth was slow but 
accelerating…preparations for rapid modern changes were made in the Middle Ages.” Hughes, 
An Environmental History of the World, 83. 
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incantation oeconomy denoted one’s home, habitat, literally ones oikos, one’s house.23 It 
was used to account for the way in which all things hold together in the natural world to 
form a cohesive, dynamic whole. Worster writes that ecology: 
… emerged as a more comprehensive way of looking at the earth’s fabric of life; a 
point of view that sought to describe all of the living organisms of the earth as an 
interacting whole, often referred to as the ‘oeconomy of nature’.24  
Such oeconomy was at this point not a product of sheer chance, nor an outcome of 
natural evolution, rather it was granted in purposeful design by the benevolent creator 
whose omniscience afforded to life on earth a wondrous symphony. Thomas stresses 
this point of origin, writing that: 
The modern idea of the balance of nature … had a theological basis before it 
gained a scientific one. It was belief in the perfection of God’s design which 
preceded and underpinned the concept of the ecological chain, any link of which it 
would be dangerous to remove. In the eighteenth century most scientists and 
theologians accordingly maintained that all created species had a necessary part to 
play in the oeconomy of nature.25 
The oeconomy of nature thus reflects a way of thinking about human-nature relations 
and inter-human relations that is informed by a sense of collective purpose and a 
(theological) sense of the good. In this way it could present as a model for human life 
and society. Accordingly, a good and balanced society would present as one in which 
the needs of all were met and no one population significantly diminished or eradicated 
the other. Such a homeful and peaceful union of person, place and religious order was 
perhaps best historically represented and symbolised by the figure of Gilbert White in 
his native Selborne. 
 
At the Threshold of Change 
Gilbert White (1720-1793) was the pastor of Selborne, a rural village in southeast 
England, and was, according to Worster, one of England’s original naturalists. His 
musings were written in letter form and later transcribed into a book The Natural History 
and Antiquities of Selborne. The book, Worster observes, was instrumental in laying “the 
                                                 
23 Donald Worster, Nature’s Economy (San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books, 1977), 37. 
24 Worster, Nature’s Economy, viii. 
25 Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England, 1500-1800 (London: 
Allen Lane, 1983), 278. 
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foundations for the natural history essay in England and America. It was also one point 
of origin … for the modern study of ecology.”26 White not only discussed the habits and 
patterns of the creatures and critters within his local habitat, preferring to identify these 
by living observations and interactions as distinct from the otherwise popular creation 
and dissection of cadavers, but was also an active conservationist observing the laws 
relating to the burning of forests and making note of when these were contravened. He 
was one of the first naturalists to trace in personal and public terms the intersection of 
the community of ‘nature’ with that of the community of ‘humans.’ 
White’s mode of world observation and placement, fashioned before oeconomy became 
ecology, was that of the citizen scientist, – a person of the village, the parish, and the 
land who brought daily observations to public light and testimony in tracing the 
movements of his community where that community was distinctively more-than-
human. In his daily meanderings and recollections, White always seemed to hold the 
consciousness that rather than standing outside of the living synthesis, he is indeed part 
of it. In this respect he encapsulated what Worster describes as an Arcadian sensibility.27 
By this, Worster alludes to the ideal of oneness, contentment and peace with the natural 
world that characterised early pastoral life and pagan culture.  For the pastoral goal, as 
Meeker too suggests, has “always been to find in rural nature an alternative to the ills of 
civilization”28 (italics added). Virgil’s writings in particular, he suggests, articulate the 
oppression of city life and the contrasting comforts of [rural] nature. This Arcadian 
temperament was revealed both by White’s parish habits and practises and by his 
marked disinterest in life and events outside the perimeters of his precinct, even those as 
consequential as the political unrest which would give way to the French Revolution. 
That White remained relatively oblivious to the social and political turmoil unravelling in 
France towards the end of his life,29 was undisturbed by the upheavals in his own 
country in response both to the American cry for independence and the technological 
age which was swiftly and irrevocably dawning in England, and that he rather remained 
absorbed and preoccupied by the activities and changes taking place in his parish 
                                                 
26 Worster, Nature’s Economy, 5. 
27 Worster, Nature’s Economy, 3-26. 
28 Joseph W. Meeker, The Comedy of Survival (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1997), 52. 
29 Worster, Nature’s Economy, 11-12. Worster here charts the disinterest White has in these 
events, but cites it as something of a limitation on White’s part. To the contrary however I 
interpret this omission as evidence of the extent of White’s embededness in and commitment to 
his own particular place. 
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indicates that epistemology, ontology and ecology remained to a significant extent 
integrated in his person. Or put more simply, here was a person still resolutely in place.  
As such, it would have made little sense to White to react to, be informed by, take a 
stance on, or have feelings and concerns regarding that which was outside of his place 
and thus fundamentally unknown to him in his integrated, ‘oeconomical’, sense of what it 
is to know. The permutations of drama and disaster some thousand miles away had little 
impact on the swifts, woodpigeons, meadow flies and clover which framed his life. It 
had no relevance to White’s role as pastor, as naturalist, as a community member of 
Selborne. It did not bear any relation to his conversation of the good – or thus the bad. 
This was not provincialism but membership. That in later times yearning for this kind of 
belonging is considered, naive, idealistic or delusional by the rationalists and those who 
advocate for the idea of ‘progress’, and as Worster writes, that it is only, “in a more 
modern consciousness [that such reconciliations could] seem superficial, false or 
impossible,”30 indicates the degree to which we have clearly and deeply forgotten that to 
be human, is to be a person in place. 
The cultural significance of White lies in the point he inhabits on the eve of a critical 
cultural shift and thus the light, his way of life shed, on the cultural transformation that 
took place thereafter. The dissolution of White’s way of life, as a cultural practise, 
symbolized not only the ending of a sympathetic unity of person, purpose and place but 
also that historical juncture where there was a significant shift in ecological 
consciousness and the accompanying sense of what it is to be human. In his person, his 
parish and his practice, White reflected a living symbiosis of ecology, ontology and 
epistemology. He became a symbol of a time, a place and a union that would, through 
the ongoing culmination and consolidation of cultural patterns, henceforth be 
splintered. More significantly still, with the consequence of such splintering would come 
the demise of symbiosis as an ideological possibility, at the level of culture. What I mean 
by this is that while such a view could, in the future, be ‘chosen’ by the individual it 
would cease to be available as a way of being and knowing at the broad and inclusive 
level of culture. As a consequence, the individuals attempting to live in this way would 
be separated from the mainstream, and in such separation would be rendered largely 
ineffectual as a socio-cultural alternative or model for change.  
                                                 
30 Worster, Nature’s Economy, 11. 
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As oeconomy as a mode of both knowing of, and being in, place became ecology as a 
form of knowing-of-place, and as intimately known places morphed into the 
environment, villages like Selborne became in the cultural imagination, a ready antidote 
to the new ‘habitus’ being created by Enlightenment fervour and industrial zeal. The 
attraction of White’s writings and of Selborne for many of his contemporaries and the 
succeeding generation(s) was the idyllic contrast it offered to a rapidly industrialising 
England with all the social, aesthetic and environmental ills that such industrialisation 
presented. Crowded, dirty, noisy, septic and harrowing urban spaces soon obliterated 
the horizons of eighteenth century pastoral life. The values afforded by the Arcadian 
model, those of habitation, symbiosis and intimacy, provided a moral and spiritual 
refuge from the competitive, isolating and alienating space of a new world order. This 
was a time when longing for ideals of rural peace and harmony ran high. As Thomas 
observes, where: 
…factories multiplied, the nostalgia of the town dweller was reflected in his little 
bit of garden, his pets … his taste for wildflowers and bird watching and his dream 
of a weekend cottage in the country.31 
In this respect, Selborne became a point of yearning and imagination, a (still) “living 
memory of a world that had been lost.”32 So for up to fifty years after his death, White 
and his Selborne remained in the cultural baseline of what it was to be human and what 
it was to be in place. Yet, in the ensuing century, Selborne ceased to be this alternative 
and ceased to be a place either ‘protected’ or ‘yearned’ for. People did not rally or 
petition for the likes of Selborne, it was neither an ecological priority nor an ecological 
issue. It was home still, to a community of creatures, but for itself it was redundant. For 
the sense of what it was to be human had shifted and it was now culturally 
demonstrated and subliminally understood that such places were not home. Indeed, in 
the wake of industrial and technological revolution the sense of the natural world as 
home began to exponentially dissolve. At this time, the natural world was not only 
increasingly ‘unknown’ at the level of culture it was also increasingly contaminated. 
                                                 
31 Thomas, Man and the Natural World, 14. Likewise, Meeker observes the way in which the 
“pastoral flourishes in times of urban crisis … [where] agriculture becomes symbolic of both 
structural integrity and moral innocence.” Meeker, The Comedy of Survival, 54-55. However 
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The Comedy of Survival, 57. 
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Outdoor air pollution, a direct consequence of city life,33 increased smog and smoke to 
such an extent that the outside was not habitus, it was the inside of buildings that 
became the refuge against a toxic environment. This toxicity also included water 
pollution that likewise resulted from industrialisation and urbanisation.34  
During these times, even those who continued to work the land were not immune from 
the drivers of industry and the way in which such forces intensified separation from 
place. As McGrayne illustrates, in charting the rise and use of chemical compounds in 
late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century Europe, the search for cheap and 
prodigious amounts of alkali to use for washing sodas and soap meant that “more and 
more trees and plants were burned in Western Europe and North America,”35 whilst 
peasants in England, Scotland, Ireland, Norway, the Orkney Isles and Hebrides, 
abandoned their farms and herds for months at a time to collect and dry seaweed that 
instead of using to manure their land they would sell to chemists and industrialists for 
soap making purposes.36 One such was the late eighteenth century French chemist, 
Nicholas Leblanc, who found a chemical alternative to the diminishing sources of 
naturally occurring alkali. Yet as McGrayne makes clear, this posed yet another threat to 
the outdoors as a habitable and homeful terrain: 
For each ton of washing soda made, three quarters of a ton of intensely acidic 
hydrogen chloride gas spewed into the air. Raining down as hydrochloric acid, it 
turned trees and hedges into gaunt skeletons and poisoned farmland… As 
hydrochloric acid poured into waterways, it combined with sulphur to make 
hydrogen sulfide gas, spreading a rotten egg smell for miles round.37 
                                                 
33 John R. McNeill, Something New Under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth Century 
World (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001), 55. 
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It is, I suggest, not an accident that this increased capacity for, and practise of, cleaning 
the home and self, intersected with an increased capacity for, and practise of, 
contaminating and destroying place. For, in this setting, home and self increasingly came 
to be understood as an internal space of contrivance, ingenuity and detail, a barricade 
and brace against the anonymity and competitive pulse of the industrial world. 38 Rather 
than belonging to the natural world, home and self, stood against its ‘threatening’ 
influence and its confronting mortal dimensions. In this context Selborne, as a home 
and place-based ideal, effectively disappeared from the ecological conversation and the 
ecological imagination. Emerging in this period was a new understanding and definition 
of the ecological and Selborne in being neither the wild, nor a novel epistemological 
object, did not fit this definition. Importantly ‘Nature’ in Selborne was not ‘other.’  
 
The Rise of Ecology as Science 
As Selborne disappeared as a point of remembrance, so did the oeconomy of nature, as 
the study of home, fall from the public vernacular, with the science of ecology – the 
study of creatures and places that were removed from home - taking its place. As a 
product and purveyor of the new science, ecology reflects the rise of science in the 
definition and determination of place.  
Ecology, as a term, was coined by the German Darwinian, Ernest Haeckel, in 1866. By 
this time, the preservation of place was not on the increase, to the contrary, the 
destruction of place and creatures was escalating. As Hughes observes; “human 
exploitation of the natural world increased on an unprecedented scale in the period 
between the last decade of the nineteenth century and the 1960s.”39 What we then see in 
the emergence of ecology as a new way of thinking about and relating to place is a new 
distance from place. This distance was in part geophysical as the domination of city life 
meant the intensifying utilisation and destruction of the countryside to serve the drivers 
of ‘progress’ and an increasing remoteness from and consequent disregard for the living 
other-than-human world: 
                                                 
38 Commenting on the conflation of ideas and modes of being, Weston observes that, 
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The city (London) and its inhabitants, particularly the poorest ones, were 
increasingly cut off from the countryside by the phenomenal spread of suburbs … 
in 1500 three quarters of the population lived in the countryside; by 1900 a similar 
proportion lived in towns and cities.40  
The distance also became, at the level of population, an epistemological one. For the 
more the person-place symbiosis is severed the more place ceases to be a point of 
subjectival relation and increasingly becomes a point of disinterest, or, one of objective 
analysis. The latter stance was that claimed by the modern scientist – ecologists and 
environmentalists amidst others – in the form of the expert ‘observer.’ Matthews 
illuminates this transition, observing that: 
…at the moment we ceased to be immersed in the subjectival field of the world, 
we began to ask ourselves what this world was. Indeed our capacity to ask this 
question, to seek to ‘know the world’ was henceforth regarded as the distinctive 
vocation of humanity … the presupposition of such knowing – the conversion of 
world into object, the confiscation of its subjectivity – was forgotten, relegated to 
unsayability.41 
So while ecology as an emerging discipline of the mid to late nineteenth century 
advanced systemic thinking, it was not the case that the person was seen as an authentic 
part of this system, rather the role of the human in this setting was to analyse and 
investigate this system. To admit oneself to the system would mean that the objective 
scientist, as defined by enlightenment methodology, would no longer be a workable 
proposition. This was accompanied, as Walter writes, by: 
…the secularization of ideas, the emancipation of science from moral values and 
the fashion of individualism [all of which] opened the door to a new conception of 
nature accentuating even more confidence in the unlimited potential of knowledge 
oriented towards the mastery of one’s environment.42 
The cultural assumption however, that ecology references and speaks to an idea of the 
whole, where that whole includes human being, evidences the inability, at the level of 
culture, to identify epistemological change and distortion, including the loss of 
ecological consciousness. For what we are actually referring to when speaking of 
ecology is a discourse that has emerged from and continues to reproduce, both in its 
                                                 
40 Hughes, An Environmental History of the World, 122-123. 
41 Mathews, Reinhabiting Reality, 107. 
42 Francois Walter, “The Evolution of Environmental Sensitivity 1750-1950.” In The Silent 
Countdown: Essays in European Environmental History, edited by Peter Brimblecombe and Christian 
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methodology (of the expert observer) and in its ideology (stemming from enlightenment 
science and fundamental cultural premises), the idea of the separation of the human 
from the other-than-human world.43 In such severance, and despite accruing 
‘knowledge’, ecological consciousness is not heightened but diminished. However, to 
assume that ecological thinking produced a new distance from the other-than-human 
world would be to shoot the messenger, it is rather that, the perpetuation of such 
distance produced – amidst other phenomena – ecological thinking. Here was the 
emergence therefore of a new epistemological space, a new ecological space, a new 
ethical space and a new carving of the self.  
 
Dis-integration of the Ethical 
While separation from place advanced with the rise of ecology as a science, it would be 
misrepresenting the systemic nature of these changes to imply that separation from 
place, at the level of culture, is the singular explanation for accelerated ecological 
destruction and diminished ecological consciousness. Accompanying and reproducing 
this separation was the rise of the epistemologically disenfranchised individual, and the 
concomitant dis-integration of the ethical. When ethical knowing was no longer 
integrated with or part of a wider knowing – whether this is early ecological knowing or 
later theological knowing – it soon became ‘object’, reified in rights discourse or 
reduced to a point of individual choice and preference. 
When, in the mid nineteenth century, the concept of ecology was first entering the 
public vernacular, Christianity was still the dominant metaphysical framework. While 
ecology brought with it the notion of an implicit order, this was not a direct affront to 
the notion of the explicit designer central to theological belief, rather the two managed 
to coalesce in an explanation that accounted for ‘natural’ design and an interventionist 
first and final act. This somewhat clumsy synthesis reveals the contradiction that sits at 
the heart of the splintering of ecology as a science or body of knowledge from ecology 
as a way of thinking and being. For theology, as a meaning making framework, could 
only incorporate ecology as a ‘theory’, insofar as it could be integrated within the sense 
of what it is to be a Christian and to know God. Yet the framework of Christian 
                                                 




knowing, ultimately rests on the anti-ecological belief that the human is not part of, but 
superior to, and separate from, the other-than-human world.44 This ontological 
framework that told of the ultimate ‘truth’ of separation, underwrote therefore the 
pursuit of knowledge and the forms this knowing could take. Ecology as a science (not a 
way of being-in-world) would then reflect and reinforce not connection with, but 
separation from, the other-than-human world. It is no surprise then that, consistent 
with the premise of separation, ecology as a science does not absorb and integrate in an 
ecological whole the other sciences. Rather, each is separate from the next, fracturing 
into hydrology, biology, entomology, geology, ornithology, zoology and palaeontology 
to name but a few, alongside the ‘human’ sciences such as psychology, sociology, 
anthropology, which are not integrated into the science of ecology. Likewise place is no 
longer known by multiple names signifying many relationships but is classified by one 
name signifying a point of separation – the space of the environment. In this context 
more ecological knowledge could not and has not changed human relations with the 
other-than-human world but rather functions to perpetuate the model of existing 
relations.  
However, while ecology emerged when Christianity persisted as the dominant 
epistemological model, over time this model was replaced. This was by the monoliths of 
Cartesian science, Lockean sociology and Newtonian physics, which were cloaking the 
world in a seamless rationality, endeavouring to rid it of all spirituality, mysticism and 
superstition.45 The cumulative and continuing effect of these intellectual forces was the 
perception, and construction, of an increasingly logical, mechanical, rational and 
disenchanted world, which as the laws of physics alone would suggest, pitted “atom 
against atom and individual against individual.”46 Indeed such laws, alongside the 
ideological shift brought forth by the French, and the earlier American, revolution, 
made available the crafting of the individual. From the collapse of the ancien regime and 
associated structures, the individual emerged as the subject of political discourse, chief 
amidst which was the revolutionary rights discourse. Crafted into a uniform entity 
                                                 
44 Bear in mind that the Gilbert White mode of knowing, was a fusion of ecology as a form of 
being in world with Christianity as a form of knowing the world and the self. It is the 
consequent splintering of this fusion that set the epistemological tone for ecology as a science 
and the separation of knowing from values. 
45 See Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution (San 
Francisco, CA: Harper and Row Publishers, 1980), 252. 
46 Worster, Nature’s Economy, 41. 
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(although less uniform than today’s single purpose ‘consumer’) the modern citizen came 
to assume certain inalienable rights. Hence, by virtue of becoming part of an abstract 
whole, the individual was removed from a specific centre – a specific community of 
belonging. What this late nineteenth century period of the West thus witnessed, was the 
recession of place, in both its geo-physical and community forms, as a site of 
epistemological and ethical navigation, alongside the emergence of the abstract 
individual as the site of social and political contestation. The rights-bearing individual 
emerged as the prize of modern life and the road by which all subsequent battles would 
be fought. This would have far-reaching implications not only for the environmental 
movement as an attempt at cultural transformation but also for the very shaping of that 
world by a new idea of the self. It was within this world that the ‘Creator’, as an 
explanatory force and presence, was becoming slowly redundant. At these historical 
crossroads, science, including ecological science, would come to not support but 
supplant an increasingly contested theism.47 
As Christian knowing was waning as a cultural form and being replaced by the search 
for ‘objective’ truth and understanding, as defined by enlightenment science, ethical 
knowing, at the level of culture was slowly being lost. The ostensibly value-free nature 
of knowing as pursued by enlightenment science meant that values and ethics no longer 
fitted the cultural definition of what it is to know (and what it is, thus, to be human). 
They became in short a source of cultural un-knowing. Values could still be discussed by 
the individual, but only as a matter of ‘opinion’ or ‘choice’, whose validity was only 
relative to the holder of that opinion or choice; they could not, either as individual 
opinions and choices nor as collections of these, be included as cultural knowledge. At 
the same time ‘rights’ came to take centre stage, not as a point of discussion and 
contestation, but as an object, a possession of the individual, individual acts and 
designated groups. While the number and membership of these groups expanded over 
                                                 
47 Indeed mirroring the domination of the modern ‘objective’, evidence based form of knowing, 
(where such evidence needs to be both material and materially, ‘objectively’, testable) the ‘test 
and consequent cultural validity’ of theism would soon depend, not on faith, but on material 
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time so that by the twentieth century they included women, homosexual communities, 
African-Americans, ‘life’, asylum, certain animals, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, in 
the opposite direction to the ‘free’ exchange of opinion, the absolute certainty and 
object-ive status that accompanied rights dispensation meant that discussion and debate 
surrounding relationship, to people and to place, was increasingly not had.  
This is not to devalue the many significant and important changes that transpired 
through the invocation of rights discourse, particularly for minority groups, but to draw 
attention to my claim that rights do not provide a source of ethical knowing at the level 
of culture – and therefore cannot be a source for cultural transformation. For like the 
dominant (objective) knowing, rights exist not as a value, subjectively informed – by 
relationship, connection, detail – but as an object,48 whose proof and validity is pre-
determined in the materiality of life itself. If I am alive, and am so, for instance, as a 
woman, as a child or an elder, I have certain rights. As an object of knowledge, they are 
not to be overturned, contested, held up to community scrutiny, challenged by other 
modes of (relational) knowing.49 They are subject to violation but not eradication.  
This has created the situation that Weston describes where: 
…we are too used to that easy division of labor that leaves ethics only the 
systematic tasks of ‘expressing’ a set of values that is already established, and 
abandons the originary questions to the social sciences. As a result ethics is 
incapacitated when it comes to dealing with values that are now entering the 
originary stage.50  
In this setting ‘the good’, like place, comes to bear only an incidental relationship to the 
nature of human being. Where, to be human, is to know of one’s separation from the 
other-than-human world, and where, such knowledge is unhinged from relationship to 
community and place, an ethics based on rights, in also existing independently from 
relationship, is not connected to any sense of the good. Knowing becomes its own end, 
a cultural pursuit that ultimately turns the world, (and as we will see in Chapter Four, 
                                                 
48 A similar point is made by Val Plumwood in her critique of rationality. Val Plumwood, 
Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London: Routledge, 1993). I pick up on her work in Chapter 
Three’s discussion on Deep Ecology. 
49 I am not here suggesting that discussion surrounding rights per-se is not had. Clearly this is 
the case but it is nearly always only the case when an argument for a new right bearing entity is 
being had. Once the rights have been established it is not culturally plausible to then contest this 
status or to suggest that other kinds of relationship could trump or be more important than the 
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50 Weston, “Before Environmental Ethics,” 331. 
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ultimately the self) into object. The search for the good then is inner-directed and 
individually oriented while protection of and care of place as an expression of this, if it 
exists at all, does so only as an individual concern. 
If Clive Hamilton and Charles Taylor are right in their claims that to be a human self is 
to be a moral self, and that “to know who you are is to be oriented in moral space,”51 
then the cultural exploration of our humanity in the search for objective, value-free 
knowledge is a search that destroys our experiential, moral capacity to be, and to know 
what it is to be, human. Lost then, with the loss of the theological (and early ecological) 
framework, is the ethical as a source of knowing available to culture. This is not to 
suggest that the theological framework somehow guaranteed ‘good’ action, indeed 
history suggests otherwise. Whilst Hughes proposes that Christianity (like other religious 
faiths) acted as something of a safeguard against the unbridled destruction of nature, 
this arguably, is not so much because Christianity advanced protection of nature, indeed 
the contrary was often the case, but because the Christian framework meant that ethical 
reflection was a property of the whole. The wrong and the right, good and evil, in this 
setting were not purely subjective interpretations of any given event or action but were 
determined by the level of allegiance to or contravention from culturally agreed upon 
norms. As Hughes observes, when Cleomenes set fire to a sacred grove in Sparta and 
burned 5000 Argive soldiers to death, some people thought he was driven mad by the 
thought of divine punishment, because destroying a god’s forest was as much of a sin as 
killing men in refuge.52 In this setting, it was as equally wrong to wantonly destroy as it 
was punishable. Conversely, where the intrinsic and implicit relationship to the good 
                                                 
51 Clive Hamilton, Clive Hamilton; “Reclaiming Morality from Conservative Dogma and Post-Modern 
Indifference,” http://clivehamilton.com/reclaiming-morality-from-conservative-dogma-and-post-
modern-indifference/ (last modified August 12, 2008). Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The 
Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 28. It must be 
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relationship with the other-than-human world. Where this relationship is lost at the level of 
culture, so too is the possibility for the realisation of human being lost, to most of the selves 
that in-form this culture. 
52 J. Donald Hughes, What is Environmental History? (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2006), 5. 
Compare this with Thomas’s account of scientists reared in the Enlightenment tradition who he 
suggests studied the natural world in order that it could better serve human life. He reports 
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these insects, as we might thereby be enabled to find out the most certain method of destroying 
them.” Thomas, Man and the Natural World, 16. 
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(and the bad) that theology (or the early sense of ecology) provided is lost, the search 
for truth, for knowledge, is set free from ethical restraint, and indeed this very search 
becomes the driving force of human being – the ultimate non-contestable good.53 
Key to this transition, and the domination of the epistemological framework of 
enlightenment science, was the removal of the epistemological focus and power from 
the citizen to the expert. In the search for objectivity, the Gilbert White like navigation 
and epistemological authority of being-in-place was incrementally removed not only by 
the very destruction of place but by the destruction of the authority with which the 
citizen scientist and eventually the citizen per-se could speak of place and of experience. 
This, as Pepper writes, is a key message of Newtonian science: it tells us that “we are 
wrong and that what we think we see is unreal.”54 This departure of the citizen scientist 
as participant of the living system, in giving way to the expert scientist as observer and 
manager of the living system, heralded both the need for, and defined the limits of, 
environmental protest. Yet, as we will see, the emergence of the culture of protest in 
response to knowledge of wide-scale destruction, illuminates not the rise, but the loss, 
of ecological consciousness.  
 
Part Two – The Rise of Knowledge-of-Place 
    Stirrings of Dissent 
If, as I am suggesting, ecological consciousness emerges from close intimacy with, and 
embededness in, place at the level of community/culture, then a decline in relationship 
with place will mean a decline in ecological consciousness. Such decline will, one can 
expect, result in a relative lack of connection to and care for the wellbeing of local 
places and creatures. If we look back in time, with a lens that encompasses place, person 
                                                 
53 Skolimowski sees the separation of knowledge from values as a product of the scientific and 
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Henryk Skolimowski, Eco-philosophy (London: Marion Boyars, 1981). It is also for this reason, I 
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54 David Pepper, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism (London: Routledge, 1989), 47. 
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and relationship to place, we can see that as destruction of place has risen so the level of 
concern for place has consistently diminished. 
While it is often assumed that environmental protest is a phenomena that began in the 
middle of the twentieth century, a closer examination suggests that a smouldering 
environmental protest extends back to Ancient Greece with the early observation of and 
laments over human-induced ecological change, and a checking, even if moderate, of 
the ravaging impulses of human communities. As far back as 600 bce, Solon the 
lawgiver, proposed to ban the cultivation of steep slopes to prevent soil erosion. 
Peisistratus, in approximately 546 bce, also introduced a bounty for farmers who 
planted olive trees to offset deforestation and over grazing.55 In 431 bce, Herodotus, 
who according to Hughes was the first Greek historian whose work still survives, 
mapped the changing patterns of the Nile. His writings also narrate the fact that he was 
displeased by the number of changes in the natural environment, believing that, amidst 
other things, “massive works like bridges and canals demonstrated an over-reaching 
human pride.”56 Two centuries later, Plato lamented the ecological damage wrought on 
Attica: 
What now remains compared with what then existed is like the skeleton of a sick 
man, all the fat and soft earth having wasted away … There are some mountains 
which now have nothing but food for bees, but they had trees not long ago . . . and 
boundless pasturage. Moreover, it was enriched by the yearly rains from Zeus, 
which were not lost to it, as now.57  
Conservation, according to Hughes, was also key to Aristotle’s idea of the ‘good city’. 
For this reason, Aristotle advocated that each city should instil ‘wardens of the 
country.’58 This mode of ecological consciousness continued over time in isolated and 
sometimes collective motions to stem the extravagances of humanism. According to 
Nash, the Romans thought nothing less than granting respect and rights to the Kingdom 
Animalium. In their order of things, the jus animalium was a collective realm where rights 
and respect were a natural extension of belonging to the kingdom of creation. While this 
notion was animal specific, Nash suggests that by association it bestowed a respect on 
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the whole of nature.59 Hughes likewise observes that the early Romans saw the 
landscape as the sacred space of the gods and would plant trees in order to please the 
gods.60 In the Christian medieval period, humans and nature continued to exist in 
intimate alliance, and this Pepper suggests fostered the idea of nature as having rights 
independent from the rights of ‘man’. Membership in the Great Chain of Being implied 
that each link in the chain was as valuable and important as the next.61 It is of 
significance that this is known by historians, despite the limitation of documents from 
this period. Furthermore, as Hughes notes, information about changes in the medieval 
period are more likely to come from local histories than general ones, as local histories 
were usually noted in the landscape of a single district and thus noted by the local, often 
illiterate, people.62 The survival of these histories is then, even more surprising, and 
testifies to their significance. Evidence of the intimacy of human and other than human 
relations during this time is also revealed through the contemporary cosmogony, rites 
and festivals, which as Merchant63 narrates were expressions of and instructive towards 
right relations with the other-than-human world.64  
Documentation of relations with and concern surrounding the other-than-human world 
continued in the seventeenth century. John Evelyn in his Discourse on Forest Trees opined 
that: 
This [old forest] devastation is now becoming so epidemical that unless some 
favourable expedient offer itself, and a way be seriously and speedily resolved 
upon, for a future store, one of the most glorious and considerable bulwarks of 
this nation, will, within a short time, be totally wanting to it.65 
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Indeed, according to Thomas, between 1770 and 1850 this concern with trees was 
common, as during this time it was believed that trees felt pain much like humans.66 
Such sentiment continued in the eighteenth century with Peter the Great voicing 
consternation at the damage being wrought on Russia’s lands and his introduction of 
laws on wildlife conservation, soil conservation, forest protection and over-fishing.67 
Likewise, Pierre Poivre, the French commissaire intendant of Mauritius in the mid-
eighteenth century, suggesting that wasting the assets of home and colonies was 
‘sacrilegious’ and placed the ‘land in servitude,’68 advocated for preservation and 
restoration of the landscape. Febvre, a French historian and geographer, (1878-1956) 
later concluded that, “civilised man directs his exploitation of the earth with a mastery 
which has ceased to astonish him, but which when we reflect on it for a moment is 
singularly disturbing.”69 
What these historical records suggest is a continuing current of ecological concern and a 
sustained measure of ecological consciousness. Against this, O’Neill contends that, prior 
to the ‘environmental movement’ of the 1960s, all environmental gestures were itinerant 
gestures, situation specific and consequently did not result in the range and networks of 
guidelines and policy characteristic of today. To this he adds that the co-ordinated 
response of Peter the Great was an exception to the broader norm: 
Environmental politics and policies, as such, began only in the 1960s. Prior to that, 
local, national, and (on a very limited scale) international laws and treaties regulated 
some aspects of pollution, land use, fishing and other issues…But all of this was 
uncoordinated – specific policies and laws for very specific instances.70 
Challenging this, I suggest that the picture is more complicated and that the more 
centralised production of policy and planning documents does not, as O’Neill implies, 
mean an increase in ecological consciousness. The important point is that the arc of 
consciousness and protest carves back in the long, if speckled, hand of time. And what 
is important about such protest is not simply that it existed but the nature of the 
ecological contexts within which it existed. These were contexts which, by today’s 
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standards, might well appear to be flourishing places far removed from human assault. 
Indeed in contemporary terms Plato’s ‘skeleton of a sick man’ would well be the picture of 
glowing ecological health, perhaps rated as one of the few remaining wilderness areas or 
bountiful regional settings, a much valued ecological corridor for remnant wildlife and 
lingering tufts of native vegetation. That, the noting and the lamenting of this change by 
leading public intellectuals and statesmen occurred during times when nature was 
relatively fecund, powerful and seemingly omni-present, and that the lament of the 
Ancient Greeks and subsequent cultural and community figures were recorded when the 
ability to produce, record and store written documents has little to no comparison with 
today’s production networks, and that such lament travelled through the ages on 
historical record, all seem to suggest that nature was not only of overwhelming 
ecological and agricultural significance during the vast sweep of history, but that nature, 
both in her panoramas and her details, may have functioned as much more than a 
picturesque backdrop, far more than a stage for ongoing human drama. We might 
surmise that for most of this time, nature was the measure and map of human being. 
Recognising the need to exercise caution in making such claims, I also stress, that it is 
equally important not to make anachronistic leaps and assume that what is now was 
always so.71 The changes which have led to nature being compromised, controlled and 
mechanised, a resource for human disposal, represent a relatively recent shift in what we 
consider to be ‘normal.’ 
 
Assault and Silence 
At the end of the twentieth century, big blocks of forest stood in only three places 
in the world: the Amazon and Orinoco basins of South America; across northern 
North America from Labrador to Alaska; across northern Eurasia, from Sweden to 
Sakhalin…. Of this monumental forest clearance, perhaps half took place in the 
twentieth century. Nearly half of this was cleared in the tropics between 1960 and 
1999.72 
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In 1900 there were about 150,000 to 250,000 blue whales in the Southern Ocean; 
in 1989 about 500. Of fin whales, a population of perhaps 750,000 in 1900 stood at 
70,000 by the time of the 1982 moratorium on whaling, and 20,000 by 1989. In 
previous centuries, whalers had depleted whaling grounds one after the other. In 
the twentieth century whalers found the mother lode of whales, and depleted it 
species by species.73  
If we compare the relative integrity of place in early antiquity through to late medieval 
times and the rise of distress that met with incursions on it, with the relentless siege and 
assault on place and its creatures in late modernity, it becomes apparent that past a 
historical threshold, while knowledge of such destruction has risen, the distress 
surrounding it has begun to fall. This fall is not due to lack of knowledge of assault, nor 
is it due to there not being a discourse of protest through which to speak. Rather it 
reflects a complex interplay of factors, the primary one being an accelerating loss of 
ecological consciousness and with this a loss of ecological care. 
I have suggested that the critical benchmark of ecological consciousness is the degree of 
intimacy a culture shares with place. This intimacy derives from living in close affiliation 
with the land whether this be through choice or historical circumstance. Indeed it is 
reasonably well known, as Blaschke argues, that “people of early epochs living within a 
natural landscape, automatically had a natural, naive, usually harmonious environmental 
consciousness”74 (italics added). Midgley concurs, arguing that nearly all ancient life 
patterns were ones of mixed communities, in which the other species were central and 
meaningful figures.75 For this reason, as Weston suggests, when humans historically said 
‘we’, they referred to the relationship between humans and other animals.76 Evidence of 
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this intimacy is found in most indigenous lore. The Hopi, for example, believed the 
whole universe to be “enhanced with the same breath, rocks, trees, grass, earth, all 
animals and human beings,”77 while Bill Neidjiie, elder of an Indigenous Australian clan, 
understood that “this tree same as me. This piece of ground he grow you.”78 Hughes 
writes that the early farmers of Neolithic times shared the respect felt by hunter-
gatherers for the wild animals and plants in their homeland “they honoured grain plant 
such as ‘Mother Corn’…a goddess who was regarded not just as the ‘spirit’ of grain, but 
also as identical with the plants themselves and their seed. Planting and harvest became 
the great festivals of the year.”79 And this we may note is not because early farmers 
shared the same cosmogony as hunter/gatherer populations, but because, like them, 
they lived in intimate relation with the overwhelming presence of other-than-human life. 
Indeed up to late medieval times, nature was a compelling, vivid and valued presence. 
As Berman writes: 
The view of nature which predominated in the West down to the eve of the 
Scientific Revolution was that of an enchanted world. Rocks, trees, rivers and 
clouds were all seen as wondrous, alive and human beings felt at home in this 
environment. The cosmos, in short, was a place of belonging.80 
Within such contexts, consciousness of change as it affects place follows from an 
embededness in place. If such change is of enough significance this inevitably changes a 
community’s relationship with place. The dissolution of human and other-than-human 
intimacy corrodes this feedback and thus corrodes ecological consciousness. Knowledge 
is, of course, pursued but being first and foremost an awareness and understanding of 
facts, theories, statistics and figures, this form of knowing is not that of one grounded in 
relationship to place. The mistaken assumption that ecological knowledge of this kind 
implies ecological consciousness, and that the wealth of such knowledge means the 
wealth of such consciousness, is made because we have in fact forgotten what it is to be 
in place. What we now take for consciousness is not so but we fail to comprehend this 
at the level of culture because what ecological consciousness amounts to has over time 
become distorted in order that it fits the new bias – the idea that objective knowledge 
replaces and transcends the forms of understanding and knowing that preceded it. 
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Where widespread awareness (of data or facts) is mistaken for ecological consciousness 
and where this knowing is not challenged by alternate forms of knowing, the search for 
ever more information continues making alternate knowing less and less available. This 
is exacerbated by the changes in the means of producing, storing and disseminating 
information. With changes emerging at first slowly with the arrival of Gutenberg’s 
printing press, with Luther nailing his 95 theses to the chapel door and Samuel Morse 
asking “What hath God wrought?,” the pace is now exponentially rapid. “The 
beginnings of the new world,” as Neil Roberts writes, “signified a time of “dramatic and 
accelerating change.”81 In recent times electronic technologies have morphed and 
multiplied knowledge distribution, populating, desks, laps, and palms worldwide. 
Alexander Bell’s simple contraption soon became the ubiquitous mobile, and television, 
vision at a distance, now increases that distance to near every possible corner of the 
earth while the initially sophisticated typewriter morphed into wildly formatting word 
packages and instantly linking nets. 
As a result, our social space is drenched in language that repackages such information, 
advocating sustainability, green living, animal rights, Earth First! Our world is one that 
advances and encourages innumerable conferences, summits, United Nation’s 
delegations on the environment. Yet, as Weston, writing now twenty two years ago, 
ironically and sadly observes, this is the world where “three dozen species have become 
extinct in the United States in the past decade just waiting for Endangered Species Act 
designation.”82  
In the first decades of the twenty-first century still more environmental statistics, reports 
and policies are being produced. More is known about, and written on, the increasingly 
fraught state of environmental degradation. But this does not give way to a deepening 
ecological consciousness. Indeed, as Pepper comments: 
…a study of the facts alone seems to lead nowhere. Scores of books have been 
written about these facts – of chronic imbalances in population/resource ratios, of 
ecologically damaging technology, of wasteful consumption patterns – such that 
substantial acreages of forest must have been consumed in the process. Yet one 
can legitimately argue that little change of a truly fundamental nature has been 
achieved by the environmental movement. The spread of detailed knowledge 
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about how man degrades and threatens his own planet has not of itself produced 
the likelihood of serious or permanent remedial action.83 
Testimony to this is not only the lack of distress and protest as far as the great majority 
of western populations are concerned but also analogously the lack of knowing and 
concern surrounding such changes as evidenced in daily practises of consumption and 
‘development’ that have ongoing devastating effects on place. While this does not imply 
that the current glut of information is without its uses, it suggests that to achieve change 
different ways of knowing and relating to the other-than-human world are needed. We 
also need a longer-term anthropological, sociological, philosophical and ecological study 
than that which has to date been available in the tracing of ecological consciousness. 
Key to any such endeavour is a consideration of what remains silenced in place, what 
remains untold, the stories of the serfs, peasants and fisher people who shared intimate, 
sometimes ravaging, sometimes bountiful, daily alliances with the land. And beyond this, 
the stories of the many Indigenous peoples whose kinship with place cannot be 
accurately expressed in the language that is at our disposal. Their relationship with place 
remains historically unchartered. Such stories perhaps contain the oldest seeds of 
modern day environmentalism. Seeds which long lost to the wind, buried beneath 
concrete, may have taken millennia to bear fruit.  
The paradox is that to dig for these seeds we need to know that such digging is required 
but to know this is to know that we are unaware of what we have lost. And to know of 
unknowing is a difficult task, it is to know that our cultural amnesia is fed by shifts in 
the baseline.  
 
The Shifting Baseline 
I have suggested that when considered from a long term historical perspective, 
environmental protest is shown to be not a novel phenomenon. I have also proposed 
that when the scale and scope of current destruction is taken into account, the protest 
of today is not particularly widespread by historical standards. Where it exists it does so, 
not as primarily a visceral response to place. Rather, modern environmental protest is by 
and large a response to a particular form of knowledge. This is knowledge that is not 
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grounded in relationship to place but is embedded in cultural narratives that tell stories 
of the self as separate from place.  
What is helpful in understanding this diminishing ecological consciousness and lack of 
awareness of change is a phenomena that Daniel Pauly refers to as the shifting baseline 
syndrome. In essence the shifting baseline syndrome explains the way in which beliefs 
and perceptions can come to be informed by a distorted idea of the normal. This is not 
to suggest that an ultimate ‘normal’ and by association ‘good’ exists, but rather to draw 
attention to the fact that we anchor our beliefs and perceptions in shifting ground. 
Further this terrain has been shifting for a long time. If we fail to notice such shifts we 
will fail to establish a clear vision of cultural and ecological realities. Applying the 
shifting baseline syndrome to environmental protest and protection can help us to see 
that the framework and spaces we are in are something other than what we take them to 
be. Further, within this model there is a knock-on effect where each misrepresentation 
responds to and reinforces the next and thus reinforces the mindset, behaviours and the 
spaces that perpetuate crisis. 
Pauly first described the shifting baseline syndrome in 1995, in the postscript of a paper 
titled Anecdotes and the Shifting Baseline of Fisheries.84 There he describes the way the 
baseline of fisheries has shifted over time so as to inaccurately reflect the size and 
species composition of current fish stocks. As he reflects: 
Essentially, this syndrome has arisen because each generation of fisheries scientists 
accepts as a baseline the stock size and species composition that occurred at the 
beginning of their careers, and uses this to evaluate changes. When the next 
generation starts its career, the stocks have further declined, but it is the stocks at 
that time that serve as a new baseline. The result obviously is a gradual shift of the 
baseline, a gradual accommodation of the creeping disappearance of resource 
species, and inappropriate reference points for evaluating economic losses resulting 
from overfishing, or for identifying targets for rehabilitation measures.85 
This inaccuracy, Pauly observes, is created, or partly created, by a lack of attention paid 
to historical, anecdotal data. Given the historical recency of the scientific method and 
the printing press it is safe to assume that most long-term historical data is in fact 
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anecdotal, as is much of today’s non-recorded data.86 Pauly does not theorize as to why 
there is no attention paid to this type of evidence but I assume that it is because such 
anecdotal data does not fit into the current scientific paradigm and corresponding 
definition of what data actually is, this itself reflecting a baseline shift in the cultural 
legitimacy of knowledge. This broad dismissal of anecdotal evidence is accompanied by 
a particular disinterest in the long hand of time and the epistemological implications of 
such assessment for ecological ‘health’ today. Such dismissal suggests that in any given 
historical analysis seminal epistemological and ecological difference either did not exist 
or if it did it is irrelevant to the case at hand as it existed alongside so many other 
differences so as to make its analysis redundant. 
Pauly concludes that “frameworks that maximize the use of fisheries history would help 
us to understand and to overcome – in part at least – the shifting baselines syndrome, 
and hence to evaluate the true social and ecological costs of fisheries.”87 Even more 
fundamentally, what the shifting baseline syndrome reveals is that we have little 
awareness of how unhelpful the current ecological ‘norm’ is as an indicator of ecological 
‘health’ or stability, given that it is based on a short term perception while lasting 
ecological changes are produced over the historical long term. Likewise we have little 
understanding of how our current epistemological norm suppresses other ways of 
knowing that may be seminal to ecological and epistemological change. My suggestion is 
that Pauly’s principle, while first utilised for ecological checkpoints, translates to the 
naming of a range of cultural amnesias and on a more fundamental level speaks to the 
way in which the separation of ways of knowing and being from embededness in, and 
relationship to place, remains all but completely undetected in our cultural psyche. It is 
for this reason that the Gilbert White mode of being in place, as cited earlier, while once 
considered the norm is now seen as an idealistic and irrational alternative. Indeed it 
could be argued that the baseline has shifted to the point of near dissolution and as such 
the possibility that we live in a distorted manner in a distorted world is not available to 
our consciousness. Where questions of distortion and dysfunction are raised they are 
done in a way that cites the cause as material and the distortion as discrete. What is the 
subject of protest/discord is not the culture itself but singular acts within this culture. 
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Consequently questions about the fundamental severance of person and community 
from place, questions regarding the nature and respons-ability in human being, are the 
very questions that do not get asked. These are the ‘magnificent’ questions that 
Hamilton suggests humans have always asked and, as I will later discuss, these are the 
questions that now, due to their purely discursive and thus meaningless form, are almost 
unaskable: 
What is the nature of our Being? Why should we behave morally? Are we saved or 
condemned by our rationality? They are in truth the oldest questions, the ones that 
in every epoch press themselves forward. Yet in our era they have been ruled 
invalid …have been expelled from public discourse, so that to even pose them 
today invites ridicule.88 
Returning to the more immediate discussion of ecological destruction we can see 
through the shifting baseline model not only how destruction has become the norm but 
also how environmental protest and the science of ecology are ineffective in its redress, 
married as they are to their own shifting baselines of what it is to be a self, what it is to 
know and what it is to be in place.  
We will now turn to the next chapter in this history, that of the Romantics, who, in their 
attempts to define and defend wild nature, inadvertently perpetuated the existential, 
epistemological and ethical distance that later environmentalists would inhabit.  
 
 
                                                 













It has thus far been argued that by the time ecology emerged as a science, separation 
from the other than human world had already become the norm. At the threshold of 
this change was the pastor/naturalist Gilbert White. For White, theological and place-
bound sympathies were united. However, post-White, ecology would transform, on the 
one hand, into a science aiming to control, manage and fashion to its own ends the 
‘resources’ of nature and, on the other, into a movement setting out to protest such 
control and reduction. This splintering, like most fractures, was not clean-cut and each 
half contained within it the seeds and the sentiments of the union from which it had 
burst forth. Thus the Romanticism that beckoned from the Arcadian impulse 
characterised in Gilbert White, while advocating unity with and sympathy for the natural 
world, was at the same time a child of the enlightenment that depended on and 
promulgated some of the core values of enlightenment thought, values which promoted 
and engendered separation and division.1 It is this working contradiction that forms part 
of the explanation as to why the environment movement born from this soil fails to 
produce real change. 
A key element of the environmental protest movement is, of course, the individual and 
his/her capacity to protest. The new found individualism supported by the logic of 
enlightenment thinking came to fruition in the French Revolution, a revolution that 
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overthrew centuries of hierarchical, externally ordained oppression and welcomed in 
with both passion and terror the reign of the ‘people’, or perhaps more precisely the 
person, the citizen, the individual and the collection of these that became the ‘nation.’ 
The core values, that the revolution championed as ‘rights’ of such individuals, were 
those of liberty, equality and fraternity, with significant emphasis on the individual’s will 
and right to self-expression in all its forms.  
It is easy to forget that this was not always so, given that the self is now the axis of all 
endeavour, meaning and purpose and we live immersed in a culture that promotes 
obsessive preoccupation with the self. Yet when the Romantics retreated into and rallied 
for the self as an ethical and epistemological authority, the celebration of the self was a 
novel and largely unprecedented phenomena. The new centrality of the self was moved 
along by the influence of other social changes, including the fragmentations articulated 
by Enlightenment science, the rise of industry and capitalism and the Protestant 
Reformation’s challenge to the spiritual authority claimed by church leaders. In this 
respect the Romantics were part of the changes they resisted. However at the same time 
they stood against them. For a key focus of these cultural transitions was the emergence 
of a culture dominated by the claims of rational and de-personalised thought, a rejection 
of personal feelings and subjective ‘knowing.’ Opposing this was the Romantics’ self-
claimed-self, as the seat of meaning and value. In this they made a significant and 
important deviation from the new world order replete with its reason-driven quest for 
mastery and control over all spheres, including that of individual emotions and 
sentiment. The Romantics then, in some respects, stood alone literally and 
metaphorically on the shores of an increasingly mechanized and alienating culture.  
However the limitation of this celebrated, individual self is that s/he is an entity that is 
by definition separate from all that is not-self. As a result, and despite the best of 
intentions, the very advance of this self, promotes the dominant culture that casts 
human being outside of other-than-human relations and ultimately, as a consequence of 
this logic, outside of inter-human relations. The division that characterised the Romantic 
Movement was one therefore where the individual became increasingly separated from 
place, from community, from certain aspects of society and the very sense of belonging 
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to the other-than-human world. In so doing Romanticism helped produce and promote 
the ‘cult of the self.’2  
 
Marking the Baseline of the Self 
In making a radical break with the Gilbert White model of community as inclusive of 
human and other-than-human life, this new delineation of, and focus on, the self, 
fractured the bonds of community as found in place. Further, it implied, in the process, 
that knowledge is not to be found through relationship with community and place 
(including knowledge of the good) but is instead sourced in individual reflection/study 
and research. In the Romantic interpretation, this produced a self that was in ethical and 
epistemological dialogue, not with others, but solely with her own inner demons and 
desires. For the Romantics, this was a seminal development, since the Romantic journey 
in its existential depths of agony and ecstasy was a resolutely solitary one. Indeed the 
soulful, deeply introspective and unique journey of each individual was an ideal the 
Romantic model depended upon. It was the “uninhibited expression of man’s (sic) own 
individuality” which according to Diderot, allowed for self-realization, a key Romantic 
goal.3 
In carving out this niche, the Romantic individual looked not to what was rule bound 
and principle driven, the world of reason and rationality, but to the world of the 
imagination and the emotions. Disenchanted with the domination of a mechanized and 
excessively cerebral rationality, and equally disenchanted with the Revolution’s failure to 
deliver the liberty, equality and fraternity it espoused, the Romantics found in the 
passionate, fluid, turbulent and fermenting world of emotions an alternative aesthetic, 
ethical and epistemological source. This short historical renaissance gave the emotions 
and the imagination a long awaited epistemological authority. As Schenz writes, during 
this period, the “battle against reason, the prime enchantress, was fought all over 
Europe,”4 at the same time, the leading Polish Romantic Mickiewicz, declared that 
feeling and faith had more appeal for him than the eye and the magnifying glass of the 
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wise man.5 Coleridge likewise testified that deep thinking was attainable only by 
someone of deep feeling.6 One of the key contexts through which the individual 
accessed communion with the soul’s truth and found exposure to, what was often seen 
as the external geography of extreme emotional experience, was through the mysterious, 
terror laden, awe-inspiring and atmospherically potent  idea and ideal of the Wild. In 
this way the Romantics fostered alongside the cult of the self a ‘cult of nature’7 as a 
source of self-realization and a welcome alternative to the dehumanising and 
machinating forces of eighteenth and nineteenth century industrialism. The squalor, 
noise, grime, ugliness, and patterns of repetitive soulless predictability found in urban 
industrial life was all that the Romantic spirit abhorred and rallied against. Not only was 
this terrain and the civilization which it was home to, stifling, ugly and oppressive it was 
also considered a vortex of moral and spiritual contamination. Maurice Cranston 
examines the way in which this dichotomy unravelled in the Romantic imagination and 
literature, observing that “Blake’s two sets of songs illustrate a theme which was central 
to [his and] Rousseau’s thinking, the contrast between the goodness of nature and the 
corruption of civilisation.”8  
Yet this contrast was not one between a debauched culture and an ethically instructive 
and informative nature. The ‘goodness’ of nature was not a utilitarian nor what we 
would perhaps understand as an ethical goodness, rather it was purely symbolic. As 
such, it was not a source of ethical instruction or guidance, all ethical detail of this kind 
had to be unwrapped in the self. The contrast then for the Romantics was one between 
a culture that had lost its ‘ground of value’9 – a convincing meaning-making framework 
that orientated one to the good - and the presence of nature as a symbol of purity, 
sanctity and ultimate truth. Nature was seen as a source of the absolute in a culture that 
had lost, through the moral, social and spiritual failures of the Enlightenment, the 
French Revolution and Christianity, the claim to the absolute. As Peckham explains, 
what the Enlightenment promulgated was the idea that the right and the good were, like 
the workings of nature, objects of knowledge that would become the more apparent the 
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more the ‘secrets’ of nature were known and were harnessed to human ends. The 
Enlightenment promise and project therefore was to reveal the complete workings and 
order of the world and in so doing restore, value, harmony, peace and meaning to 
society. The violent failure of the ethical and social dimensions of this project were 
dramatically revealed in the French Revolution, a revolution that in promising liberty, 
equality and fraternity ultimately produced tyranny, oppression and bloodshed. What 
this failure made apparent is that there was a lack of symmetry between an 
understanding of the order of nature and the value and purpose that was thought to 
constitute human life and human knowledge. Uncovering the order of nature therefore 
could not and did not result in a revelation of social and moral order, peace and 
harmony, but to the contrary such uncovering hence gave way to unprecedented, violent 
conflict. This produced, in the Romantics, a spiritual alienation from what was seen as a 
disturbing and chaotic civilisation, one that could not be a model for a good and 
meaningful life.10 The initial response to this, Peckham argues, was negative 
Romanticism, an initial, bleak form of Romanticism that saw the world, nature and man 
as devoid of value. However, as Peckham notes, this could not be psychologically 
sustained without reverting to pre-enlightenment explanations or turning a blind eye to 
Enlightenment failings. Subsequently, the Romantics turned to the self as the source of 
all meaning, purpose and value. To access this purpose and value however one needed 
to secede from the corrupt, clouding and disorientating effect of ‘civilisation’ and seek 
clarity, insight and inspiration from the truth and thus ‘goodness’ of nature. Hence 
nature, in remaining ‘other’ both to culture and to this cultural failure, became for the 
Romantics a spiritual alternative, one that enabled access to the noumenal that was both 
within and beyond the self.  
 
Wilderness as ‘Other’ 
This nature for the Romantics was the wild or the wilderness, the antithesis of 
civilization and an object of reverential and religious focus. Rousseau, an early 
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Romantic, in having what Cranston describes as ‘the temperament of a worshipper,’ 
displayed this, given that he worshipped that “which was to take the place of God for 
many later Romantics, and which he himself identified with God, namely nature, – 
nature in those forms least touched by the hand of man, high mountains and deep 
forests and windswept lakes.”11 
However, in this regard, the Romantics were not in fact novel for, as Nash reminds us,12 
ideas of the wild and the wilderness have been perpetuated throughout the history of 
western civilisation. These ideas have always been imbued with mythic, moral and 
symbolic significance, alternating between casting the wild as an object of fear, terror 
and repulsion or, to the contrary, one of purity, sanctity and awe. In Wilderness and the 
American Mind, an astute historical analysis of the story of wilderness since the 
approximate beginnings of western civilisation, Nash describes the way in which 
wilderness has been shaped according to the changing geographical, theological and 
epistemological forces that have dominated at any given time. In so doing he elucidates 
the way in which notions of the ‘wild’ or the ‘wilderness’ have always been indicative of 
a set of feelings and attitudes as much as they have gestured towards actual geographical 
places. Indeed in the infancy of western civilisation the wild spoke more of a feeling – 
one of fear and horror – than it did of a discrete place. This is in part due to the fact 
that the formative idea of the wilderness referred not so much to the material space we 
today define as wilderness: “A large area of unmodified or slightly modified land, and/or sea 
retaining its natural character and influence, without permanent or significant habitation, which is 
protected and managed so as to preserve its natural condition,”13 as to a reckless and powerful 
nature and the will of an avenging or rewarding God. Nash, in describing the early 
Hebraic conception of the wilderness, observes that “an unusually dry season would 
wither crops and turn arable land to desert. In these circumstances men naturally hated 
and feared the wilderness.”14 Here wilderness is a hostile condition which climatically 
descended on what was formerly an inhabitable and thus friendly land. Rather than 
referring to a specific place it was in this sense primarily adjectival, describing a 
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wasteland, a dry, inhospitable region, a familiar yet mercenary place made unliveable by a 
“curse dispensed by the divine power in order to show his displeasure.”15 
Wilderness in these early renderings thus took the form of a capricious and powerful 
Nature holding a vulnerable human fate in her unpredictable hands. The explanation 
that gave sense to such benighted conditions and what was perceived as a humanly ill-
fitted circumstance was the wisdom of an all-powerful deity exercising ‘His’ will through 
nature’s extremes. This was not, consequently, a nature to be loved but one to be feared. 
It was a place that offered little mortal comfort. While the wilderness as ‘threatening 
other’ incrementally became the modern, geographically remote and/or liminal place, in 
either case – whether describing a place where human life cannot flourish or is not 
flourishing – it is a place that is decidedly not, now or ever, the home of human being.  
This sentiment reached its apotheosis in medieval Europe, merging as it did with the 
superstitious and enchanted temper of the time.16 Yet what is most illuminating about 
the medieval conception of the wild is not that it was populated with goblins, trolls, 
elves and warlocks and still ‘wilder creatures of the imagination,’ but the nature of the 
ethical and spiritual threat that the wilderness held for human being. The wilderness was 
a place where one needed to maintain not only physical but spiritual and moral distance 
from its unknown dangers and devils. While at times this mything was interspersed by 
representations of the wilderness as a monkish source of spiritual catharsis this did not 
override the dominant sentiment that wilderness, far from being a spiritual sanctuary, 
was a place of ethical and spiritual corruption, threatening to appropriate, distort and 
deform one’s very humanity. This was due to the fact that in the medieval imagination 
the wilderness was a patently Godless terrain.17 In presenting nothing that approximated 
a Christian sense of order, value and understanding, the wilderness was disconnected 
from the human. Insofar as this was the case and insofar as God’s way was the path to 
the true and the good the wilderness was a demonstrably corrupting territory. Such 
perceptions took ethical knowing further and further from relationship with place and 
repositioned the ethical and spiritual centre more resolutely in specific human 
community, and eventually, singularly in the self.  
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In the forsaken ground of the wilderness, ‘man’ could be returned, it was believed, to 
the state of the ‘savage’, barbarous and without bounds.18 The medieval wilderness 
apprehension was in this regard driven not so much by concerns over ferocious bears, 
wolves and serpents as with the spectre of those distorted beasts that had appropriated 
something of the human. Nash notes that “many of the medieval European monsters 
were lineal descendants of the man-beasts of classical mythology,” including …“Pan, 
the lord of the woods …pictured as having the legs, ears and tail of a goat and the body 
of a man” as well as “the tribe of satyrs – goat-men of a demoniacal character devoted 
to wine, dancing and lust” who appeared “only at night and then solely in the darkest 
parts of the forest …ravished women and carried off children who ventured into their 
wilderness lairs” and Sileni and centaurs monsters who had “the torso and head of a 
man and the body, legs and tail of a horse.” 19 Expanding on this, he observes that: 
…the most important imaginary denizen of the wildernesses of medieval Europe 
was the semi-human Wild Man. His naked figure, covered completely with thick 
hair, appeared widely in the art, literature and drama of the period … According to 
folk tradition the Wild Man lived in the heart of the forest as far as possible from 
civilization. He was regarded as a kind of ogre who devoured children and ravished 
maidens.20 
He also had a mate whose character: 
…varied from place to place … In the Austrian Tyrol and Bavarian Alps, the Wild 
Woman was imagined to have enormous size, pendulous breasts, and a hideous 
mouth that stretched from ear to ear … Her principle offense was stealing human 
babies and leaving her own offspring in their place.21  
All this suggests that the ‘wild’ and the home where the wild roamed, the wilderness, 
were states and places to be avoided, shunned and, if possible, eradicated. Equally 
embedded in this worldview is a choice between the ‘wild’ and the ‘civilised.’ A middle 
ground or synthesis is not possible, for in the fashion of the primordial forces of good 
versus evil one will win out. You can, as a human, be civilised or become beast, the 
‘wild-man’. Such a ‘man’ is recognisably human but only in a physical capacity and only 
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Demarcation of Civility,” Journal of the History of Ideas 56, no. 1 (1995): 25-39. 
19 Nash in this narrative also observes that “The word “panic” originated from the blinding fear 
that seized travellers upon hearing strange cries in the wilderness and assuming them to signify 
Pan’s approach.” Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 11. 
20 Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 11. 
21 Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 11-13. 
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insofar as such recognition serves as a warning of the dangers the wilderness holds. At 
no point is there any suggestion of a moral or spiritual kinship with the ‘wild-man’. As 
Bernheimer points out, wildness: 
…implied everything that eluded Christian norms and the established framework 
of Christian society, referring to what was uncanny, unruly, unpredictable, foreign, 
uncultured and uncultivated. It included the unfamiliar as well as the 
unintelligible.22  
This is why wilderness was often regarded with both physical and spiritual apprehension 
if not Pan-ic. One could not merge with the wilderness as the wild would always 
threaten to engulf the human and revert it to a primordial state, wilderness in this 
context, be it populated by goblins and warlocks or by tigers and wolves, is the opposite 
of civilisation, it is overwhelmingly all that civilisation is not. Being human and civilized 
meant being separate from and superior to nature’s chaos and perhaps more importantly 
it meant that one knew of this separation and superiority. To lose such knowing is to 
enter the wilderness.  
If one falls from grace into the underworld of the wilderness one loses the defining 
feature of one’s humanity. If, on the other hand, one conquers the wilderness, the 
victory is spiritual and moral. Conquest of wilderness becomes a conquest of the savage, 
the uncouth, chaotic and unpredictable. It is a championing of civilisation, its 
projections and values. Here, Cronon observes, is the ongoing danger in the cultural 
mapping of wilderness, for it does not release us from, but reinforces, cultural bias. 
While on a superficial level it is generally believed to be: 
…a pristine sanctuary where the last remnant of an untouched, endangered, but 
still transcendent nature can for at least a little while longer be encountered 
without the contaminating taint of civilization. […it is in fact a…] product of that 
civilization … we mistake ourselves when we suppose that wilderness can be the 
solution to our culture’s problematic relationship with the nonhuman world, for 
[the idea of] wilderness itself is no small part of the problem.23 
Wilderness through its ancient, medieval and subsequent Romantic incarnations is 
clearly a concept premised on distance, both geo-physical and conceptual, far from the 
familiar, the safe and predictable, far from what is known. When we consider the 
historical transition of the wilderness from the Hebraic version that Nash describes 
                                                 
22 Bernheimer, Wild Men in the Middle Ages, 20. 
23 William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature (New York: W. W. 
Norton and Company, 1996), 69-70. 
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where it is a place of physical death and decay subject to Yahweh’s command,24 to the 
medieval version where it is a patently Godless terrain and thus a place of ethical death 
and decay, the extent to which wilderness illuminates cultural fears, anxieties and 
projections becomes apparent. It is no accident that within these accounts the Hebraic 
wilderness, the desert, is a land where ‘man’ is figuratively and literally exposed, awaiting 
redemption from the moral and spiritual sins he has committed as manifested in the 
wilderness condition of the land, while the medieval wilderness, to the contrary, is a 
deep, impenetrable forest, a place where darkness and danger linger, a place clearly 
defined from the known the visible and the Godly. This transition can be better 
understood when we examine the dual narrative that accompanies the story of the 
wilderness, that is, the story of the garden. 
Behind the early Hebraic and Christian roots of moral and mortal Pan-ic is the silent 
narrative of ‘culture’ travelling in its wake. This is suggested first in the land of Canaan 
“the Promised Land of milk and honey,”25 appropriate to good Hebraic life. Although 
this is an early Hebraic suggestion, escape from the earth’s wilderness or from the very 
earth as wilderness has earlier literary references. As Crouse cites, the narratives of 
Homer and Virgil are both explorations of the ‘pilgrimage’ and journey man must make 
from a place of exile, hardship and suffering (earth) to one of homecoming, peace and 
rest (heaven). Earth as a mechanism to assist this journey can help reveal the divine 
truth but in no sense is earth ever the final or proper resting place. This is again 
reinforced by Plato’s well known idealism, the imperfect reflections of reality that 
populate earthly existence and the belief that it is for the human soul to “hold converse 
with the divine, immortal and everlasting world to which she is akin,” disencumbering 
herself of all “that wild profusion of rock and shell whose earthly substance has 
encrusted her.”26 These sources reveal that what is at stake here is a deep cultural 
premise, one that finds its most lasting metaphor in the Garden. The garden as the place 
of human refuge and belonging, would both as a metaphor and as an increasing 
geographical reality, persist and intensify over time. At the same time, the cultural and 
moral logic giving rise to this, would come to legitimate the ongoing, systematic and 
often systemic, devastation and destruction of ‘wild’ places. Yet, while the places and 
                                                 
24 Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 13-20. 
25 Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 16. 
26 Plato, The Republic of Plato (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1941), 345-346. 
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creatures under assault are real what is driving their assault is not the real presence of 
threat but a figurative motif deeply embedded in the cultural imagination. The 
conception of such creatures as ‘wild’ and such places as ‘wilderness’ and perhaps more 
importantly as not-garden are fundamental to a culture premised on the separation of 
the human from the earth and, in this, the other-than-human world.  
 
Mapping the Garden 
The garden was first incorporated into the cultural psyche with the Garden of Eden 
motif, a paradise found and necessarily lost. With such loss, the eternal quest was to find 
such paradise once more, implying a perpetual restlessness and dissatisfaction with the 
Earth’s given conditions as not the rightful human conditions. That ‘man’ was cast out 
of these conditions after the Fall takes on a credible and real explanatory focus for the 
exiled Hebraic people, but its meaning is also symbolic. For the curse that original sin 
imposes on mankind for eternity is the transition from a place of innocence, grace and 
eternal life to knowledge of the nature of the human. In knowing our mortality, in self-
consciousness we are fallen and it is this that simultaneously and symbolically becomes 
both the curse and definition of human being. The project therefore is to rise from this 
fallen condition, to be redeemed, saved, repentant – to ‘know’ otherwise. Knowing 
otherwise, means overcoming one’s mortality, overcoming that which threatens to take 
us away from the appropriate garden setting and cast us as vulnerable beings into the 
wilderness: 
After the fall, the paradise of delights which was Eden [was] turned to wilderness, 
man is in exile from his patria, condemned to journey as an alien through desert 
places, where man and nature are at enmity.27  
‘Nature’ in this setting is the mortal and material world that ‘man’ is pitched against. 
That the wilderness is mythed as, and therefore becomes, foreign, unknown and as such 
dangerous makes it a place where human life is in fact less than safe; yet this physical 
threat is not the prime offence. The primary offence is ‘mans’ vulnerability per-se and the 
wilderness as symbolic of this becomes forsaken ground. Conquering the wilderness is 
                                                 
27 Robert. D. Crouse, “The Earth as Wilderness and Paradise in Medieval Christian Thought,” 
In Replenish the Earth: The Christian Theology of Nature. A Theological Conference Held at Christchurch 
Cathedral Hall, Fredericton, New Brunswick, June 9-12, 1991, edited by Susan Harris (Charlottetown, 
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then a moral and spiritual necessity. It is what verifies the human, and the human must 
be verified for ‘man’ can never return to Eden, self- consciousness cannot be severed 
from the human condition. Rather, this consciousness and knowledge is to be used, to 
overcome the limited, mortal condition. One must not look back to Eden but forward 
to the day when one can be restored to one’s full humanity and the soul finds its rightful 
resting place.28 
When we return to the historical narrative we see that, over time, the garden evolved 
from being the Hebrew’s physical place, a promised land to a spiritual place, the heaven 
of medieval Christians. This was partly due to the fact that the medieval period was a 
time not of exile but of Christian dominion. It was also a time when nature was under 
reasonable domestic control, where life was more assured. From this vantage point the 
Promised Land need not be a place on earth but the preferred and appropriate, 
everlasting, spiritual home. The focus of any pious Christian was therefore not on the 
beauty, majesty and immensity of nature but on the inward-gazing life and care of the 
soul. This was the only reality and all that would endure beyond this world into the next. 
As a result, the world and its beauty, became irrelevant and often a detrimental 
distraction to the proper task and purpose of humankind.29 
 In therefore, all versions, the garden is the place where ‘man’ does not physically live 
but is the place where ‘he’ rightfully belongs. Such a garden is not, was never and never 
can be the wilderness. The wilderness to the contrary is the place where ‘man’ is lost, 
condemned or purged. This is no less apparent today, except that the garden is no 
longer a heavenly abode but a cerebral terrain, somewhat ironically, the literal garden of 
knowledge itself.  
Knowledge in modernity has become the final refuge, it is both the source and 
definition of human being. It is the virtual place where we flee from earth’s constraints 
and reposition ourselves as unrestrained and infinite. This knowledge is not, however, 
the subjective kind of the Romantics, it has no recourse to the fluid terrains of the 
emotions and the imagination. Rather, this knowledge parades as objective and in 
response positions the world as object. It is classifiable, verifiable and quantifiable 
                                                 
28 This future focused ideology is that which at least partly informs the mantra of progress that 
defines modern capitalist, industrial society, an approach that has its source in a need to escape 
from the present, from the earth and from the limits and boundaries of finitude. 
29 Norman Davies, Europe: A History (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
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knowledge, it is knowledge that names, manipulates and manages the ‘other’. Within this 
framework the mystery and latent possibilities of mortal and moral decay that lurked in 
medieval wilderness have been eroded. They have been epistemologically conquered. 
The scientific nomenclature used in modernity to describe the fore-named wilderness 
reflects this dominion, these areas are now variously named “old growth forest,” “bio-
diversity region,” “Class A Marine Park,” amidst a range of classificatory terms that 
describe an epistemological colony. Wilderness is rarely now used in a moral sense, 
except by environmental groups, campaigning to summon an emotive, Romantic 
response of old. Thus, while wilderness is now threatened by culture, it no longer itself 
poses a threat to culture. The garden reigns. 
 
Wilderness as Spiritual Renewal 
I have suggested that the wilderness through the long hand of time has been primarily 
mythed as a presence that both defines and threatens the ‘garden’. Yet there were, and 
remain, alternative renderings. Chief among these is the notion of wilderness as a space 
of spiritual renewal and enlightenment. Nash observes that the notion of the wilderness 
as a place of catharsis and enlightenment began with the Exodus of the Jewish people 
from their homeland and their consequent roaming of the desert for forty years, during 
which time Moses received the Ten Commandments on the Mount. The safety from a 
punitive society and the spiritual clarity and moral instruction consequent upon such 
removal, became a powerful symbol for the Hebrew and consequently Christian faith. It 
is Nash’s view that this “Exodus experience established a tradition of going to the 
Wilderness for freedom and the purification of faith.”30  
For Christians, the wilderness as a place of spiritual catharsis, was reinforced by Jesus’ 
visit to the desert and his emergence with the word of God.31 This established a long 
standing tradition that included sacred pilgrimages, the voluntary seclusion of monks, 
and the communion of certain figures, such as St Francis of Assisi, with the birds, the 
bees and the soul of nature.32 This notion of the cathartic role of wilderness, was one 
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the Romantics wove into their wilderness dream. Yet it is, we must remember, a notion 
extracted from the garden. The Romantic wilderness is no more known, and is as 
imaginatively constructed and as much the ‘other’ as it was for the Hebrews in the 
desert and for the medieval townspeople running from Pan. The nature it presents is 
not Selborne, it is not intimate, and it is not lived in and is not kin. 
Indeed, for the Romantics it was seminal that nature should remain unknown. Knowing 
would not only diminish the concentration of the passions but it would break the very 
metaphor of wilderness, for when one ventures into the wilderness, one ventures into a 
metaphorical as much as a geographical space. The Romantic wilderness experience is a 
venture into the great ‘unknown’ in order that one may come to know oneself, sometimes 
one’s culture, more fully.  
In this exploration, one must pitch oneself against the vast, mysterious blanket of the 
other, so that the image of the self becomes visible in relief. To forge an actual 
relationship with nature, to know and understand her on her own terms, means the 
boundaries of the self would merge and the ‘unique’ individual self, remain invisible. 
Therefore the intellectual and spiritual journey to understand or know the wild is not 
made, for it is categorically mysterious, sacred, other. Outside the cultural hall of mirrors 
it is that which can tell us about ourselves. The necessary qualities of the Romantic 
wilderness are therefore those of scale, depth and difference, with ideas of the wild and 
the wilderness capturing a vast panorama of awe inspiring proportions. It is that which 
is precisely not human in scale let alone micro-floric. The Romantic wild captures the 
imagination, the heart, the moral sensibility, not the botanists, the biologists or the 
ornithologist’s detailed, investigative, order making sensibility. If such scale and depth 
are broached then the very Romantic project of self-realization is lost. This is why the 
sublime, the tremendous and the terrible are such key ingredients in Romantic thought, 
it is through these that the Romantic self is transported and transcended to another 
realm of being, to the deepest recesses of the soul and the heights of ecstatic 
communion. Such transportation cannot be delivered through the proximity and 
complexity of everyday relationships.  
As Mc Gilchrist points out: 
…vast distances evoked by visual depth, grand objects and perspectives, become 
of great significance, because of their metaphoric power to express a sense of 
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ineffability, which is experienced physically and emotionally as much as 
conceptually.33  
The enchantment with the distant also extends to the past, by which the Romantics are 
‘captivated,’34 and again in the gaping void that marks unrequited love, enjoyed for the 
depths to which it plunges the longing soul.35 Separation from an idealised idea of 
union, tragic in most instances, is what informs the Romantic experience of awe, 
longing and romance. The drudgery, familiarity and predictability of the ordinary and 
the accessible are not part of the romantic experience and obliterate the romantic self, 
indeed the very point of the sublime and terrible is that in transporting one it takes one 
away from a pedestrian reality. Within these ideational perimeters it is neither plausible 
nor desirable that the wilderness be known or understood in any way that suggests 
access to the detail and dirt of its presence.36 Indeed Edmund Burke an English 
Romantic promoted not-knowing as a key aesthetic and imaginative priority, claiming 
that it is our “ignorance of things that causes all our admiration and chiefly excites our 
passions” a clear idea, he asserted “…is another name for a little idea.”37 
Peckham suggests that the sense of distance and mystery the wilderness held, was 
necessary not only because it shaped the Romantic imagination, but because the Wild 
was, at the time, the only, and indeed the best, phenomenal means to a noumenal end. It 
functioned for the Romantics as a link to the enduring and the divine, both within the 
self and beyond the visible world. This was a link that was otherwise largely unavailable 
due to the spiritual failings of the modern age. The ‘wild’ thus, could not be engaged 
with in a substantive and nuanced way, for to do so would threaten this link. It was 
                                                 
33 McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary, 363. 
34 McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary, 366. 
35 These depths were dramatized by Goethe’s protagonist Werther in The Sorrows of Young 
Werther. Werther’s non-consummated longing for the married Lotte, culminates in the 
appropriate Romantic conclusion of suicide. The success of Goethe’s novel in capturing this 
Romantic sensibility, quite astoundingly, set off a spate of Werther-like suicides in 18th century 
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36 While the great romantic poets such as Keats, Yeats, and Blake did document the beauty of 
nature in all her details this was primarily a rural nature and did not include recourse to any 
intimate foray into the ‘wild’. However in making these comments it is important to identify that 
there remain exceptions to cultural patterns. One of these in the Romantic tradition was William 
Wordsworth who walked thousands of miles of the Lake District, this district being perhaps as 
loved and compelling for him as Yosemite was for John Muir. For further discussion of 
Wordsworth’s walks see, Robert Macfarlane, The Old Ways: A Journey on Foot (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 2012). 
37 Cranston, The Romantic Movement, 49. 
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essential therefore that nature remain a “mere transparency.”38 Nature worship, was 
hence, not strictly nature worship but meant: 
…the use of the natural world – free from human social enterprise – as a screen 
against which to project that sense of value which is also the sense of the self … in 
such heightened moods, one became aware, it was thought, of the immanent in the 
natural world. One saw through the phenomenon of nature into the divine 
noumenon (or ultimate reality) that lay behind it. And at the same time one 
released the noumenal self from the bondage of the phenomenal self, the 
personality and the world of social roles.39 
What this reveals is a symmetry in the wilderness narrative. Like the medieval 
townspeople who held wilderness epistemologically and ethically at bay, and like the 
Enlightenment technicians for whom nature was an eminently knowable object (while 
the citizen self in the process, likewise became, less the knowing subject and more the 
known object), the Romantics, in positioning the self as the ethical and epistemological 
centre, maintained an ethical distance from the wild. Becoming a part of the wilderness, 
or indeed the ‘wild’, was, for them, no less a resisted state.  
The lack of intimacy and relationship the Romantics  had with these wild places from 
which they were, by and large, geo-physically and epistemologically separated, is also 
made apparent by the Romantic’s celebration of the ‘solitude’ wilderness affords. That 
the Romantics saw wilderness as a place where one can be alone and find peace, is 
further evidence of the extent to which nature was not seen as kin, in the way it was for 
Gilbert White and most Indigenous cultures, for whom forested, desert and humanly 
sparse places are not places to be by oneself, in silence, but are rather convivial hubs, 
replete with fellow other-than-human companions. Such cultures sit within and not 
against those places we name as wild. The Romantics sense of the wilderness as strange 
and mysterious thus reveals the disconnect between the Romantics and the creatures 
and critters that dwelt in these ‘wild’ spaces and indicates to what extent company and 
kin were considered in only human, and culturally specific, terms. Analogously, the 
assumption by North American settler populations that the Native American Indians 
did not appreciate the ‘solitude’ wilderness provides,40 reinforces the fact that here was 
an immense cultural gulf and a fundamental lack of understanding, not only of these 
places, but also of the people who called such places home.  
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Neither is it surprising therefore that a distinctive feature of the burgeoning Romantic 
Movement is the fact that it was not a grass-roots or working class movement but one 
that belonged first and foremost to the literati, a group of people who did not have to 
wield either sword, axe or apron to eke out a living. Nor were such folk living proximate 
to, or at all dependant on, the unknown place(s) travelling under the sobriquet of 
‘wilderness.’ The wilderness was, in this respect, not a ‘force’ or a ‘threat’ to conquer or 
manage, rather, it was primarily a compelling and mystical idea. What the Romantic 
sentiment expressed was an educated and emotional response to the ills of 
industrialisation and the consequent search for an ethical, spiritual and aesthetic 
alternative. It became, Nash suggests, a genteel pursuit, a sign of refinement, sensitivity 
and class, born not from prolonged experience of, or immersion in, ‘N’ature but from a 
prolonged and distressing experience of urban life and urban values.41 Similarly, 
Cranston notes, that Rousseau did not himself see the wild as a place of refuge to turn 
to and be amongst in any continuous sense, rather he considered that the only real 
reprieve from modernity was to be found by “escape into villages and country places 
which had not been corrupted by the industries and luxuries and cultural institutions of 
cities.”42 
The centrality of urban experience to patterns of knowing and being has continued, and 
now largely defines the late-modern environmental movement.43 In this regard, the 
preservation of ‘wilderness,’ even where successful (and this is rare), does not change 
relationship to place. The wilderness continues to function culturally as a place to be 
admired and preserved, for aesthetic, spiritual and ethical reasons that variously reside in 
individual hearts.  
 
Conclusion 
While not wanting to underestimate the way in which the depth of Romantic feeling, 
intuition and imagination reignited a core and culturally neglected tenet of human being 
and while not wanting to negate some of the positive social and ecological consequences 
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42 Cranston, The Romantic Movement, 17. 
43 There are some notable exceptions, such as the protest group Sea Shepherd whose primary 
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following from the mything of the wilderness, what needs to be remembered is that the 
Romantic’s ideation of the wild is married to the idea of, and preoccupation with, the 
self. It is not then, one which can move us towards a different relationship with the 
other-than-human world, rather it reinforces in many important respects, the existing 
relationship. The wilderness that we may visit and love is, as a landscape, real and 
complex, yet the idea that circumscribes it will always threaten such places or indeed 
mark such places as threatening. As Cronon observes, wilderness has always been part 
of a dualistic vision where the human is not within but outside of/separate from nature. 
Therefore: 
…to the extent that we celebrate wilderness as the measure with which we judge 
civilisation, we reproduce the dualism that sets humanity and nature at opposite 
poles. We thereby leave ourselves little hope of discovering what an ethical, 
sustainable, honourable, human place in nature might actually look like.44 
The false move for the Romantics and for later environmentalists who adopt their 
epistemology comes in assuming that where epistemological and geo-physical distance 
predominate, ethical relationship and change are still available. Throughout the rise of 
western culture the place(s) named as the wilderness, and the wild, have not been 
encountered on their own terms but have been subject to a mythology that has variously 
revered or denounced them. As such, the historical narrative of wilderness provides 
another window into the ontology that drives our cultural project - that to be human is 
to be, not, of this earth. Further to be human is to know this distinction, and in such 
knowing realise ones human being. In this regard, the ‘new’ idea of the wild, that post-
White animated the Romantic Movement, was no different to earlier ideas and the 
relationships they suggested. Indeed the Romantic’s invocation of the wild reinforced 
earlier ideology with the Romantics resting under this ontological umbrella, seeking in 
its shade, knowledge of the self.  
Unsurprisingly then, the late modern rendering of the wilderness, following the old, fails 
to apprehend the subjectival presence of place, and moves us not towards but away 
from nuanced, flawed, complex relationship. What is most apparent, in the mapping of 
the wilderness, is that whether it is from a theologically imbued aversion or a romantic 
self-oriented reverence, what our relationship to the wild reveals is our relationship to 
the earth. The damaged and distorted nature of this relationship now threatens and 
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violates the integrity, diversity and beauty of the other-than-human world and the earth 
itself, that place we will not call home. 
Unfortunately, the environment movement that attempts to mitigate and stem such 
destruction, is itself born from the epistemological framework premised on human/ 
earth separation. Mistaken assumptions surrounding ideas of progress, and mistaken 
understandings of the present, due to a constantly shifting baseline, cloud our ability to 
see that cultural change within the given epistemological paradigms is not a viable 
proposition. The next chapter will examine the conservation era and subsequent 
iterations of the environmental movement from a place-based perspective and will argue 
that the limitations and capacities of such movements are determined by the potential 
for ecological consciousness within the culture, which itself depends on the capacity for 









A lady comes to my door to tell me about everlasting life. I am studying, I tell her, this is 
not the time to dwell on everlasting life. This is not, my story. 
I do not belong in the tale of Jehovah. 
A woman in a pub starts rehearsing the plight of being single, Mum, going to uni, seven 
years, do I know how hard that is? I shake my head at my version of ingratitude. I 
switch off my attention. 
My story is not there. 
We sit, a circle of loved ones. A family. A new marina. Drinking coffee, eating fries, fish. 
The view entrancing, deep blue wet, lapping, rhythmic, encompassing each perceptive 
moment. 
Fairy terns. My mother remarks. This used to be their nesting site, they flew all the way 
from the Arctic, and nested, and rested, here. 
Where? I ask, right, here? Where we are drinking coffee on plastic chairs? She turns to 
my father, yep, he nods, just here.  
And I remember, back. Two years ago, walking with my father and mother along what 
was then sand, the deep blue lapping against its shore, salt, seagulls and terns composing 
with the air. “Watch where you’re going!” my dad yells at the bmx bikers carelessly 
skidding near the nests. 
My dad crouches down checking that the nests are okay, “You’ll be right, little battlers.” 
We watch, our family, the family of terns, feathers-full, nestling, caressing, preening. 
Now we sit, on plastic, no terns, no nests, no homing.  
I feel sick as the coffee slides down my throat. 











This chapter examines the conservation movement and what is commonly seen as its 
successor, the environmental movement, in their historical relationship to place. I 
propose that such relationship is informed by, the epistemological, ethical and ecological 
conditions that precipitate it and in turn emerge from it. My central contention is that 
the attempts at cultural change made by conservationists and environmentalists were – 
and remain – deeply informed and determined by their level of intimacy with and 
subjectival knowing of place.  
I have argued that our cultural pattern of being human assumes and fosters the 
separation of the human from the other-than-human world. This has, as time passes, 
and place recedes from cultural view, resulted in the exponential destruction of place. If 
ecological consciousness depends on and develops from relationship with intact and 
diverse places, the continuing destruction of place means the continual diminishment of 
ecological consciousness. With a diminishing ecological consciousness the potential to 
transform our cultural relationship to place is likewise diminished. From this 
perspective, I suggest a vital difference between the conservationists and the 
environmentalists: namely, that despite the apparent stock of ‘eco-knowledge’ in late 
modernity, the early conservationists were more ecologically conscious than subsequent 
environmentalists. This is, I suggest, due to their connectedness to and relationship with 
place. Drawing on the research of Richard W. Judd (2009), I will consider the extent to 
which the conservationist’s lineage is traceable to the early naturalists of continental 
Europe and settler America, due to the conservationists’ physical intimacy and 
relationship with the land they were protecting. In this respect I also argue that the 
conservationists belong to a different tradition than the latter day environmentalists, 
whose heritage fits more closely with the Romantic sense of nature and the self. 
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This distinction indicates a bifurcation in the history of ideas, and challenges the widely 
accepted notion of an unfolding social progress and an ever expanding ethical compass. 
Key to the notion of progress is the belief in the historically continuous advance of 
consciousness, blossoming in the enlightenment worldview, finding social form in the 
revolution and rights discourse of eighteenth century Europe, and proceeding onward 
to produce multiple expressions of civil liberties including the conservation era and the 
subsequent swell of social and environmental protest that characterised the 1960s and 
beyond. In contrast, I propose that in important ecological respects there has not been a 
rise but a decline in consciousness and further there is no one single narrative, rather,  
two (or more) divergent paths exist. One fosters an ethical-epistemological, place-based 
holism. This, as symbolised by the character of Gilbert White, extends to the naturalist 
tradition and the subsequent conservation movement. The other follows the modalities 
of enlightenment science to produce the birth of the individual as socially defined and as 
excised from any specific place. Central to this tradition are the Romantics with their 
emphasis on the individual as an epistemological and ethical source and their emphasis 
on the natural world as fundamentally other. Following in their wake are the 
environmentalists who likewise look to the individual as the site of change and in so 
doing reinforce the enlightenment path, while by this time the ‘environment’ is, at the 
level of culture, excised from epistemological and ethical relationship.  
The naturalist path, I will argue, is one that sustains a level of ecological consciousness. 
It does so by cultivating a Gilbert White form of knowing, one that is embedded in 
place and is subjectively and ethically informed. The second path, I suggest, undermines 
ecological consciousness by cultivating an epistemology that depends on the separation 
of person from place. This form of knowing cannot embed the self in place nor offer an 
alternative ethical relation to place at the level of culture. This is not however to suggest 
that the naturalist-conservationist tradition somehow ‘floats free’ from the ontological 
premises of its culture. Rather I am supposing that when these premises are situated in a 
more holist setting, they are circumscribed by affiliation and intimacy with the other-
than-human world and are to this extent modified by such an affiliation. In such a 
context the error of the false ontology, premised on separation, is less likely to dominate 
and the pursuit of ways of knowing that reinforce such error are also less likely. In this 
setting, the risk of further ecological, epistemological and ethical distortion is reduced 
and place-based subjectivity has the opportunity to persist as a fertile, relational state. By 
contrast, where the notion of separation is reinforced, where place becomes geo-
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physically and epistemologically remote from and peripheral to human experience, 
epistemological, ecological and ethical malformations can multiply. In such a setting 
place-based subjectivity diminishes as a viable condition.1 
In ignoring place as a person-shaping modality, while at the same time failing to theorise 
the site of the self as a culturally crafted phenomena, much environmental theory and 
protest tends to reinforce our faulty cultural model, despite tremendous efforts to the 
contrary. Since environmental theory and protest offer the most consistent and vital 
cultural attempts to confront ecological destruction, their impotence in addressing 
patterns of being and knowing is particularly alarming. At the same time, this failure can 
offer deep insight into the elemental mistake of our culture and the way in which this 
mistake has been perpetuated over time. With such awareness we can more readily see 
how, through such perpetuity, this error has become engrained in both our physical and 
psychological spaces.  
In observing the limits of environmental theory and practice, I do not underestimate the 
passion, persistence and self-sacrifice of many environmentalists. Indeed this kind of 
activism was a role that I was deeply committed to for many years, and in a much more 
limited and indeed in a contradictory fashion, continue to be. What I want to stress is 
that the limitations of the environmental movement reside in its contingent but deeply 
embedded historical predicament. The paradox with which environmentalists are 
confronted is that the culture of protest whereby they voice their dissent is situated in an 
epistemological framework that alienates place from the human experience and alienates 
any one self from other selves. Yet to stand outside this (invisible) framework is to stand 
outside the ‘culture’ of protest and to stand outside this culture is to no longer be an 
environmental campaigner. What is needed, is a different epistemology, and this has not 
to date been available to the protest movement, or to our culture at large. 
In the latter part of this chapter I examine what is perhaps the most probing attempt to 
forge both a different epistemology and a reconfiguration of the cultural relationship to 
                                                 
1 My point here is that without ecological consciousness it is difficult if not impossible to care 
for and about place and its creatures. However ecological consciousness, as I am so describing 
it, does not necessarily imply ecological care, (even though the two usually coincide). A hostile 
relationship remains a relationship, albeit not usually a deep and intimate one – and where 
intimacy is lacking so too I suggest is consciousness. To the extent that the wild was morally 
repugnant to many early settlers indicates that some kind of relationship still existed. To the 
contrary the loss of relationship as evidenced in late modernity means that these spaces become 
objects – of analysis, research and discussion to be preserved or destroyed at will. 
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place and self. This is made by one of the more radical strands of the environmental 
movement known as ‘deep ecology.’ Deep ecology is unique in the way in which – 
unlike the vast amount of related literature – it pays close and specific attention to the 
cultural roots of ecological destruction. It examines the way in which our manner of 
thinking about the self and nature exist in direct relation to the ongoing and systematic 
degradation and destruction of nature, which in the process creates a limited and 
incomplete self. The movement thus differentiates itself from the ‘shallow’ address of 
the crisis as represented by those theorists who, while objecting to environmental 
destruction, seek to challenge the behaviour but not the values or the mindset of the 
culture where such behaviour resides.2 
Notwithstanding the significance of this, I argue that deep ecology does not succeed in 
its attempts to foster an alternative way of knowing and being human, for it fails to 
address the extent to which cultural and geo-physical forms shape the potentiality for 
self (and social) transformation. Despite the fact that most individuals in late modernity 
live in contexts that deform and destroy the ecological integrity and stability of place, 
deep ecology continues to imagine the late modern self to be a discrete entity whose 
potential for change and ‘S’elf-realisation are unaffected by the widespread deformation 
and destruction of place. In this way it reinforces the very notion it seeks to challenge: 
namely, that the integrity of, and cultural relationship to, place does not affect the 
integrity of the self or the type of knowledge that is available to such a self. They are 
therefore committed to the premise that this self is sufficiently intact, even where and 
when place is damaged, this self, is then, in key respects fundamentally separate from 
place. Further, in perpetuating the belief that the individual self (as culturally defined) is 
the locus of cultural change, the movement ultimately leaves us to choose between the 
devil of dominant cultural paradigms and the deep blue sea of environmental discourses, 
neither of which proffer ontological, epistemological or ethical alternatives.  
First however, to the perceived beginnings of the environmental movement, the 
conservationists and the historical (mis)perceptions of this movement that reveal 
accelerating shifts in the baseline of what it is to know, and to be in, place.  
                                                 
2 For example, see Alan Drengson:  “The short-term, shallow approach stops before the 
ultimate level of fundamental change, often promoting technological fixes (e.g. recycling, 
increased automotive efficiency, export-driven monocultural organic agriculture) based on the 
same consumption-oriented values and methods of the industrial economy.” Alan Drengson, 
Foundations for Deep Ecology; “Some Thought on the Deep Ecology Movement,” http:// 




Conservation and the Judgments of History 
It has been variously argued that the goals of the conservationist movement were 
modest to a fault and its values closely aligned to those of mainstream, resource-driven 
culture. Under this line of interpretation, the movement aimed not for the preservation 
of forests, wetlands and prairies for their own sake but for the resource value they 
offered current and future human generations. According to Nash: 
One of the most useful insights into recent American history concerns the 
qualitative difference between ‘environmentalism’ as it emerged in the 1960s and 
what used to be called ‘conservation’. When Gifford Pinchot named it in 1907 
conservation stood squarely in the American mainstream…It stood for wise and 
efficient use of natural resources not the absence of use or the reinterpretation of 
nature as something other than a resource.3  
Likewise Hays in, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency, suggests that: 
Conservation in its early stages was the handmaiden of economic development ... it 
was a movement of applied science not a democratic protest and its goal was the 
rational management of resources.4  
These sentiments are reinforced by many of the more ‘radical’ modern 
environmentalists who argue for what are seen as the more far-reaching goals of 
reclamation (of degraded land) and preservation (of wilderness). Devall and Sessions, 
for instance, while identifying that John Muir, a key conservationist “cultivat[ed] his 
ecological consciousness through direct intuitive experiencing of nature” maintain that the 
conservation movement as a whole was primarily dictated by considerations of nature as 
a resource, worth preserving merely for current and future human enjoyment and use.5 
Their critique of the conservation movement implies that the goals of the modern 
environmentalist are more challenging, exacting and morally potent than those of their 
early forebears. Such a critique also suggests that the values of modern 
environmentalists are sharply at odds with contemporary culture. At a yet more 
fundamental level, the implication is that culturally we have progressed and that our 
                                                 
3 Roderick Nash, The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics (Madison, WI: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 8-9. 
4 Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-
1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), 2. 
5 Bill Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered (Salt Lake City, UT: 
Gibbs Smith Publishing, 1985), 47. 
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ecological consciousness has advanced with the technological, scientific and economic 
‘advances’ of our civilisation. Yet if we pause to reflect on the broader implications of 
such change it appears that these assumptions, in the face of accelerating ecological 
destruction and relatively muted protest to such destruction, are nothing if not peculiar. 
Already in 1952 Rauschenbusch was lamenting that: 
Conservation is in danger of becoming a lost cause…the emotional content of 
these ideas survives mainly among the small farmers who love the land which gives 
them their living…But for most of the rest of the community, the two moving 
ideas of Theodore Roosevelt, Gifford Pinchot and the host of great 
conservationists of the early part of the century seem to have lost attractiveness.6  
While some fifty years later, the 2006 American Environmental Values Survey, indicates 
that: 
Americans active support for environmental protection has been steadily eroding. 
Participation in Earth Day events in America is down from 20,000,000 people in 
1970 to less than 1,000,000 today. And while 77% of Americans say they worry 
about the environment a great deal, or a fair amount, for most of them it is neither 
a personal nor a public policy priority.7 
David Nicholson-Lord similarly argues that ecological concerns have faded from the 
public imagination and that instead we see an overall return to anthropocentrism with 
“human society turning in on itself and losing contact with nature.”8 Indeed Sessions 
himself comments that in 1992, 1575 of the world’s leading scientists from sixty nine 
different countries issued a collective warning to humanity, stating that “human beings 
and the natural world are on a collision course… [and that] a great change … is 
required, if vast human misery is to be avoided and our global home on this planet is 
not to be irretrievably mutilated.”9 Yet since that time no substantial change has been 
forthcoming. Instead “exponential global ecological deterioration ... has continued to 
occur since the Rio conference.”10 Given that destruction has not subsided but 
                                                 
6 Stephen Rauschenbusch, “Conservation is in Danger of Becoming a Lost Cause,” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 281 (1952): 2. 
7 ecoAmerica, American Environmental Values Survey: American Views on the Environment in an Era of 
Polarization and Conflicting Priorities (Washington DC: ecoAmerica, SRI Consulting – Business 
Intelligence, 2006), 3. 
8 David Nicholson-Lord, “Blind Spot,” Resurgence, 237 (2006): 21-22. 
9 UCS (Union of Concerned Scientists), quoted in George Sessions, “Wildness, Cyborgs, and 
Our Ecological Future: Reassessing the Deep Ecology Movement,” Trumpeter 22, no. 2 (2006): 
128. 
10 Sessions, “Wildness, Cyborgs, and Our Ecological Future,”128-129. 
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continues to escalate it is unconvincing that ecological consciousness has, at the level of 
culture, increased. To the contrary, I suggest, it has waned and this is because the 
ongoing destruction of place is logically implicated in a diminishing relationship with 
place. From this perspective, I propose that the conservationists, who were more 
embedded in place, were both more conscious and more radical than earlier critics 
attest. Reassessing the conservation movement in the context of its times is one method 
of making visible shifts in the baseline and to draw attention to, the limitations of 
common analyses of the past and related diagnoses of the present. 
 
The Origins of the Conservation Movement 
Chronologically the conservation movement is defined, in the literature and in the 
public imagination, as the origin of the modern day environmental movement. It covers 
a period of protest in late settler America, spanning approximately forty to fifty years, 
from the end of the nineteenth century until the late 1930s. Characterised by the 
concerted attempt of a small group of individuals to stem, halt or mitigate what was 
promising to be the wholesale destruction of America’s wild places, its key figures 
include John Muir (1838-1914), Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919), Gifford Pinchot 
(1865-1946), Aldo Leopold (1887-1948), John Burroughs (1837-1921), George Perkins 
Marsh (1801-1882), Stephen Mather (1867-1930) and William E Colby (1875-1964), 
amidst a host of local characters. However, Madelyn Holmes also draws attention to the 
fact, that the movement included many women who, while participating in and helping 
to define the movement, are often historically overlooked. These include (but are not 
limited to); the naturalist/ ornithologist Susan Fenimore Cooper (1813-1894) who wrote 
at length about local bird species. Their decline, she observed, was due to the 
destruction of the forests for railways and the culling of small birds for women’s hats;11 
Mary Treat (1830-1923) who wrote about insects and spiders;12 Katherine Dooris Sharp 
(1846-1935) a botanist and keen conservation activist, who proposed that, “a tract of 
land be protected in every neighbourhood”;13 Olive Thorne Miller (1831-1918), a nature 
lover, bird specialist and author of children’s books, who advocated for the love and 
                                                 
11 Madelyn Holmes, American Women Conservationists: Twelve Profiles (London: Mc Farland and 
Company, 2004), 7-8. 
12 Holmes, American Women Conservationists, 9. 
13 Holmes, American Women Conservationists, 9. 
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protection of nature;14 and Mary Austin (1868-1934) who rallied for the central 
Californian desert landscape, and wrote the influential text, The Land of Little Rain.15  
All these figures were seminal in defining the values and goals of the movement. They 
were also vital in the realisation of its goals, key to which was the creation of, “the 
world’s first national parks, its first public game refuges [and] its first national forests.”16 
As the environmental historian, John R. McNeill, observes: 
Small nature conservation societies arose almost everywhere in the western world 
by 1910. Nature preserves and national parks, more or less isolated from economic 
use, emerged after 1870, first in Australia and North America, where after the near 
elimination of Aboriginal and Amerindian peoples, there was plenty of open 
space.17 
The fundamental purpose of these national parks, as stated by the 1916 National Park 
Service Organic Act, was to: 
Conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein, 
and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means 
as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.18  
In responding to the threats of clear-felling and the destruction of wildlife habitat, 
conservationists helped to found the New Hampshire Forestry Commission in 1881, the 
Society for the Protection of the New Hampshire Forests in 1901, and the White 
Mountain National Forest in 1911.19 One of the best-known ventures in conservation 
history was the establishment and protection of Yosemite National Park in 1890. The 
1200 square mile expanse of this park was advocated for by the Sierra Club,20 a group of 
                                                 
14 Holmes, American Women Conservationists, 9. 
15 Holmes, American Women Conservationists, 17. 
16 Thomas D. Visser, “Common Lands, Common People: The Origins of Conservation in 
Northern New England by Richard W. Judd,” The New England Quarterly 71, no. 2 (1998): 317.  
17 John R. McNeill, Something New Under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth Century 
World (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001), 337.  
18 Sierra Club, Sierra Club. “Policies: Conservation Policies,” http://www.sierraclub.org/policy (last 
modified January 29, 2015). 
19 Visser, “Common Lands, Common People,” 317. 
20 The Sierra Club’s mission as stated in their policy is to “To explore, enjoy, and protect the 
wild places of the earth; To practice and promote the responsible use of the earth's ecosystems 
and resources; To educate and enlist humanity to protect and restore the quality of the natural 
and human environment; and to use all lawful means to carry out these objectives.” Sierra Club, 
“Policies: Conservation Policies,” http://www.sierraclub.org/policy/. 
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passionate individuals who named their collective after California’s Sierra Nevada 
mountain range.  
While national parks and reserves are now an accepted part of our cultural and 
geographical landscape, it is worth remembering that such mappings are historically 
quite a recent phenomenon and a concerted response to the destruction of ‘wild’ nature. 
In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, America, with its ample 
‘resource’ pool and significant developments in technology and engineering, held out 
the promise for wealth, prosperity and an improved New England. To suggest a halt to 
or curbing of such ‘progress’, was at this time, to make a clear and definite counter 
statement. Gifford Pinchot, a Governor and one of the original conservationists recalls 
the origins of the thinking and practices that gave birth to the movement as an idea: 
…so new that it did not even have a name. Our little inside group discussed it a 
great deal. Finally Overton Price suggested that we should call it Conservation … 
so we called it the Conservation Movement.21 
The novelty Pinchot is here referring to is the sense in which his, ‘little inside group’, 
shared a goal and vision that stood against the broader goals and values of the time. To 
consider this we need to look at the nature of ‘nature’ in early settler America and the 
broad cultural response to such places.  
A distinguishing mark of the conservationist’s story is that the land, for which the 
conservationists were seeking protection, was not a semi-rural idyll, but was proximate 
and formidable in a way that nature was not for Gilbert White, or for the Romantics in 
their rural and urban enclaves. Nor does the relationship the conservationist’s had with 
these places, bear any real resemblance to the (lack of) relationship most campaigners 
have today, with the distant wild that, at best, fringes the geography and lives of today’s 
heavily urban population. The distinction of this late nineteenth century American 
wilderness lay not only in its vastness and proximity to human life but also in the fact 
that it was, for most people, not a safe place. Dissimilar to the long hunted-out English 
woods, this was a setting where ‘man’ could, become prey. Wolves, tigers, bears and 
vipers all formed part of the American wilderness. This makes the relationship the 
conservationists bore to this space even more surprising, compelling and unique. Added 
to this was the fact that in late nineteenth century and early twentieth century American 
                                                 
21 J. Leonard Bates, “Fulfilling American Democracy: The Conservation Movement, 1907 to 
1921,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 44, no. 1 (1957): 30-31. 
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life, the wilderness, while retreating under the colonialist’s assault, was still both a 
geographically and mythically powerful place. The proximity and power of its – 
voraciously hunted and ravaged – wild creatures and the mythology that attended the 
idea of the wild meant for most the summoning of a certain kind of horror. To ‘defend’ 
this space against human attack was to reverse the moral logic of the society, where the 
human in both a moral and physical sense, was to be defended against the wild. Those 
who thought otherwise, were taking a radical stance for the time.  
That the great majority of the settler population thought of the wild as a Godless and 
amoral terrain, is demonstrated by historical translations of prevailing attitudes and too 
by the destruction of these places. Muir reports that William Bradford, in observing the 
American landscape in 1620 from the deck of the Mayflower, saw, “a hideous and 
desolate wilderness, full of wilde beasts and wilde men.”22 Similarly, Judd alludes to the 
‘philosophical distaste for wild nature’ characterising the times, with French Naturalist 
Comte de Buffon, one of the most influential naturalists of the eighteenth century, 
characterising it as a “nightmarish repetition of aimless growth and decay that without 
human intervention, was barren of purpose … filled with old trees, loaded with parasitic 
plants, lichens, fungi, the impure fruits of corruption.”23 Scheuering comments that 
because of such attitudes “even when the trees were not needed for building houses or 
for heat, settlers cut them down, believing they needed to let redemptive air and light 
into the musty gloom.”24 In his description of the Salem witch trials, of 1693 Arthur 
Miller suggests that the “the Salem folk believed that the virgin forest was the devil’s last 
preserve… to the best of their knowledge the American forest was the last place on 
earth that was not paying homage to God.”25 This orientation continued over the 
ensuing centuries, where the domination, suppression and conquering of this landscape 
was key to cultural developments. Nash quotes a correspondent to the Saturday Evening 
Post, as ‘late’ as 1965 forewarning that Wilderness was: 
                                                 
22 John Muir, The Story of My Boyhood and Youth (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1965), 27. 
23 Richard W. Judd, Common Lands, Common People: The Origins of Conservation in Northern New 
England (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 10. 
24 Rachel White Scheuering, Shapers of the Great Debate on Conservation: A Biographical Dictionary 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), xvi. 




…precisely what man has been fighting against since he began his painful, 
awkward climb to civilization. It is the dark, the formless, the terrible, the old 
chaos which our fathers pushed back … It is held at bay by constant vigilance, and 
when the vigilance slackens it swoops down for melodramatic revenge.26  
As discussed in Chapter Two, the idea of the wilderness does not exist in isolation but 
has its counterpart in the Garden. The idea of the wilderness is everything that is outside 
the garden, geographically, morally and spiritually. It is the unknown and unknowable 
‘other’ that threatens human ‘being.’ In contrast, as Worster points out, Americans 
believed that their land of plenty, full of ‘timber’, ‘game’ and ‘acreage’, to be felled, 
culled and farmed, was abundant not by sheer chance but because it was the restored 
Garden of Eden, a land bestowed on them by Divine Providence.27 Accordingly, and 
consistent with the purity of Eden, the Americans perceived themselves as a 
fundamentally innocent and good people, who were appropriately placed in this new 
world order.28 Such a perception did not advocate the checking of colonial appetites but 
sanctioned the rampant culling of wild creatures. This is evidenced in the relative 
splendour of 1830s America, where: 
Forty million Bison roamed the continent … forty million white tailed deer, before 
there were farms and guns … there may have been five billion prairie dogs … as 
many as three to five billion passenger pigeons, migrating in dark, torn clouds that 
blotted out the sun … navigations encountered off Newfoundland schools of fish 
so dense they blocked their passage, holding them prisoner, and waterfowl so thick 
they could feast forever on wild duck eggs.29 
Compare this to a century later, where, as Beatty observes, there is the loss of several 
important species including: 
…the buffalo, the passenger pigeon, the heath hen, the condor and the whooping 
crane… in wildlife conservation there are many current predictions that wildlife is 
on the way out and that the end of public fishing and hunting in this country is 
near at hand.30  
                                                 
26 Saturday Evening Post, cited in Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1973), 27. 
27 Bear in mind this ‘garden’ is not full of wolves, bears and forests but it is the wild, converted 
and controlled into ‘game’, ‘timber’ and ‘acreage.’ 
28 See Donald Worster, The Wealth of Nature: Environmental History and the Ecological Imagination 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 9-15. 
29 Worster, The Wealth of Nature, 4. 
30 Robert O. Beatty, “The Conservation Movement,” Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 281 (1952): 16. 
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These sobering details only document the loss of a few of the more conspicuous 
species, those that are perceived as an unnecessary or regretful loss. The menacingly 
wild creatures that were seen to, or did, threaten human life are remarkably absent from 
such accounts. The zeal and enthusiasm for hunting such creatures means that the Red 
Wolf no longer exists in the wild – only as a reintroduced species,31 while the Grey 
Wolf, which was once the ‘world’s most widely distributed mammal’, has become 
extinct in much of Western Europe, in Mexico and much of the USA.32  
This drive to eradicate wilderness and advance the garden that characterised settler 
America indicates that the conservationists in seeking protection of this wilderness not 
only stood outside their social norm, but on a deep level actively opposed it. Supporting 
this claim is the fact that their position was often met with outright hostility. Nicholas 
Roosevelt tells of how the conservation innovations that his uncle, the president, 
Theodore Roosevelt, tried to make, such as attempting to withdraw lands from being 
patented and ultimately exploited, were met with strong opposition from large swathes 
of the public as well as from industry: 
It is difficult for Easterners to realise the depth of the antagonism of politicians, 
businessmen, ranchers, chambers of commerce and almost everyone living within 
easy reach of National forests or Parks, against the initial setting aside of these 
reserves and against all efforts to enlarge them and tighten the regulations 
governing their use.33  
Muir, Colby and others who opposed the damming of the Hetch Hetchy Valley were 
likewise denounced as “mere visionaries and enemies of progress, which in the America 
of the early 1900s were words of scorn and contempt”34 (italics added). Bates also 
observes the manner in which conservationists went against the colonial grain of the 
                                                 
31 “Very little is known about Red Wolf habitat because the species’ range was severely reduced 
by the time scientific investigations began … The last naturally occurring population utilized the 
coastal prairie marshes of south-west Louisiana and south-east Texas (Carley 1975; Shaw 1975). 
However, many agree that this environment probably does not typify preferred Red Wolf 
habitat. … Red Wolves are habitat generalists and can thrive in most settings where prey 
populations are adequate and persecution by humans is slight, [in areas of] low human density, 
wetland soil type, and distance from roads.” IUCN (International Union for Conservation of 
Nature), The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species; “Canis Lupus,” http://www.iucnredlist.org/ 
details/3746/0 (last modified January 29, 2015). 
32 IUCN, “Canis Lupus,” http://www.iucnredlist.org/details/3746/0. 
33 Nicholas Roosevelt, Conservation: Now or Never (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1970), 
11. 
34 Roosevelt, Conservation, 37. 
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time and despite being a diverse group of people were united by their “hatred of the 
boodler, the rank materialist, the exploiter.”35 Part of the conservationist’s vision was a 
keen apprehension and appreciation of the beauty of the wilderness, which again most 
of the settler population failed to identify. As Madison observes, “Burroughs’s families, 
relatives and neighbours were as indifferent to Burroughs’s own writings as they were to 
the aesthetic pleasures of their region.”36 Likewise Muir was one of the few people of his 
community who “looked on conservation as a practical way to preserve beauty – a 
concept which relatively few then grasped.”37 
In sum, the fact that the conservationists argued and rallied for place at a time when 
wild nature was seen as a physical and moral threat suggests that their stance was far less 
conservative than many modern writers suggest. In key respects, these writers and 
thinkers, naturalists, farmers, ramblers, explorers, foresters and poets, were not 
reinforcing but opposing the colonial ethos. They were, arguably, writing in the midst of 
another baseline shift, which, while less significant than that which proceeded the life of 
Gilbert White, nonetheless spoke to a model of person, place and community that was 
disappearing as fast as the Appalachian forests.  
 
Knowing in Place 
The charge of conservatism made against the conservationists, implying that they were 
reinforcing and reproducing the dominant culture, one in which nature was little but a 
resource to be used and exploited, becomes even less convincing when one considers 
the conservationist’s depth of relation with the places they were seeking to protect. This 
is revealed both in accounts of their lifestyles and in their own writing.  
Unlike the earlier Romantics and unlike most urban dwelling environmentalists, and in 
spite of the threat the American wilderness posed, the conservationists in the Gilbert 
White model shared an intimate and often daily alliance with the places they attempted 
                                                 
35 Bates, “Fulfilling American Democracy,” 38. 
36 Mark G. Madison, “Green Fields: The Agrarian Conservation Movement in America, 1890-
1990,” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1995), 21. 
37 Madison, “Green Fields: The Agrarian Conservation Movement in America, 1890-1990,” 28. 
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to conserve. As detailed by Judd, Worster, Beatty and Roosevelt,38 this relationship was 
evidenced by the explorer with a zest for the scale and the scope of the land; the 
naturalist who found delight, pleasure and intrigue in nature’s particular details; botanists 
and ornithologists in love with their subject of study, and wanderers, dreamers and 
poets who made use of their rambles to sing about the beauty and majesty of the natural 
world: 
If you scratch a conservationist you are likely to find a crusader under the skin. 
Among conservationists are artists and dreamers and hardy hikers and 
mountaineers: passionate protectors of wildlife: men and women who love natural 
beauty.39  
For this reason, the earlier naturalists, explorers and hikers, and most of the key 
conservation figures of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, were 
reputed as much for their rural know-how and forays in the wilderness as they were for 
their political actions. Nicholas Roosevelt recalled his uncle fellow conservationist and 
President Theodore Roosevelt speaking of Pinchot as a “great outdoors man, hardy, 
tireless and fearless.”40 Mather was known as ‘an indefatigable hiker, mountain climber 
and camper,’ with his interest in preserving the West for purposes of hiking, camping, 
sight-seeing, being a “natural outgrowth of having done much tramping not only in the 
California Sierra but through most of the National Parks already in existence in the early 
1900s.”41 Likewise Yosemite’s key protector, John Muir’s legendary love of the 
American wilderness and Yosemite came from him having “tramped over every trail – 
and off many of them – in the Sierra from south to north.”42 
Indeed Muir lived in Yosemite for up to eight years in a log cabin he built by the 
Yosemite Falls trail. Joseph LeConte, a fellow conservationist and friend, described 
Muir as: 
… a most passionate lover of nature. Plants and flowers and forests and skies and 
mountains seem actually to haunt his imagination… [as he gazed he] meticulously 
recorded details – the effect of winds on waterfalls, the melting of snow on 
                                                 
38 Richard W. Judd, The Untilled Garden: Natural History and the Spirit of Conservation in America, 
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2009), Donald Worster, Nature’s Economy (San 
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39 Roosevelt, Conservation, 5. 
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evergreens, the sudden appearance and evaporation of clouds, and countless 
interrelationships of a kind usually overlooked by specialists.43 
Muir’s writings communicated his love for, and knowledge of, this land and inspired 
similar feelings in his audience. As one commentator puts it, “his readers, whether they 
be presidents, congressmen, or plain folks, were inspired and often moved to action by 
the enthusiasm of Muir’s own unbounded love of nature.”44 Muir revisited Yosemite for 
his entire life, as it always remained dear and deep to his heart and to his political 
compass. At the same time he also played a significant role in the creation of the 
Sequoia, Mount Rainier, Petrified Forest and Grand Canyon, national parks.45 The year 
after Yosemite suffered the loss of Hetch Hetchy Valley to a hydro-electric project, a 
project that divided Pinchot and Muir henceforth, Muir himself lost his life to 
pneumonia.  
This level of intimacy and personal connection of the conservationists with the places 
they were protecting was also facilitated through the non-motorized mode of travel by 
which conservationists, explorers and naturalists traversed the length of their 
landscapes, deploying the slow and tactile mediums of “foot, horseback or canoe.”46 
The proximity to place that such modes entail suggests a level of observation that was 
not only a matter of choice but also matter of survival.47 Like the Indigenous people of 
the land, attention was mandatory and as usually happens, where attention is given, 
affection and intrigue spring. This intimacy and subjectival knowing is reflected in the 
depth and detail of the conservationist’s language, which like Indigenous modes of 
expression, does not speak of the world as a sterile, unanimated and remote object 
separate from one’s own experience. To the contrary, such language reveals and gives 
expression to one’s connection with the creatures and places in which one is immersed. 
                                                 
43 Roosevelt, Conservation, 27. 
44 Roosevelt, Conservation, 27. 
45 Sierra Club, Sierra Club. “John Muir: A Brief Biography,” http://vault.sierraclub.org/john_ 
muir_exhibit/life/muir_biography.aspx (last modified April 29, 2013).  
46 Judd, The Untilled Garden, 309. 
47 The recognition that walking the land changes the way we relate to it, is explored by a number 
of writers. Two of the more recent theorists examining this relationship are Robert Macfarlane 
and Jules Pretty. Macfarlane, The Old Ways. Jules Pretty, This Luminous Coast: Walking England's 
Eastern Edge (New York: Cornell University Press, 2011). 
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Muir published up to three hundred articles and ten major books that described his 
travels, explicated his naturalist philosophy, and in which he beckoned everyone to 
“climb the mountains and get their good tidings.”48 In such writing is found his love and 
understanding of the places and creatures so dear to his heart. Speaking here of his 
feathered friends he writes that: 
Of all the great singers that sweeten Wisconsin one of the best known and best 
loved is the brown thrush or thrasher, strong and able without being familiar, and 
easily seen and heard. Rosy purple evenings after thundershowers are the favourite 
song-times, when the winds have died away and the steaming ground and the 
leaves and flowers fill the air with fragrance. Then the male makes haste to the 
topmost spray of an oak tree and sings loud and clear with delightful enthusiasm 
until sundown … and how faithful and watchful and daring he is!49 
In a similar tone and with the same reverence for the land she inhabits, Florence Bailey, 
tells of a poignant and finally disturbing scene: 
Coming down into the forest primeval, where the majestic hemlocks towered 
straight toward the sky … there we found the blue jays in their home. A flock of 
them lived together, feeding on wild berries and beechnuts, sporting among the 
ferns and mosses and drinking from the brook that babbled along near the trail … 
But the memory of the spot is dreary. Unmoved by the beauty of the scene, to 
which the blue jays gave color and life; unawed by the benedicte of the hemlocks; 
betraying the trust of the friendly birds, the boy of the party crept into their very 
home and shot down one after another of the family as they stood resistless before 
him. Today the pitiful lament of the brave old birds haunts me.50 
These narratives tell not of epistemological or ethical distance but speak of a depth of 
knowing and feeling born out of intimate relationship. Such relationship did not arise in 
dreams of escape from a sordid urban reality, as characterised the Romantics, nor from 
abstract systems of classification and the objective analysis of the natural world, which 
identifies late ecological knowledge. Rather, the conservationists’ was a subjective 
knowing that emerged through intimacy, observation, kinship and love of a dramatic, 
commanding and sometimes foreboding land. It was this embodied and embedded 
knowing that prefaced their will to conserve. In these key respects the conservation 
movement emerged from, a land ethic that existed between place and person and did not 
exist in person alone.  
                                                 
48 Sierra Club, “John Muir,” http://vault.sierraclub.org/john_muir_exhibit/life/muir_biography. 
aspx. 
49 Muir, The Story of My Boyhood and Youth, 113. 
50 Florence Bailey, quoted in Holmes, American Women Conservationists, 43. 
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Due to the conservationists’ level of intimacy with, and knowledge of, the land as 
revealed in their writings, Judd argues that the conservation movement could not have 
emerged from the ‘thin national tradition’ captured by the lives of its few key figures 
alone.51 He suggests rather, that it its roots lay in the more nuanced naturalist tradition 
that began some one to two hundred years earlier.52 From this perspective, the seeds of 
the conservation movement were sown in the thinking and practices of explorers and 
naturalists such as John James Audubon (1785-1851), Mark Catesby (1682-1749), 
Thomas Nuttall (1786-1859), Charles Lyell, (1797-1875), John Bartram (1699-1777), 
William Bartram (1739-1823) Benjamin Barton (1766-1815), Meriwether Lewis (1774-
1809), and Constantine Rafinesque (1783-1840), among others.53 According to Judd, 
these and the hundreds of like-minded characters who traipsed the American continent 
between the mid eighteenth to the mid nineteenth century, dedicated their lives to 
understanding nature and “commented on everything from antiquities to zoology, 
including … the human condition in this wilderness.”54 These figures were key in the 
discovery of new species, in their observations of the local flora and fauna and their 
place in the natural order. In bearing witness to the rapid and often vast destruction and 
transformation of much of America’s wilderness, their understanding of ecological 
connection was firsthand. Damage to one part of the system was visibly and 
immediately seen to affect another. From such understanding they promoted the idea 
that Americans were morally bound to preserve the health and stability of this ecological 
whole and the creatures for which it was home. In this sense, they can be seen to have 
cultivated the ecological understanding and appreciation to which later conservationists 
responded. 
Like the conservationist’s narratives, the naturalist’s records, were full of life, colour and 
affection for the nature they observed. The travellers’ descriptions embody a sense of 
camaraderie with their other-than-human kin, full of anecdotal observation and 
brimming with imagination, humour and wonder. Thus, for example, the esteemed 
ornithologist, John James Audubon provides an intricate account of birds: 
                                                 
51 Judd, The Untilled Garden and Common Lands, Common People. 
52 Judd, The Untilled Garden and Common Lands, Common People. 
53 Judd, The Untilled Garden, 6-7. 
54 Judd, The Untilled Garden, 6. 
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But see, the tide is advancing: the billows chase each other towards the shores; the 
mullets, joyful and keen, leap along the surface, as they fill the bays with their 
multitudes. The slumbers of the Pelicans are over; the drowsy birds shake their 
heads, stretch open their mandibles and pouch by way of yawning, expand their 
ample wings, and simultaneously soar away. Look at them as they fly over the bay; 
listen to the sound of the splash they make as they drive their open bills . . . mark 
how they follow that shoal of porpoises, and snatch up the frightened fishes that 
strive to escape them.55 
Likewise, the nineteenth century Alabama naturalist Thomas Nuttall, describes the birds 
that: 
…play around us like fairy spirits, elude approach in an element which defies our 
pursuit, soar out of sight in the yielding sky, journey over our heads in marshalled 
ranks, dart like meteors in the sunshine of summer, or, seeking the solitary recesses 
of the forest and the waters, they glide before us like beings of fancy … How 
volatile, how playfully capricious, how musical and happy, are these roving sylphs 
of nature.56  
This level of imaginative intimacy is also revealed in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries naturalist’s and explorers’ pictures, where the creatures being sketched, rather 
than being presented in structural and anatomical detail or static pose, are drawn as 
animate, often moving, paw raised, about to leap, fly, dive, perhaps catch an unwitting 
spectator.57 This is the image of life – not death – as the intelligible condition. 
It is important to remember that language consists of not simply a telling, a description 
of a static world, but that our very expression reveals a way of being in and of this 
world. The way one speaks to, of, and with, place indicates the kind of relationship one 
has – or fails to have – with place. As Cheney observes; 
… language is a mode of interaction … that affects the life and behaviour of all 
other animate forms…The mindfulness – or etiquette – we bring to our interaction 
with the world shapes our knowledge of that world.58  
In their ways of knowing and being in place is the fundamental synthesis between the 
naturalists and conservationists – one that sets them apart from the enlightenment and 
Romantic tradition that respectively objectifies and separates nature from human 
experience.  
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The conservationists spoke out for, lived within and intimately knew the wild-erness at a 
time when nature was considerably more physically immediate and threatening than it is 
today. They also spoke for a land ethic59when the ethical was increasingly a matter of 
individualised convictions and when there was powerful social resistance to opposing 
the colonial norm. When the intersecting and shifting baselines of place, person and 
community are taken into account, the level of ecological consciousness the 
conservationists had compared to earlier romantics and later environmentalists, 
becomes apparent. But it is also clear that in the practice of defining and protecting the 
wild, the conservationists also unwittingly participated in the definition and protection 
of culture. This is particularly apparent in the national park model. In the cultural 
environment of settler America, wilderness could only be protected if kept at a safe 
distance from the garden. If the wild was removed from normal day-to-day human 
experience it could to some extent be normatively accepted. For the conservationists, 
such a remove was not the norm, these parks were known and loved places, yet for 
many of their own and subsequent generations they remained largely unknown, sparsely 
visited areas that stood outside of daily life and reinforced the nature/culture divide. As 
a park, the wild is not a free but a conditional space, the condition being paradoxically, 
that the wild is not too-wild, that it is in fact, contained. In this way the national park 
ideal was at its conceptual centre deeply flawed and yet at the same time it undeniably 
placed a check on the drive to be rid of wilderness altogether.60  
The ideology of the separation of the human from the other-than-human world has 
continued and it is this that has become the very premise of environmentalism. 
Environmentalism, as Anthony Weston suggests, delegates protection of the ‘earth’ to 
its human custodians, who remain safe and fit in an increasingly unsafe and unfit world. 
                                                 
59 Aldo Leopold, in tracing his relationship with the land, coined the term land ethic, well before 
environmental ethics had come to the fore as a body of theory. Aldo Leopold, A Sand County 
Almanac: With Other Essays on Conservation from Round River (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1966). 
60 Under this park model if the geographical distance between the wild and the garden is 
transgressed, nature ceases to be a source of wonder and awe becoming instead a site of fear and 
a threat to be banished or killed. Currently this is disturbingly apparent in the policy to cull 
sharks that merely exist in their own habitat, in the panicked removal and/or destruction of 
urban dwelling snakes and in the northern hemisphere the eradication of bears or wolves who 
frequent rural areas, grazing as they will on livestock. 
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This is an inversion of the order of things, for in actuality it is “nature [that] conserves 
us, as the Naskapi Indians say, not we it.”61 Because of this inbuilt pull towards 
separation, when the wild became scientifically named, cordoned, distanced and thus 
diminished, the self-place relationship at the centre of the conservationists’ approach, 
collapsed. 
Hence the twentieth century environmental movement began at a significant ecological, 
epistemological and ethical disadvantage. Its revolutionary hands, were, from the outset, 
tied. The space into which it was to fight for the ‘environment’ was a space already 
separate from human being, from the self, from self-knowing and from the ethical as a 
form of cultural transformation. 
 
 
From Conservation of Place to Protection of the Environment 
Between the decline of the conservation movement in the early 1930s to the rise of the 
environment movement in the early 1960s there was a period of relative quiet. This was 
not in terms of ecological destruction and consumer production, which continued 
unassailed, but in the volume of voices speaking out against such practices. Prior to the 
1960s, according to McNeill, “no co-ordinated policies or political currents dealt with 
the environment as such” but this changed “as a direct result of the tumult in the world 
of ideas.”62 As a social phenomenon protest was exploding in the 1960’s. Here emerging 
environmental concern shared the protest arena with the fight for women’s rights, racial 
equality, and anti-war demonstrations. This period galvanised an increasingly vocal mix 
of philosophers, scientists, farmers, students, mothers, teachers, activists and members 
of the general public who started to think, and started to say, that something was wrong.  
For many a turning point was the 1962 publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. In 
this ground-breaking text, Carson documented the deadly effects of pesticide use on 
human and other-than-human communities. What galvanised public attention was not 
only the toxic effects of this ‘certified’ industry but also the fact that a scientist was 
speaking out against the establishment of which she was part. Under the power of her 
                                                 
61 Anthony Weston, Back to Earth: Tomorrow’s Environmentalism (Philadelphia, PA: Temple 
University Press, 1994), 3. 
62 McNeill, Something New Under the Sun, 337. 
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dissident voice and her well-documented arguments, Carson collected a support base in 
the same manner that environmental organisations with their own anthems of dissent 
began to collect members.63 From this time forth a wealth of national and international 
environmental organisations emerged. Some of the more prominent groups included 
societies such as Greenpeace, founded in Canada in 1971, The Wilderness Society, 
Earth First!, Friends of the Earth (the second chapter of The Sierra Club), Earth Watch, 
Worldwide Fund for Nature, World Conservation Union, Wetlands International and 
Sea Shepherd. Alongside these arose a multitude of local and regional forest, marine, 
estuarine, flora and fauna protection societies. 
However, despite the calibre and force of these groups and their protests, these 
organisations were and have been for the last fifty years largely unsuccessful in 
challenging patterns of destruction. At each instance, when a local area is seemingly 
saved or a new environmental law is introduced, this apparent win is undercut by 
further and more wide reaching destruction, made ‘feasible’ by the allocation of a 
‘protected’ area. An example of this is the ‘win’ by the Tasmanian Wilderness Society in 
1984, to save Tasmania’s last wild river from being dammed. At the time this might 
have seemed like a cultural turning point. But today, environmentalists are caught in 
tireless efforts to stop more and multiple destructions. In Tasmania alone, and to name 
but two recent incursions: the world heritage listed forests of the Florentine Valley are 
set to be logged by the Australian government and the fragile ecosystem of the Tarkine 
Wilderness is under threat from mining, while new legislation is being introduced that 
makes protest under certain conditions illegal.64 The lack of success environmentalists 
experience is thus through no fault of their own or through lack of effort and concern 
but is due to the fact that the place from which they are speaking and the culture which 
they are addressing is one  that is epistemologically and ethically separate from place. 
This is no more apparent than in the discourse of the environment. The environment, 
                                                 
63 While making note of Carson’s historical significance I do not intend to underestimate the 
struggle she went through with the pesticide industry. The challenges she was up against are 
narrated in her biography: Linda Lear, Rachel Carson: Witness for Nature (New York: Henry Holt 
and Company, 1997). 
64 “The Legislative Council has backed the Tasmanian Government's anti-protest laws, which 
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…On-the-spot fines for first-time offenders were dropped from $2,000 to $280 but the upper 
limit is still set at $10,000 for repeat offenders.” “Tasmania’s Anti-Protest Laws Pass Upper 




as Anthony Weston relates, is not something that one is part of, belongs to, or craves 
but “supposes a point of reference, something or someone surrounded. And of course 
that point of reference is – us!”65 The ‘us’ to which Weston refers is a self not in or of 
this environment but separate from it (and the earth), a spokesperson, an advocate, a 
supporter – barracking from the stands.  
When place became the environment, usurping ecology in the same way that ecology 
had previously filled the space that oeconomy once inhabited, the ‘wild’ had long been a 
place that was not considered home (except by a few individuals) but this was not just a 
semantic exchange of terms. For what was reflected in this language was a change in 
relationship to these places at the level of culture. Discussion and analysis of the 
environment and environmental problems, is discussion and analysis of a place and a set 
of problems that are inherently abstract and separate from human life; it is a place that is 
not now and could never be, in this definition, home. Accordingly, in late modernity, 
the wilderness has been ideologically and geo-physically consigned to the periphery of 
civilisation and all but divested of its capacity to pose a moral or physical threat. In 
addition, widespread industrial and technological developments that keep the wild-
erness at a vast and ‘safe’ distance mean that subjective knowing of, and moral 
commitment to, wild places is less and less culturally possible. The wilderness is now 
defined as an object of scientific and legal discourse and dispensation – as, for example, 
“a place that is mostly biologically intact” and “a place that is legally protected so that it 
remains wild, and free of industrial infrastructure, and open to traditional indigenous 
use, or low impact recreation.”66 The story of modern environmental protest is thus one 
that is speaking of a place that is not part of human experience or human identity as 
culturally prescribed. Compounding this is the fact that the protest culture is one that is 
also premised on separation. The very act of speaking out is to speak out as a self who 
has an individual right to his/her voice. One can speak thus as a black, as a woman, as a 
homosexual, a pacifist or as an advocate of the earth, the ‘cause’ being always subsidiary 
to the right to be heard. What then collects the disparate voices is that which, ironically, 
also divides them: their constitutionally distinct, individual right to speak. This 
                                                 
65 Weston, Back to Earth, 6. This is also apparent in the way people speak of their ‘surroundings,’ 
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66 The WILD Foundation, The WILD Foundation: How We Work. “What is a Wilderness Area,” 
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discursive stance divides them ethically not only from each other but also from that 
which they are speaking for. 
Hence, fifty years after the environmental movement emerged, the multitude of once 
marginalised voices have found a place in the public text, where they now reflect 
widespread opinion. ‘Extinction’, ‘global warming’, ‘deforestation’, ‘oil spills’ ‘cultural 
decimation’ have become part of the collective vocabulary. Yet far from being 
galvanising concepts, these form the basis of everyday reporting. Indeed environmental 
discourse and what appears as environmental consciousness are seemingly 
commonplace. As Weston wryly observes: 
We are all environmentalists now. Yet we stand at no less a distance from the 
more-than-human world: from “nature,” from other animals and natural places. 
We are no more inclined to acknowledge – certainly not really to feel – that we 
ourselves are at stake with “nature,” with the rest of the world: entwined, 
enveloped, submerged in it. Vanishing species, to take just one example, are only 
regretted in the way we might regret the loss of a television series … we move 
ourselves outside the system entirely. We have been “dangerous” now we must 
“care.” We are still the chief actors in this play, only now we must take a bit more 
care for the scenery.67  
Under this scenario, ‘nature’ comprises the set of phenomena variously under threat – 
rivers, species, eco-systems and forests. Their ‘protection’ is seen to exist in the absence 
of a particular threat, whether this involves a cease-mining by Woodside, the ‘banning’ of 
certain practices, a long awaited moratorium on the logging of old growth forests, or a 
report outlining in scrupulous detail the impending consequences that will result in the 
‘no-action’ option.68 In these respects, the problem is not seen to lie in the fundamental 
western premises of what it is to be human, (and the ‘solution’ therefore is not in 
challenging these premises) but is read as a limited, finite, earth bearing the consequence 
of a late technological-industrial-consumerist lifestyle. This lifestyle however is not up 
for contestation. 
                                                 
67 Weston, Back to Earth, 1-3. Analogously, even in the language of ‘saving the earth’, human 
separation is accentuated. 
68 One such is the seminal Club of Rome report whose scope and range attempts to account for, 
model and map the “‘limits to growth’ for the entire world system.” Carolyn Merchant, The 
Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row 
Publishers, 1980), 252. Obviously, since this time, damage and destruction has escalated as has 
the production of reports outlining this. One of the most well-known series of reports since the 
Club of Rome data, is the Climate Change reports produced by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). IPCC; “Organization.” Last 
modified January 29, 2015. http://www.ipcc.ch/ organization/organization.shtml. 
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The mainstream response is thus to try to preserve iconic ‘wild’ places, rivers, forests, 
beaches, with their own set of mega fauna, dolphins, elephants, koalas, tigers, while at 
the same time catering to western lifestyle yearnings so that they may be met in finite, 
ostensibly sustainable, material ways. Herein the crisis is not only offered technological, 
scientific, organisational, administrative and economic solution, but the lifestyle 
suggested by such solutions is the same lifestyle the affluent West now experiences, only 
with green alternatives replacing less sustainable models. Where our ‘choices’ may 
formerly have been understood as part of an individual, consumer practise they can now 
be written into a collective green ‘conscience.’ Arguably, under the green model it is not 
the patterns of consumption and citizenship themselves that change, but the packaging 
of consumer and civic practice. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five, 
these cultural solutions succeed only to perpetuate and reproduce both ecological and 
cultural pathology. 
That the environmental movement was not relieving assault on the environment, which 
was continuing relatively unmediated, caught the attention of the Norwegian 
philosopher Arne Naess in 1972. Together, with other concerned philosophers, Naess 
suggested that for any long-term transformational shift to occur, what we need to 
address is not just particular behaviours but our very relationship with the other-than-
human world. He called this approach, deep ecology.  
 
Deep Ecology 
Deep ecology emerged from within the midst of the culture where environmental 
protest was most active, the northern lands of Europe and America. It was also 
theoretically embedded in a suite of discourse that voiced a wide range of ecological 
dissent and debate. Much of the debate was focused on the difference between shallow 
reform oriented approaches and deeper cultural reform, also, within the cultural 
reformation (and transformation) models debate raged around social, political and 
ecological alliances. Some of the key schools of thought that arose at this time did so, in 
response and reaction to the claims of deep ecology. These included, amidst other 
minor camps, social ecology,69 political ecology,70 spiritual ecology71 and eco-feminism.72 
                                                 
69 See Murray Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism (Stirling, Scotland: AK Press 2004), Murray 
Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom (Stirling, Scotland: AK Press, 2005). 
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All these, perhaps most notably eco-feminism, have made key contributions towards 
furthering our understanding of the logic of domination and power that systematically 
underlies individually mediated, yet ultimately collective, behavioural norms which lead 
to the incremental and relentless devastation of the planet. 
What however distinguishes deep ecology from these schools is the manner in which it 
does not link this behaviour and its remediation to a political platform but to the 
experience of being human that is beyond questions of gender and questions of 
factional alliance. Its lens is focused on a metaphysical/ ontological examination of 
cultural practice not on a political or gendered examination of such practice. Whilst 
these alternative discourses provide valuable cultural commentary, in the specificity of 
their focus, this commentary remains limited in its capacity to redress the foundation of 
the crisis. Without considering, how, for example, patriarchy impacts on place, where 
place is an ecologically and culturally informed identity or how socialism frames and 
understands the self and how this understanding impairs relationship to place – or – 
how capitalism and the materialist imperative impact on the possibility for not only 
diverse political systems but for diverse mappings of the self, these theories, while 
valuable and powerful in their own terrain, remain in their efficacy confined to such 
terrain. Without this redress so much political, social and gender reform will remain 
palliative and fail to ultimately challenge and transform the cultural fabric and fail 
further to proffer insight into the way in which the threads of this fabric knit together. 
The key theorists of deep ecology, Arne Naess, Bill Devall, George Sessions, Warwick 
Fox and Andrew Laughlin,73 are thus singular in the way that they respond not only to 
                                                                                                                                          
70 See James O’Connor, Terry L. Anderson and Donald R. Leal, cited in Michael E. 
Zimmerman, J. Baird Callicott, George Sessions, Karen J. Warren and John Clark, eds., 
Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, 1998). 
71 Henryk Skolimowski, A Sacred Place to Dwell: Living with Reverence upon the Earth (Rockport, MA: 
Element Books, 1993). For an interesting analysis on Christianity’s role in shaping and mal-
forming human relationship to the earth, see Lynn White Jr, Medieval Religion and Technology: 
Collected Essays (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1978). 
72 See Freya Mathews, The Ecological Self (London: Routledge, 1991), Freya Mathews, Reinhabiting 
Reality: Towards a Recovery of Culture (Sydney, NSW: University of New South Wales Press, 2005), 
Merchant, The Death of Nature, Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London: 
Routledge, 1993), Val Plumwood, Environmental Culture: the Ecological Crisis of Reason (London: 
Routledge, 2002), and Karen J. Warren, Ecofeminist Philosophy: A Western Perspective on What it is 
and Why it Matters (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000). 
73 There are of course others who may be more or less happy to be counted as deep ecologists, 
these include Joanna Macy, Jim Cheney, Stephan Harding, Patsy Hallen and John Seed to name 
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the threat of human devastation upon the planet but to materialist ‘solution’ to such 
devastation. Deep ecology asks and demands deeper questions and deeper responses to 
what it considers to be a complex predicament of historical, ecological and ontological 
proportions, “the essence of deep ecology is to keep asking more searching questions 
about life, society and Nature as in the western philosophical tradition of Socrates.”74 
Deep ecologists argue that it is through this questioning process that the central norm 
of deep ecology becomes intuitively apparent. This is the norm of ecological 
consciousness. From this norm derive the subsequent norms of ‘self-realisation’ and 
‘biocentric equality’. While distinct, these three norms mutually inform each other. In 
deep ecology, to be realised as a self is to be conscious of the ultimate connectedness of 
the self with the wider ecological whole. The self if fully realised – in one of three 
possible interpretations75 – is indistinguishable from the wider ecological whole. John Seed 
proposes that when this identification is present, “‘I am protecting the rainforest’ 
develops into ‘I am part of the rainforest protecting myself. I am that part of the 
rainforest recently emerged into thinking ... the change is a spiritual one.”76 
The realisation of the ecological self requires the relinquishing or repositioning of the 
egoistic self – becoming conscious of the breathing, biotic world as composite of and 
co-extensive with self. In self-realisation therefore is ecological consciousness, a 
consciousness of the connectedness and interconnectedness of all parts of the living 
cosmos. It is to know that if we poison and degrade the earth we poison and degrade 
                                                                                                                                          
but a few of the more well-known writers and practitioners. This of course leaves glaringly 
absent the wealth of activists and campaigners who practise deep ecology and pursue its goals 
on a daily basis. For this reason I need to stress that the focus is here on the key theorists of this 
movement and the direction they offer in this theory. 
74 Devall and Sessions, Deep Ecology, 65. 
75 Warwick Fox documents the three kinds of self available to deep ecology theorists, these 
being, the indistinguishable self, the expanded self and the transpersonal self. Warwick Fox, 
Towards a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism (Boston, MA: 
Shambhala, 1990). I am only here focusing on the indistinguishable self – this is because it 
attempts the most direct relation to place and, as Plumwood observes, the transpersonal and 
extended self are heavily mired in respectively, the egoistic and rationalist models of the self, 
with the transpersonal self in seeking dis-attachment to the particular, reinforcing the 
universalizing, abstracting principles characteristic of rationalist accounts of the self, while the 
extended self in its taking into the self of the other denies and disrespects the difference of the 
other and to this extent further reinforces the presence and scope of the egoistic self. 
Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 173-182. 
76 John Seed, Thinking like a Mountain: Towards a Council of all Beings (Philadelphia, PA: New 
Society Publishers, 1988), 36. 
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ourselves. “The greater the comprehension of our togetherness with other beings, the 
greater identification and the greater care we will take.”77 
To the extent that this is not simply a consciousness of ecological destruction on its 
own terms but a consciousness of the way in which such destruction damages the 
possibility for being a fully realised self, self-realisation is intrinsically related to the 
second key deep ecology norm, biocentric equality. Biocentric equality is the intuition 
that all things in the biosphere have an equal right to live and flourish – they have an 
equal right to self-realisation. The greater the self-realisation of all beings – the greater 
the ecological diversity – the greater the potential for self-realisation of all beings “self-
realisation is the realisation of the potentialities of life ... the self-realisation we 
experience with the universe is heightened by the number of ways in which individuals, 
societies and even species and life forms realise themselves.”78 
Deep ecologists argue that in pursuing the norms of self-realisation, bio-centric equality 
and ecological consciousness, one is lead to one’s own ultimate premises that in turn 
lead to one’s own Ecosophy. There is no need for agreeance in ultimate premises, these 
can be found in sources as diverse as Buddhism, Christianity, Philosophy or any 
‘intuitive’ foundation that seems compatible with deep ecological leanings.79 For Naess 
his Ecosophy, grounded in place and philosophy was Ecosophy T – where T refers to 
Tvergastein. – the mountain hut in Norway where his thinking and being were most at 
home.80 
Aside from accessing one’s fundamental Ecosophy, through the deep questioning 
process, one must also, as a deep ecologist, accept something like the eight principles at 
the core of deep ecology that together form the deep ecology platform. The eight 
principles are a set of norms, beliefs, values, and implied actions that follow the form of 
a deductive argument with acceptance of the first five resulting in a commitment to six, 
seven and eight. They present not a definition of deep ecology but are intended to foster 
a collective allegiance to the ‘what is’ of what deep ecology represents. While they can 
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be interpreted according to one’s own worldview they cannot, by those who accept deep 
ecology, be rejected. They are as follows: 
1. The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman life on Earth have value in 
themselves (synonyms: inherent worth, intrinsic value, inherent value). These values 
are independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes. 
2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and 
are also values in themselves. 
3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital 
needs. 
4. Present human interference with the nonhuman world is excessive, and the situation 
is rapidly worsening. 
5. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease 
of the human population. The flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease. 
6. Policies must therefore be changed. The changes in policies affect basic economic, 
technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply 
different from the present. 
7. The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in 
situations of inherent worth) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard 
of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and 
great. 
8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly 
to participate in the attempt to implement the necessary changes.81 
Given that deep ecologists do not develop a theory per se, the eight point platform of 
deep ecology, alongside the cultivation of ecological consciousness and the related 
norms of self-realisation and biocentric equality, stand in for such. Deep ecologists also 
present as ‘evidence’ for their position a collage of thinkers from disparate discourses, 
who, in one way or another, seem to support deep cultural change. For this reason, 
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somewhat ironically, what we find in the deep ecology literature is not depth but 
breadth, with the authors in question quoted widely in an ad-hoc, unsystematic way. 
This has led to much criticism, Marshall writes that “these fine ideals often remain 
vague slogans without substance in the writings of deep ecology,”82with the 
qualifications issuing from biocentrism being ‘so ambiguous and vague that they are 
virtually meaningless.”83 Likewise part of Sylvan’s critique is directed at the wide bow 
deep ecology draws and the way in which such imprecision creates ‘conceptual 
murkiness’ and ‘degeneracy.’84 
Against this, Sessions and Devall argue, that deep ecology is strengthened by the wide 
array of traditions that support it – these include but are not limited to indigenous 
philosophies, the science of ecology, the perennial philosophy, the new physics, the 
pastoralist/naturalist literary tradition, singular poets, essayists and philosophers, 
feminism, some eastern spiritual traditions and some Christian sources.85 Accordingly, 
Naess boldly claims that, “the deep ecology movement tackles every major 
contemporary personal, economic, political, and philosophical problem.”86  
While the celebration of breadth does not necessarily counter critiques against deep 
ecology’s lack of depth and detail, part of the reason for this broad compass and lack of 
systemisation, is the reluctance on the part of deep ecologists to develop anything that 
may be interpreted first and foremost as an environmental ethic. What is at stake, they 
argue, and what is required, is a change that develops and persists at the more 
fundamental, experiential, level. Naess, Sessions, Devall and Fox all stress this distinction, 
arguing that, ‘the foundations of Deep Ecology are the basic intuitions and 
‘experiencing’ of ourselves and Nature which comprise ecological consciousness.’87 
Likewise Naess writes: 
I’m not much interested in ethics or morals. I’m interested in how we experience 
the world … if deep ecology is deep it must relate to our fundamental beliefs, not 
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just to ethics. Ethics follow from how we experience the world. If you experience 
the world so and so then you don’t kill.88 
This stress on the centrality of experience is tied into Naess’ belief in the significance of 
gestalts, that is, the experience of the whole by which we interpret reality. More 
fundamentally for Naess, this experience of the whole always occurs at what he calls the 
apperceptive level – an apprehension at the level of perception that includes both 
sensory and normative elements. In this interpretation ethical distinctions and broad 
distinctions of fact and value operate at the level of abstraction which is outside 
apperception.89 Naess argues that, for this reason, the world of apperceptive gestalt is 
the only world we can truly know and it is to this knowing that we need to orient 
ourselves in order to execute deep cultural change.90  
At first glance the deep ecologist’s emphasis on experience as the tool of transformation 
seems to assist them in overcoming some of the limitations that beset environmental 
ethicists. As Plumwood suggests, the tendency for environmental ethics is, 
unsurprisingly, to see both the core problem and the core solution as an ethical one 
where the problem presents as the lack of ethical expansion – to include other species/ 
systems/ life-forms and the solution, unsurprisingly is to expand or develop ethics in a 
direction that includes alternative species/ systems/ life-forms. The task then becomes 
making sense of an ethical model that will do justice to the sort of environmental 
change that is required to both preserve and respect ‘nature’, however we understand 
this. However, Plumwood insightfully suggests, that not only is ethical solution fraught, 
but the emphasis on conventional ethics as the key problem is deeply misplaced: 
Mainstream environmental philosophy is problematic not only just because of 
restriction in ethics but also because of restriction to ethics. Most mainstream 
philosophers continue to view environmental philosophy as primarily concerned 
with an extension of existing ethical frameworks … but this neglects the key 
further aspects … of dualism and the account of the self and of human identity as 
hyper-separated from nature, the connection between this and the instrumental 
view of nature, as well as the broader historical and political aspects of the critique 
of dualism and instrumentalism.91 
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What she narrates as the more fundamental and systemic problem is the rationalist 
tradition with its accompanying dualist structures. While critiquing deep ecology for its 
reversion to such a tradition Plumwood concedes that deep ecology has had some 
success in broadening the scope of concern beyond mere ethics to include questions of 
the self (as indicated in the ‘experience’ of the self), self-identity and discontinuity from 
nature.92  
Nonetheless it is not entirely clear that deep ecology avoids recourse to mainstream 
ethics altogether, invoking as it does, rights theory and general prescriptive positions 
both in its eight point platform and its norm of biospherical egalitarianism. Indeed one 
of the key critiques launched at deep ecology by Sylvan is that deep ecology, rather than 
having an experiential core, has a normative, value-prescriptive core.93 In response, 
Naess argues that he employs rights discourse since it is the “best expression I have 
found so far of an intuition I am unable to reject in all seriousness.”94 Likewise Sessions 
suggests that Naess, in citing the ‘equal right of all things to live and blossom’, is not 
suggesting a rights theory but is using the word ‘right’ in an everyday or metaphorical 
sense.95 However the difficulty Naess and Sessions face is that it is not the more careful 
philosophical sense but the ‘everyday’ sense that is precisely the problem, and precisely 
that which gives rise to the ‘intuition’ that rights are the appropriate means for changing 
relationship to the other-than-human world. The everyday thinking and rhetoric that 
surround discussions of rights tend to not focus on the individualistic, neo-liberal legacy 
from which rights are spawned. Rather, the emphasis is on how and where and for 
whom or what these rights should function. In this respect rights tend to be understood 
as a pre-given social and political reality that bear a certain obviousness to the modern 
citizen, one that makes ‘intuitive’ sense. This is acceptable of course, to the extent that 
one is not trying to transform current modes of thinking and being. If however, one is 
hoping to do this, as are the deep ecologists, then the invocation of rights discourse 
becomes problematic. For as even a cursory historical analysis reveals, rights, rather than 
being obvious or intuitive, are a discrete cultural product that are inseparable from the 
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idea and identity of the individual self in the liberal, democratic model.96 And it is 
precisely this idea of the self and the ontological premises that undergird it which is at 
the heart of the crisis.  
The problem for deep ecology here is not one of intention. It is certainly the goal of 
deep ecologists to move away from the liberal, individual, egoistic self as so defined and 
understood. The problem is one of extension. By extending rights discourse and 
language as the ‘solution’ one remains bogged in the same moral ground that produces 
the problem. The kind of mire that results from this, to name but one instance, is 
evident in Naess’s attempt to articulate the meaning of the universal right of all 
creatures to self-realisation. This universal right Naess suggests is not a prohibitive but a 
limiting norm for ‘we’ are always required to harm and kill the unfolding of certain 
others.97 If this is so, one has to wonder, what does it limit? And under what 
circumstances? Leaving the ‘limits’ up to the individual at once returns us to the 
individual as the ethical and epistemological centre, a centre whose validity to the culture 
at large has already been discounted. Further, in so doing, there is little priority given at 
the individual or cultural level, to care for the other-than-human world. Indeed the lack 
of any viable, long term protection for the other-than-human world testifies to the 
extent to which human interests and rights invariably trump the competing and 
conflicting rights of other species. In this regard, the inter-species problem is but an 
expansion on the inter-personal, for rights discourse in returning us to the site of the 
individual takes us not to a holistic space but an inherently separate and competitive 
space. My right is my moral ground that I stand in against yours. The point at which 
rights are realised and present moral conflict (and resolution) is the point at which ‘I’ as 
an individual assert my right – to free speech for example – against your right – to not 
be slandered. How this contested and reified space of the self can be useful in moving 
away from this egoistic self towards the holist setting of self-realisation and ecological 
consciousness is very unclear. As will be discussed in more detail in the next section, 
this is particularly the case, when the experience of the self is not one that is situated in 
sustained, deep relationship with the other-than-human world but conversely is one that 
reinforces on a daily basis the experience of the egoistic, individual self that is separated, 
geo-physically and epistemologically from the other-than-human world. Even in the 
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instance where rights are deemed universal, such as the right to free speech or clean 
water, where this right seems to collectivise it does not. For its universality applies to 
every single individual creature not to communities or relationships within communities. 
In so doing universal rights not only over-write other ways of knowing and being in 
place but also cast aside the ethical complexities and intuitions that arise out of specific, 
nuanced relationship. It seems rather that to effect, or at least proceed along, the path to 
the kind of transformation for which deep ecologists are hoping, the ‘idea’ of rights and 
egalitarianism need to be dispensed with in favour of a discourse that can succeed in 
moving away from the egoistic ‘s’elf.  
However, even if we were to accept, for arguments sake, Naess’ claim at face value, and 
assume that his ‘intuition’ can function unaffected by the neo-liberal history in which it 
is embedded, the ultimate solution to which deep ecologists refer – that of 
transformation at the experiential level – presents yet deeper problems. These problems 
suggest quite a different mapping of the self to the ecological self for which the deep 
ecologists are hoping. 
In arguing that ‘experience’ as the loci of a certain knowing, is the epistemological 
alternative to mainstream responses to the crisis and an alternative to ethical solution, 
Naess hopes to shift the individual’s environmental decision making process from what 
otherwise presents as a site of personal sacrifice. Rightly suggesting that, “when people 
feel that they unselfishly give up or even sacrifice their self-interests to show love for 
nature this is probably in the long run a treacherous base for conservation,”98 he 
proffers the experience of ecological unity as the unselfish alternative. In this way it 
seems we both avert conversations that are limited to the ‘egoistic’ self, with the 
associated moral complexity and confusion, while moving towards ontological unity as 
the foundation of a wider, deeper, larger selfhood. Consequently, there is no sense of 
sacrifice for in acting to protect the rainforest one is, to use John Seed’s metaphor again, 
not forgoing but protecting oneself, “through the extension of the self, our ‘own’ best is 
also that of others. The own/not-own distinction survives only in grammar not in 
feeling.”99 
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Expanding on this, Naess names this relationship, as one of reciprocity. If I damage the 
rainforest I damage a part of myself. However, there are two core dilemmas here: one is, 
to understand that in damaging the rainforest one is damaging oneself one has to 
already have had sustained, deep connection with the rainforest at an experiential and 
not just an intellectual level. Yet it is precisely this kind of experience that is both 
epistemologically and physically not available to the culture at large. ‘We’, live at a 
farther and farther remove from the more-than-human world, where this world asserts 
its physical and epistemological claims on us. Even where this experience is available, in 
any given moment, it is rarely sustained, for the ‘wilderness’ is still the unknown - or the 
subjectively known. In the case of the former, there is no relationship with wild places 
and in the latter instance the relationship is not culturally validated. The wilderness is 
not a place that is lived in, it is certainly not home, rather it is visited and consumed. As 
will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, experience, in late-modernity, 
is not a space for transformation at the individual or cultural level. For, in the contexts 
of late modernity, experience itself tends to not be a mode of connection or self-
extending but a mode of consumption, a mode of self-filling. The ingesting experiential 
self, in this setting, is not the self that reaches out to the world but is the self that 
voraciously takes the world in. Experience, thus, more often than not, is but another site 
of distortion.  
The second problem with deep ecology’s use of experiential knowing is a logical one. 
Within an experiential context, it follows that, if I am damaged, I will damage the 
rainforest. This is a key problem that Naess and the deep ecologists overlook. For in 
advancing the experience of unity and connection as the solution to ongoing destruction 
they fail to theorise the site of the self as a cultural phenomenon, where damage is 
already at advanced, systemic levels. The problem is that the damage at the level of 
culture, in which the multitude of selves to which Naess is referring are immersed, is too 
vast and physically and epistemologically embedded, to allow ‘experience’ to be a way 
out. To the contrary, the experience available to most late modern selves, of depleted 
and shut off places, reinforces the cycle of destruction. Further, for those who ‘visit’ the 
wild, they primarily do not do so in a way that fosters or facilitates connection and 
continuity with such places. Rather, this landscape, is, from the car window, or the 
bungalow window, kept at significant epistemological and ethical distance. This is not a 
place that can be connected to, except by a minority - of which Naess is part. The 
minority, however, does not reflect and cannot be a solution to the pattern of being 
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human in the culture at large. By the deep ecologist’s own logic, any given self, for 
whom experience is the mode of being in and responding to the world, has little choice 
but to keep damaging the rainforest. This is no more pressing then in late modernity 
where the excessively (and continuously) damaged site of the environment coupled with 
the premise of ‘experience’ as the key epistemological tool suggests a collation of 
excessively damaged selves. Such damage means as Snyder observes that “human beings 
themselves are at risk, not just on some survival or civilizational level, but more basically 
on the level of heart and soul.”100  
Compounding this is not only how place is experienced but the kind of place that is 
experienced. The late-modern self is shaped and mapped not by rainforests, deserts and 
mountain lakes but by those places within which we are in daily epistemological 
exchange. These are the stairwells, car-parks, highways, shopping centres, florescent lit 
boardrooms and cemented, gridded, often homogenous and impermeable forms that 
compose our urban landscapes. This is not to suggest that the kind of self, shaped by 
such forms, is without goodness or moral virtue. This is not the nature of this 
observation. Rather, I suggest that this kind of self, in being moulded by the properties 
of the world within which she primarily moves, becomes necessarily less sensitive and 
responsive to the needs, calls, and subjectivity of other-than-human place. The other- 
than-human sphere is not that through which one’s identity is carved, rather the late-
modern self is increasingly existentially and epistemologically remote from the other and 
within such a setting experience is not the solution but the problem, for rather than 
transforming consciousness, it reinforces the given consciousness.  
Further if one is to build an argument from materiality this need include all materiality. 
Yet we exist in a world saturated by plastic veneers and rigid impermeable structures 
which suggests we are primarily shaped by this world and its attendant structures, values 
and beliefs. This has the implication that among other things we too become less and 
less permeable and thus less able to receive and enter in to relationship with the other-
than-human world. Herein Naess’ point, that ‘we are the mountains dancing’ is correct 
but its very correctness is one that makes deep ecological alternatives unviable. While we 
respond to the world in kind, ‘we’ are today not the mountains dancing, largely they 
dance on the outskirts of human community. We are rather, the concrete blocking biotic 
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life. We respond still to the world, but firstly to the world in which we live, which is 
primarily one of concrete towers, super-highways, super-markets and throwaway objects 
that consume the very places Naess speaks of.101 
Naess himself acknowledges this difficulty regarding built geographies, suggesting that;  
rooms, interiors, stairs, farmyards, gardens, nearby trees, bushes – all these things 
become, on the whole unconsciously, a part of that which is ours, a powerful kind 
of gestalt. The geographic relationships are of great importance in an appraisal of 
urbanisation and design and its penetrating transformation of personality.102  
If we are to take seriously Naess’s gestalt description of experience, then it follows that 
with changes in geographic relationship the whole will be changed in a – deleterious – 
way that is not accessible either at the conscious or the individual level. This form of 
experience and knowing cannot therefore be transformed by the individual by processes 
of conscious questioning – such as deep ecology advocates. 
In this failure to theorise the site of the self, and by advancing the centrality of 
experience, deep ecologists inadvertently reinforce not identification but separation. In 
this, deep ecologists are faced with a double bind. If one is to assume that the late 
modern self is intact and unaffected by the places within which she dwells, this implies 
that this self is separate from these places, both in their geographical and cultural setting. 
Alternatively, if one assumes that the modern self is shaped by such places then the 
separateness and impermeability of such places will become the separateness and 
impermeability of the self. Deep ecologists are left then with the hyper-separate self that 
is separate because of her capacity to connect (with late modern forms) or the separate 
self that cannot connect and therefore does not get mapped by late modern forms or by 
the natural world. For either self, the knowing that may transform relationship with the 
other-than-human world in daily self-constructive experience is simply not available. 
And ethical decisions which may arise from a knowing of ‘connection’ are increasingly 
unlikely.  
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Indeed the failure to theorise the site of the self reflects the failure by deep ecologists to 
sufficiently theorise the site of culture.103 And in this is the crux of the deep ecologists’ 
problem, that it is the (unsituated) self that is seen as the conduit for cultural change. In 
their explication of certain values and goals and in stressing the need for such 
explication, deep ecologists make two false assumptions. The first is that ‘fundamental’ 
norms and values exist and function primarily in the ‘individual’ – and if these are 
accessed and challenged, cultural transformation can be had. The second is that ultimate 
norms and values are ‘unearthed’ primarily through an isolated process of self-reflection 
in the form of deep questioning, rather than through engagement in the world at large.  
These mistakes have serious consequences for deep ecology as a tool for cultural 
change. Firstly, in situating the site of change and solution in the individual, the deep 
ecologists return us to the very ideology that is producing the crisis. A reliance on 
individual analysis in this instance is romantic in ideation, ahistorical in critique and 
antithetical to deep ecology’s purported holist orientation. The recourse to the 
individual also moves one way from scrutiny of the culture out of which the individual 
is formed. This brings us to the second mistake – a failure to unearth the way in which 
norms and values are implicit and embedded in the cultural fabric and the way in which 
they therefore construct identity and the self. In an important sense, the individual does 
not choose those norms and values that determine and inscribe what it is to be human 
in the places and practices of daily life. Rather these form the larger historical and geo-
physical web into which we, as temporary, contextual selves are woven. Self-reflection 
on these norms and values is rarely effective then in changing the collective nature of 
these norms and values. At best such reflection places us alone, in a ‘world of 
wounds’.104  
Not only then does deep ecology take us no further along the path of cultural change 
but the ‘idea’ of place which it employs returns us to the cultural norm. Nature, in deep 
ecology, corresponds to nature as mapped in the discourse of the 
Romantic/Enlightenment model and to the ancient idea of the wild as that which is 
separate from and opposite to culture. In this respect, Plumwood argues, deep ecology, 
rather than challenging the dualist structure that defines western metaphysics, 
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reproduces it. This, she suggests, is chiefly reproduced through the denial of difference 
and the assimilation of the other into the self, that deep ecology’s versions of the self 
advance. In looking for unity and oneness deep ecology fails to scrutinise the idea of the 
self and the human that gave rise to separation in the first place and to this extent fails 
to challenge this idea. The recognition of both continuity and difference are key, in 
Plumwood’s account, to the overcoming of the dualist structures that separate the 
human from the other-than-human world and are at the heart of the historical 
devaluation and degradation of both women and nature.105   
In failing to theorise the separation of nature from culture, deep ecology faithfully 
represents the wild as an untainted source of renewal from which the tainted human can 
seek reconnection and wholeness. Thus the wild, in the historical tradition I have been 
documenting, continues in deep ecology translation to be defined against culture and in 
this definition forms part of the dualist logic where the more powerful side of the 
dualist structure (culture) homogenises, incorporates and hyper-separates from the 
disempowered side (nature). In this very idealising of nature, deep ecology does little to 
admit its otherness, the different and unique being of other life forms, or to examine the 
ontological and epistemological ‘separation’ from nature on which western culture relies.  
By staying within the fundamental cultural premises of being human, those that shape 
relationship to place, deep ecology, at the same time, poses a false dichotomy, 
suggesting that only two alternatives exist - the mainstream ‘shallow’ response to the 
crisis or total identification with ‘nature’. Not only does this dichotomy reinforce the 
cultural tendency to search for ‘solution’ rather than deep analysis of the problem (the 
distorted cultural) but in the process, it reproduces the failure of environmental 
discourse to theorise culture and the self, and to sincerely investigate the limitations of 






                                                 




In tracing the history of environmental protest and its relationship to the loss of 
ecological consciousness, a pattern emerges. What we witness with the rise of the 
protest movement is an equal rise in the destruction of the other-than-human world. 
Both seem to coincide. This does not, of course, suggest causality, while increased 
destruction may trigger more protest of a certain kind, increased protest does not, one 
would think, trigger increased destruction. Rather, a more subtle and important point is 
apparent, this is, that the rise of the protest movement is deeply implicated in a certain 
individualised, rights based culture. And this culture is one that depends, for its 
meaning, on the separation of the human from the other-than-human world and a 
consequent cultural imperviousness to the destruction of this world. A reluctance or 
incapacity to identify such stops us from seeing that ecological consciousness is 
diminishing rather than increasing over time, that consciousness of place relies on 
consciousness in place. If I am right in suggesting that we are living in times of 
diminished consciousness, this means that as much as we can speak of the desecration 
of place in some senses, at the level of culture we do not fully understand this loss, 
perhaps we are even immune to it. More problematically still, it seems, that we do not 
know that we do not know. 
Reading the environmental protest movement as a story of diminishing efficacy, a story 
whose loss of ‘voice’ corresponds to the loss of place and relationship to place – the loss 
herein of ecological consciousness –,  it bodes us well to consider alternative stories, 
those that have examined the malformations of culture, self and nature in a late-modern 
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“The best way to keep a prisoner from escaping is to make sure he never knows 
he’s in prison” Fyodor Dostoyevsky. 
“If Facebook were a country it would be the third largest in the world.”1 
 
Some years ago I was returning from the East of Australia on that long red highway that stretches 
across the country to the West. Part of this is called, The Great Ocean Road. If you are not familiar 
with this particular three hundred kilometre expanse then it will be difficult for me to translate the 
breath-taking, awe-inspiring and perspective giving symphony of sea-sculpted limestone, stupendous cliff 
face and immense wild ocean that this ‘road’ provides access to. It is one of those places on earth that in 
its untainted magnificence both humbles and transports. You know those places, those few that still 
exist. So perhaps in knowing others you can imagine the power and presence of this encounter. 
Due to its overwhelming beauty and undoubtedly for reasons of driver safety there are intermittent 
viewing platforms, walk trails, and rest areas where you can stop and be member to its salty, sandy, 
windswept magnificence. You can listen, breath in, touch, smell, be enveloped by its presence.  
We were. But not completely. For what I cannot name as anything other than a cultural disturbance, 
perhaps a cultural sin of sorts broke the spell, the “spell of the sensuous.”2 It was not anything 
                                                 
1 Rob Williams, “Revealed: The third largest ‘country’ in world – Facebook hits one billion 
users,” The Independent, October 4, 2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-
tech/news/ revealed-the-third-largest-country-in-the-world--facebook-hits-one-billion-users-
8197597.html. 
2 The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-than-Human World, is the appropriate 
and evocative title, and subject, of David Abram’s examination of the alienation from the 
sensuous world, that characterises modern life. David Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception 
and Language in a More-Than-Human World (New York: Vintage Books, 1996). 
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abnormal, indeed it was something very common. And yet it was also something deeply perverse. Its 
perversity in this particular place stood out like a neon sign polluting the land with its fluorescent gaze. 
This perversity came in the form of the photo, the record. Yet what was perverse was not the photo itself. 
One understandably yearns to capture and hold on to the vision of such natural splendour. No, it was 
not simply the photo. Rather it was the subject. The images being snapped away at were not of this 
breathtaking piece of landscape but of the self. Land and sea were merely backdrop, panorama, a scenic 
‘environment’. 
Within less than an hour of being perched on the cliff top overlooking this expanse, we witnessed bus 
load after car load after bus load of what could only be called spectators, swarming out of their vehicles, 
talking hurriedly, walking hurriedly, on their march to the photo-opportunity landmark. A minute 
hence they stood, smiling cheese, before quickly glancing around and within five, four, three minutes or 
less, hurriedly returning to their vehicles, satisfied, driving away, with proof, that they had in fact, been 
on the Great Ocean Road. 
This bothered me for a long time. Innocuous perhaps to others, it seemed to me, albeit opaquely at the 
time, to signify a deep malaise. It was not just its quality of superficial engagement, it was something 
else, something much more disturbing. That drive was now twelve years ago. Since then my feelings of 
anger and incredulity have transmuted into a kind of despair, a worried sadness of sorts, a need to 
understand what is in fact going on. What is at the root of these phenomena and what links these 
behaviours, and much other, superficially disparate behaviour, together? Needless to say that within the 
ensuing years this pathological obsession with the self has only intensified, one need look no further than 
the proliferation and utilisation of social media sites for evidence of this. Yet the pathology of the self is to 
be found not only in the production and reproduction of the image of the self, this is simply its more 
recent and extreme manifestation, though one that I will argue threatens irreversible change for the fate of 
subjectivity. This pathology is found in saturated form in every dimension of our culture. And this 
pathology both in its incubus and in its proliferation feeds on the world. 
Since the mid to late twentieth century the process of self-referencing has received 
increasing intellectual attention and has become a source of sophisticated speculation 
and debate.3 Yet this debate has been largely disconnected from conversations 
                                                 
3 Seminal theorists that have commented on this process include, Zygmunt Baumann, Jean 
Baudrillard, Theodor Adorno, Jurgen Habermas, and Max Horkheimer. The deformation of the 
self which these theorists document is attributed variously to the rise of the industrial world 
with its dehumanizing processes of mechanization, the domination of capitalism and the logic of 
the market place, the reign of bureaucracy with its efficiency, means driven rationale and the 
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surrounding the problem of rampant ecological destruction. Somehow the two are seen 
to be separate issues that are logically unrelated to each other. If the connection between 
the two is made, it is one that is generally material in nature, one that marks our habits 
of consumption, (but not the endless production and reproduction of images of the 
self), as those, which in draining natural ‘resources,’ are inherently unsustainable. In such 
conversations, the natural world as constituent of our very humanity is absent. In 
scrutinizing this fissure and drawing conceptual bridges across this divide, and in 
analysing the process of the objectification of the self, I argue that our cultural practises 
of self construction are implicitly and endemically woven into the practises, processes and 
outcomes of ecological destruction. In this, consumption, as a process both of self 
construction and ecological destruction, is key.  
In particular, I want to draw attention to the distinction between consumption as an 
obsessive behaviour (widely documented), and consumption as an ontological form 
(widely undocumented). As a reasonably well-scrutinized behaviour, consumption 
emerges as cultural form with the collective influences of industrialisation, capitalism 
and urbanisation. In the digital age of late modernity, it produces what I am naming as 
the ‘record,’ the frenzy to photograph, film, blog, tweet, record any and every moment. 
The ‘record’ here presents, ostensibly, as the next material increment in an extended 
process of self-representation and self-externalisation. However, I am arguing that what 
the production of the record reveal is the (collective) search for proof. This search is not 
consumption intensified but rather represents a threshold change, a shift in the baseline 
of what it is to be a self. The self, in adopting consumption as an ontological form, 
becomes not the consumer but the consumed, becomes ultimately object. In this the 
possibilities for returning and relating to the world-as-other (i.e., not-self) are few. In 
this therefore the possibilities of knowing what it is to be human, to be a self are also 
few. In this, we need proof that we do, in fact, exist 
 It is, nonetheless, my hope, that if we cease to consider the late modern processes of 
self construction as merely futile, somewhat desperate and benign gestures but instead 
come to see them as deeply implicated in the malformation of our world, then the 
                                                                                                                                          
tyranny of Enlightenment science at the expense of other epistemologies and other ways of 
being. Consumerism also features as derivative from, and enhancing of, these systems. While 
these are all powerful and significant analyses in their own right, insofar as they do not speak to 
the relationship between ecological destruction and the loss of subjectivity (aside from Baumann 
who will be discussed in Chapter Five) they will not be included in this discussion. 
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other-than-human world may become less endangered and we, in the process, may 
come that bit closer to our human being. We may stop to smell the salt, the brine, the 
unfathomable itself in the Great Ocean breeze.  
 
The Death of Subjectivity 
That ecological destruction and the loss of subjectivity are inextricably linked and exist 
together in a feedback mechanism is not immediately apparent. The agreed upon 
manifestations of the crisis in subjectivity, often referred to as the identity crisis,4 
phenomena such as searing levels of depression, accelerating incidence of unprovoked 
homicidal outbursts, rising addiction rates, relentless consumption and generalised angst 
and despair are not considered to bear any necessary relation to ecological destruction, 
as found in deforestation, air and water pollution, over-fishing, widespread species 
extinction, global warming and ozone depletion, to name but a few phenomena. Popular 
wisdom and the majority of theoretical reflection associates cultural cause with cultural 
effect and ecological destruction with material cause, be this materiality culturally or 
ecologically situated.5 Thus despair, anger, feelings of meaninglessness and angst are 
                                                 
4 Key theorists that have so named and examined the identity crisis accompanying modernity 
and late modernity include, Albert Borgmann, Zygmunt Baumann, Charles Taylor and Hannah 
Arendt to name but a few of the more central writers. This alienation was also of course 
anticipated by earlier theorists such as Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, Soren Kierkegaard, 
Friedrich Nietzsche and Fyodor Dostoevsky. Consideration of different theoretical perspectives 
will be considered later in this chapter and in more detail in Chapter Five. 
5 Yet it must be noted that significant connections between person and place are made by a 
number of writers, these include, Edward Casey, Jeff Malpas, Freya Mathews (see Reinhabiting 
Reality and The Ecological Self) and Glenn Albrecht, all of whom are discussed in more detail later. 
Mathews traces the destruction of place, of particular loved and known places to feelings of loss, 
disembededness and an unnamed sorrow. Freya Mathews, Reinhabiting Reality: Towards a Recovery 
of Culture (Sydney, NSW: University of New South Wales Press, 1995). Malpas and Casey also 
discuss at length the extent to which place is key to beingness and to understanding human 
identity. Glenn Albrecht, a Western Australian eco-philosopher, likewise has coined the term 
Solastalgia to refer to the feelings of nostalgia and yearning for place that surface when loved 
and known geographies are destroyed and ‘developed’ in ways that make them no longer 
identifiable. However where these important writers and I diverge is in our particular theoretical 
focus. The writers here, primarily focus on particular relationships with place or the effects of 
the loss of place on the human. While this is in indeed an important focus, my attention is on 
the feedback relationship, how loss of place perpetuates loss of identity, and this in turn 
perpetuates further ecological destruction. I also am concerned with the way identity is not 
merely challenged but shaped by the places in which we dwell, thus the possibilities for self-hood 
are closed down where place as a permeable, living, space is closed down. What I am referring 
to in this instance is a cultural pattern, a mode of being that exerts a collective and somewhat 
catastrophic effect both on the self and on place and is one that fails to be perceived by those 
who are most deeply embedded in its machinations. 
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theorised to be the result of a range of cultural variables, which can include, adverse 
socio-economic conditions, frenetic modern living, the dissolution of the extended 
family system, the rise of the nuclear and suburban model of family life, longer working 
hours, and/or changing lifestyle expectations. At a deeper and more theoretical level 
such phenomena are often attributed to the alienating forces of a mechanized, industrial, 
capital driven framework. In essence such angst, its dysfunctions and outbursts are 
understood as a consequence of any one of many socio-economic pressures. Likewise 
deforestation and other ecological ills are typecast as the result of social and economic 
demand for more ‘resources’, for example, more timber, woodchips, arable land to grow 
grain for an ever exploding population, or again on slightly deeper analysis, 
deforestation, as an ecological ill, is attributed to corporate greed and the general 
disinterest and avarice of a consumer fed population. Within such thinking, phenomena 
such as species extinction, deforestation, air and waterway pollution, crime, addiction, 
anger and angst, not only fail to be systemically linked, they are barely linked at all.  
The failure to make this connection, is in part, due to the linear cause-effect model we 
access for explanation, regarding changes in both social and ecological phenomena. Part 
of the limitations involved in the speculation that A, B and C collectively or in 
succession cause D is the assumption that A and B and C are separate from D.6 If we 
step past this model and consider the phenomena in question not as logically or 
contextually separate but as contiguous, existing together in necessary relation then the 
associations to be made appear quite different. What I am suggesting is not that 
deforestation is a direct result of over consumption, or that over consumption is a direct 
result of deforestation in the standard cause and effect model, where both phenomena 
exist as separate ‘catalysts’, ‘results’ or ‘events’. Rather, I am suggesting, that the mode of 
being human prescribed by and inscribed in our culture makes possible and in the late 
modern chapter of this logic, systemically produces, species extinction, deforestation, 
ozone depletion and widespread ecological degradation. Deep relation with and deep 
caring for the earth is incompatible with considering oneself as separate from and not at 
home on the earth. And further by building these considerations into nearly every social 
and physical structure, deep relation and caring become increasingly implausible. It is 
the case, as Midgley reminds us, in quoting the molecular biologist Jacques Monod, that, 
“the ethic of knowledge that created the modern world is the only one compatible with 
                                                 
6 The simple but profound observation of the way in which our culture shapes a difference into 
a separation issues from the great mind of Gregory Bateson. 
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it.”7 The ultimate outcome of this ethic also makes possible and unavoidable over 
consumption, social discord and an intensifying anxiety, malaise and despair. The link 
that draws this anxiety, malaise and despair into the circle of species extinction and 
waterway pollution tells both of a certain way of being human and a certain way of 
searching for the knowledge that we are human. These phenomena in other words share 
the same ontological and epistemological foundations. 
If to be human in our culture, is, as I have argued, to be separate, to not be of or belong 
to this earth, then the task of human being in the face of mortal evidence to the contrary 
is to prove this separation and lack of belonging. This quest has, as I have suggested, for 
the long stretch of history been explicitly named and conducted. To be human has 
meant to be in possession of a soul, to be a part of the divine purpose and plan. One 
has known of this distinction through knowing God and one has verified such 
knowledge through faith in or proof of God’s existence; with the latter usually being 
found in miracles or the miracle of (human) life per-se. Once departed from this mortal 
coil, the God abiding individual is ultimately returned to the rightful place of human 
being and belonging, the eternal, changeless heavenly sphere. With the emergence of 
those forms of thinking, knowing and being that came to be defined as the 
Enlightenment and with the consequent domination of these modes the search for 
proof continued but lost its theological dimension. Here, the ontological framing of the 
human as separate from, superior to and not of this earth remained but God as proof of 
one’s separation ceased to be the default position.8 With this cessation, the ‘project’ and 
‘question’ of human being was closed off from cultural analysis. This is because the 
question was now answered. To be human became to know of separation per-se. All that 
was left was to search for more and more evidence of this separation. This proof is not 
to be found in God’s work nor is it to be found in the sheer fact of human life. It is to 
be found in more and more, objective, conscious, knowing – the proof of separation. 
For this reason, it is no surprise that, rarely, if ever, in social discourse and public life, 
certainly never in dominant media, is the question of “What is it to be human?” asked. 
                                                 
7 Mary Midgley, The Myths We Live By (London: Routledge, 2004), 3. 
8 I am talking here about cultural patterns and collective attachments. So in this regard I am not 
suggesting that God as an object of faith no longer subsists. Rather I am suggesting that this 
faith exists in the only way which within modernity it can, as a matter of private, ethical concern. 
The cultural collective on the other hand mediates being not through knowing God but through 
knowledge itself. This cultural demise of theology as a working premise of humanity is one 
Nietzsche marks when he has the madman proclaim that “God is dead!” 
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That this absence, after its millennia long formulation and discussion by society at large, 
is not seen as peculiar, is further evidence of the extent to which the answer has – for all 
cultural intents and purposes – been provided.9 The answer surrounds us in concrete 
and digital form. It is found in the cultural frenzy for more and more information. The 
more information we gather the more we know. And in such knowing is our humanity. 
Cartesian thought, mind, knowledge is, in late modern translation, that which establishes 
human being.  
This is an important and interesting transition point for the fate of the self and 
subjectivity in late modernity. If we recall the figure of Gilbert White discussed in 
Chapter One, we remember that with his departure was the demise of a certain form of 
co-habitation, a certain and well established form of being and knowing. This form of 
being and knowing was embedded and engrained in the other-than-human and the 
immediately human community in which he lived. It was a form of world navigation, 
understanding and literacy that spoke of a self in relation to that which was other-than-
self. His knowing, while not named as such at the time, would retrospectively be 
described as subjective.  
What saw the dusk of Gilbert White’s ‘subjective’ epistemology also saw the dusk of 
religion as the central working explanation of human separation.10 Waning religious faith 
was married to waxing scientific faith and increasing dedication to the scientific method, 
not simply as a form of knowing, but as a form of being. This method invalidated the 
subject in the pursuit of truth and knowledge of the object, and in the pursuit of 
objectivity as an epistemological form. Eventually, it would make sense for our 
humanness, our separateness, to be grounded in the search for culturally viable, testable, 
provable, objective knowledge. It also makes sense that this search, in maintaining a 
‘safe’ epistemological distance, approaches and scrutinizes the world as object. Insofar 
                                                 
9 Even its ethical counterpart, “What does it mean to be a good person?” is, in everyday 
conversation, rarely discussed. However the question of what it is to be happy - pleasured, 
satisfied, successful and healthy, as a self, is a matter of ongoing concern and conversation. This, 
I concur, is because the former question situates the self in community with others whereas the 
latter, in tangent with the late-modern preoccupation with the self, positions aspirations and 
ideals firmly within the individual.   
10 The ways White co-existed in and understood his world in relation to his human and other-
than-human kin did not supersede or replace but existed alongside the theological framework. 
His being was positioned in its ontological and ethical dimensions by the theological model yet 
he was placed, one may suggest ‘homed’ by the intimate and daily association he had with the 
creatures, critters, sounds and seasons that constituted Selborne. 
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as to know the world in a certain way is to be in the world in a certain way, it becomes 
apparent that in the domination of objective knowledge is the death not just of God but 
of subjectivity. For, in the search for objectively provable, verifiable knowledge 
subjective knowledge, alongside the subject, becomes culturally invalid, peripheral to the 
task and project of human being – at a core level the subject becomes existentially 
irrelevant. 
The rise of the object as the site of knowing, and thus of being, was accelerated and 
amplified by the mutually reinforcing networks of industry, technology, or as Hougan 
describes, technique,11 bureaucracy and capitalism that came to (and continue to) 
dominate nineteenth century, twentieth century, and now twenty-first century life. These 
together made possible and plausible the rapid and systematic extraction of 
communities and individuals from embededness in other-than-human and intimately 
human community. The outcome of this for late modern life is that the forging of 
separation, having being carved in its millennial long march into both our ecological and 
cultural geographies, is now carved into our epistemological forms and models. Our 
search for, and accumulation of, knowledge, is one which has become separate from 
relationship with place, community and ultimately the self. This is not only insofar as 
knowledge is held within the sharp and rational definitions of expert discourse and the 
organised archives of libraries and digital networks, it is not only a separation of content 
it is equally a separation of form. That which was set to define our human being and thus 
our sense of self has become through our own paradigms separate from our human being 
and what it is to be a self.12  
Our primary ontological mistake, of rejecting the mortal confines of being human and 
thus making the fact of human difference, from other species and land-forms, into a 
point of human separation from other species and landforms,13 and of building this 
separation into our worlds has resulted in a profound epistemological failure. We now 
can no longer know what it is to be human for the objective knowledge that (ostensibly) 
                                                 
11 Jim Hougan provides a fascinating account of the way in which technique and the means 
driven logic that it subsists by, has come to form and deform every human interaction. Jim 
Hougan, Decadence: Radical Nostalgia, Narcissism and Decline in the Seventies (New York: William 
Morrow and Company, 1975). 
12 Evidence for this fate can be found in the fore mentioned failure of exponential knowledge 
accumulation to affect, relieve or in any way mitigate the ‘environmental’ crisis. 
13 Again, the description of the core mistake of our culture, as one where a difference is turned 
into a separation, is the insight of Gregory Bateson. 
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tells of our humanity is that which is separate from the subject. Further, any subjective 
knowing the self lays claim to, in lacking objective verification, bears no cultural value. 
We have thus become separate and disconnected both from the geo-physical contexts 
by which life makes sense and within which subjectivity emerges and from our 
erroneous, albeit all-pervasive, evidence of what it is to be – human. Consequently what 
I suggest we are witnessing in the late modern frenzy to represent, record and ‘view’ the 
self is the desperate search for proof that we as selves, as subjects, in any real and 
meaningful way exist. 
In this desperate search, and the distortions of the world and the self which it gives rise 
to, there is a particular danger. This is the feedback nature of this cycle. This will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Six, however it is important here to make a few 
prefacing comments about the nature of this feedback. The feedback is one that does 
not cycle within but between the contours of ecology, epistemology and ontology. The 
feedback relation of, for example, species extinction or environmental calamity and 
angst, means that due to both sharing the same ontological and epistemological 
foundations the exacerbation of one exacerbates the other. The logic is self-
perpetuating. Our response, for instance to, species extinction, which, in diminishing the 
template of the other, to ‘difference’, diminishes relation to that which is required for 
understanding ourselves as human and as membered to specific geo-physical texts,14 
sends us off on a search for more knowledge, usually about the species in question, their 
environment, or the environmental effects of their extinction. Yet it is this form and 
type of knowledge, which in reinforcing the culture/nature divide, reinforces the mode 
of being human that is responsible for species extinction amidst other ills. It is also 
knowledge, that, in accordance with the working western definition of human being and 
the structures we have put in place to affirm this, is now separate from our experience 
of ourselves as selves. It cannot therefore produce behaviours which stem patterns of 
destruction, to the contrary it is that which, in detailing the separation of the human 
from the ‘object’ of knowledge and research, ultimately reinforces patterns of 
destruction.  
                                                 
14 I am not at all intending here to cast aside or underestimate the stark tragedy of species 
extinction in its own right. Rather, I am suggesting that, unless we can somehow cultivate a 
consciousness of the relationship our acts of mindless destruction bear to our acts of equally 
mindless self construction, this tragedy will continue 
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At the same time, in seeking remediation to the loss of subjectivity in the form of 
knowledge that is available to the culture, that of the object, the consumption of the 
world escalates. Herein the not-self, the ecological (and increasingly cultural) ‘other’, is 
literally destroyed to feed the industrialist and capitalist processes whereby self 
construction is sought. In the destruction of place one is drawn further and further from 
relationship to that which is not self, that from within which subjectivity could emerge. 
Thus, subjectivity further diminishes while the search for it becomes more intense – and 
is sought in processes of self-reflection as found in the object. The more this cycle 
continues the more it approaches a closed system. This, Hougan refers to as a ‘chreod.’15  
The behaviour that is being executed at the level of the self to redress the loss of 
subjectivity is, in this way, a mirror image of the behaviour that is executed at the level 
of culture to redress ‘ecological’ problems. In both instances a conscious and material, 
epistemological solution (seeking respectively to know the self exists and to know more 
about ecological problems and processes) is being sought for what is in fact – the same 
– non-conscious, immaterial, ontological error. This reinforces the systems sub-errors 
for the epistemological solution is itself a product of the ontological error. Both 
instances suffer therefore the distorting and duplicating effects of false description, 
where the situation is not relieved but intensified by the solutions sought to redress it.16 
What this means for the fate of subjectivity in late modern life is its continued 
dissolution and, ultimately I will argue, its loss. To interrupt this cycle what is required is 
not only a reanalysis of our relationship to those spaces, places and creatures we name 
as the other but also a reanalysis of the boundaries of that which we understand to be 
and name as the self and what I suggest is, in late modernity, the voracious self. 
 
 
The Consuming Self 
To begin to understand what we are speaking of when we speak of a self, we need to 
look not to any one individual self, inasmuch as the sense of self-hood that permeates 
                                                 
15 Hougan, Decadence, 63. 
16 Again I owe my understanding of the nature of feedback cycles and how they operate in 
ecological/cultural settings to the work of Gregory Bateson, specifically, his writing on the Steps 
to an Ecology of Mind. The systems properties and effects of the crisis will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter Six. 
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our culture. If we are to strip the individual bare of any defining uniqueness and 
consider it simply as an entity, its defining quality is, its form. This, one could suppose, 
is a discrete material form with an outer boundary of skin. This form is differentiated at 
the level of perception from other forms – though certain physicists and sceptics may 
wish to contest this. The problem however, is that in this late modern chapter of the 
‘crisis,’ we are suffering from a diffusive and profound anxiety, a doubt, that this form, 
which we call the self, in any real and meaningful way exists.  
This doubt is obviously not material, given that we can mark the physical boundary of 
the self, off from other physical forms. I know where you end and I begin and the way 
in which the table, the tree and the post-man are not me. Rather, the doubt, the anxiety, 
is existential in nature. This, at a deep cultural level is, I propose, rooted in anxiety 
surrounding the termination of existence in death. However, the outcome of denying 
and sublimating this anxiety, alongside destroying the contexts whereby it can be 
alleviated (nature and the sense of the sacred/belonging to the whole), and the resultant 
disembededness from the other-than-human world, has produced an existential crisis 
such that one cannot be assured of one’s existence, one’s selfhood in life. Within this 
psychic unrest our modern lives have become an endless search for proof. This search 
for proof is currently pursued by the incessant preoccupation with photographing, 
filming, posting and making visually present any and every moment of one’s existence, 
to garner evidence that one endures and one exists. This search is not conscious. In 
tirelessly documenting the self, one knows not for what one searches. The search, as 
here described, forms part of the collective, non-conscious psyche. As it is here too, in 
this non-conscious space, that the anxiety feeding the crisis resides.  
This search in many senses builds upon and has its form set by patterns of 
consumption. The extended historical tendency to externalise the self, seeking images 
and reflections of the self in material objects, and through this constructing identity, 
together with the process of making the ‘other’ instrumental, invisible and peripheral to 
the process of self-construction, was given systemic and systematic reign in the mid to 
late twentieth century age of consumption. This was facilitated obviously by the fore-
stated rise of industry, technology and capitalism and the way in which these forms 
severed the (western) human community from embededness in the natural world and 
repositioned the bulk of the population in dense, urban, industrial contexts dominated 
by human products and human forms. To understand the complexity of this transition 
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we need to consider the point(s) at which the consuming self, morphed into the 
voracious self.  
 
 
From Consumer to Consumed: the Voracious Self 
The will to consume has been documented as reflecting a denial of and a rallying against 
mortality,17 a millenarian anxiety transposed into self-absorption and decadence,18 and a 
vehicle through which cultural choice can be expressed.19 This latter position closely 
corresponds to the popular post-modern perspective that consumption in its various 
forms, but primarily through its utilisation of electronic and digital technology, is a 
socio-political forum of endless self-reinvention, and in this regard is considered neither 
a dysfunctional nor deforming phenomenon but one of liberation and power.20  
All of these perspectives, I want to suggest, aside from the latter post-modern 
interpretation, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five, are useful ways of 
looking at and interpreting the culture of consumption. Self-extension as mediated by 
consumption has functioned as and continues to function as a veil from mortality, a 
defence against vulnerability and as a compulsive antidote to a lack of control and 
power in the face of cultural and ecological threats. However, I contend that what we 
are witnessing at this period in time, is something that takes us beyond these tendencies 
and dysfunctions. Consumption, while still remaining a defensive behaviour, has 
evolved into consumption as a distorted and distorting form, one that beckons a 
threshold change, a shift in the baseline of what it is to be human. Part of the reason 
why this transition remains largely undetected and part of the reason why consumption 
remains hyper-separated from observations of persistent and rising ecological 
destruction, is due to a strong theoretical focus that suggests mass consumption derives 
from the limitations of identity mapping in the context of a bureaucratic, mechanical 
                                                 
17 See Dennis Smith, Zygmunt Baumann: Prophet of Postmodernity (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 
1999). 
18 Hougan, Decadence.  
19 Alan Aldridge, Consumption (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2003). 




order. Under this interpretation, consumption is simply a response to various forms of 
political and social closure. Accordingly, the destruction of place that consumption 
wreaks, and the consequent loss of capacity to be a self and to know oneself as a self, 
that these habits produce, are by and large unaddressed. Consciousness of these 
connections is also stymied by the alternative tendency in post-modern discourse to 
consider consumption a key forum for political and social choice. This latter 
perspective, which interprets or rather misinterprets consumer potential with the 
creation of a dynamic, free space replete with social and personal possibility is detailed 
by Aldridge in his discussion of cultural omnivourism. Aldridge describes consumption 
as a space within which one can break free from classification and in the fashion of an 
omnivore sample all the world has to offer: 
…one can listen to new age in the morning, ballet music in the afternoon and 
heavy metal in the evening, without ever becoming a pagan, a balletomane or a 
head banger.21  
The (implicit) claim here is that one can be endlessly culturally diverse and free to graze 
without the restraints of attachment to any one group, genre or identity, and that within 
this process identity is not threatened, indeed it is crafted. McLuhan, while identifying 
the significance of the form – the medium – as a reality shaping force,22 by which logic 
incessant consumption shapes the person into the consumer, similarly maintains that the 
production (and implicitly consumption) made available by the technologies of the 
electronic age is in fact a liberating space, which, when eventually disengaged from its 
immersion in residual mechanical mediums, will allow us to live mythically, integrally, in 
depth, and in harmony. However this is only convincing insofar as one considers human 
existence to be a viable and meaningful pursuit, when removed as far as possible from 
the other-than-human world. However, this existence is one that, I suggest, exists 
outside the realm where subjectivity can be realised. When not only the material but the 
existential effects of ecological destruction are considered, it becomes apparent that this 
experiential medley is indicative not of hybridization, liberation and fluidity, but rather 
of the dissolution of the places and spaces where a coherent and cohesive identity can 
be found. Indeed the dependence on place for the development of personal and cultural 
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identity has been a theme traced by a number of writers. Escobar,23 Malpas,24 Katz,25 
Casey,26 and Mendieta27 all speak of the way the western philosophical tradition (and 
often theology) alongside much recent theory, has valorised absolute, space and time 
while completely disregarding place. Casey writes that for an entire epoch, by which he 
means the last three hundred years, “place has been regarded as an impoverished second 
cousin of time and space, those two colossal cosmic partners that tower over 
modernity.”28 This, according to these thinkers, is variously due, to the emotive, 
personal and particularised character of place, a character that does not correspond to 
the clean, objective lines of modern science and modern thought. It is also due, as 
Malpas writes, to the fragility and changefulness of place, that in mirroring our own 
fragile, mortal condition is for this very reason rejected, in favour of the eternity and 
certainty of space. Malpas also draws attention to the way that place requires a form of 
relational engagement and consideration that is beyond the ken of abstract theory. As 
these writers have charted, this abjection has grave consequences both for place and for 
subjectivity, which requires relationship with place. Place is the other and the other is 
the “necessary presupposition of my own consciousness29 … it is what makes my 
consciousness of me available.”30 
The significance here rests, not only, on the dissolution of place as an inter-subjective 
text but also on the construction of other kinds of places, non-places that have 
encroached on place. These non-places, as Auge discusses, are the places within which 
modernity is mired, they are not abiding places, where one lingers, where one is at 
home, but are places that one passes through – places of transit. Essentially they are 
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empty spaces to be filled. These include airports, bus-stations, super-markets, train 
stations, elevators, car-parks, stairwells, roads. Indeed it is interesting and disturbing to 
observe the increasingly prevalent creation of non-places encroaching on actual place. 
Where so many ‘public’ spaces used to be places of dwelling they are now no more. 
Street benches are now designed or modified in order that they not be slept on; parks 
are only to be utilised in certain hours, dogs, cats, fires, drinking are usually not allowed, 
beaches and town squares are heavily regulated and the bush itself is a user-pays terrain. 
The earth in short is being crafted into a non-place, not a place to linger, not a place to 
be at home, for it is not, after all, where we belong. The empty space of non-place is 
clearly not where we can find, or know ourselves, as human.  
Real places, as Auge suggests, in contrast to non-places, are ‘relational, historical and 
concerned with identity.’31 In thus shaping the world into non-places, where relation and 
thus the tapestry of history cannot be woven, we are shaping a world where identity 
cannot be fostered. Sharing and amplifying this world of non-place is the world of self-
produced space, that “complex skein of cable and wireless network that mobilize extra-
terrestrial space for the purposes of communication so peculiar that it often puts the 
individual in contact only with another image of himself.”32 It is this empty, mobile 
space, alongside the vacant and transient places, that enables the fluidity to which 
Aldridge and McLuhan refer. This fluidity allows us to travel between such realms, 
consecutively and apparently seamlessly. Yet the very vacancy of such space, reveals the 
nature of this travel to be not one of integration or embededness but one of superficial 
engagement. What may appear therefore as fluidity and freedom, is in fact the loss of 
the intimate and proximate demands of place. Instead the endless, because empty, space 
of possibility, of consumption, becomes the dominant mode by which one experiences 
the world.  
Aldridge’s and McLuhan’s failure to identify the distortion of these places and the 
desperation with which they are met consists in their tendency to equate the world of 
‘goods’ and the process of consumption with social and cultural choice. Where 
consumer choice or forms of self-expression and extension are seen to exist, cultural 
choice is seen to exist. And by association choices for the self and the reinvention of the 
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self are seen as authentic possibilities. Whereas in fact while consumption is the driving 
and dominant force of culture it does not offer authentic cultural ‘choice’ but rather 
reinforces fundamental cultural premises in their most recent, prevalent and distorted 
form. This distortion has made other modes of being not more but less accessible. 
Albert Borgmann in Crossing the Postmodern Divide makes an analogous observation, citing 
the way in which once certain fundamental choices are made other choices become 
unavailable: 
A consumer is in a morally weak position in the same way that anyone is relatively 
helpless in the exercise of daily decisions. Daily decisions are pre-formed by 
fundamental decisions. The fundamental and material decisions that have shaped 
the technological society leave little leeway to the daily decisions of the consumer.33 
To illustrate this he uses the example of the television, suggesting that once television 
has been introduced as a ‘given’ into the household the shape of human relations shift. 
The possibilities, once the new framework has been introduced, are no longer between 
reading a book, writing a letter, playing a game, telling stories or watching television but 
are reduced to the singular possibility of: “What are we going to watch tonight?”34 
It is important to be aware that in instances such as these, the fundamental decisions are 
not made by chance and neither are they consciously made – at the level of the 
individual or culture. The spell television casts on daily life is driven both by the 
silencing of other alternatives, by the kind of form television is and how this releases 
one from the need to navigate self. Television, offering a hyper-real world, lures the 
viewer into a world seemingly rich in relation and drama but one devoid of 
responsibility, this is a world that can be turned off (or on) at the flick of a switch. As 
such, it stands outside of the material demands of a finite, complex world and however 
temporarily dupes the viewer into believing that she too stands outside of this world. 
Temporarily she is offered proof.  
In the same way that television sidelines other modes of being in world, the emergence 
of consumption as an ontological form means other forms of being become increasingly 
redundant. The now centralised task of consumption is reflected in the adjectival 
description of the modern human, as not citizen, as not even ‘individual’ but as merely, 
                                                 
33 Albert Borgmann, Crossing the Postmodern Divide (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
1992), 114. 
34 Borgmann, Crossing the Postmodern Divide, 112. 
 
123 
‘consumer.’ Consumption is not thus one act of doing amidst other possible acts. It is 
for all social and political purposes who we are.35 The self, through this process, is not 
existing in the space of fluid and liberated reinvention, but is being more firmly cast in 
the space of rigid cultural definitions. To assume otherwise is to fail to consider the way 
in which the ‘consumer’ rather than simply acting on, or acting out on the world, is 
herself being shaped by this world. As McLuhan observes: 
It is one of the ironies of Western man that he has never felt any concern about 
invention as a threat to his way of life. The fact is that, from the alphabet to the 
motorcar, Western man has been steadily refashioned in a slow, technological 
explosion that has extended over 2500 years.36  
This refashioning as McLuhan reminds us, delivers with it, limits for other ways of 
being human. He argues that we, as humans, are shaped by the ‘medium’ within which 
we move, think and feel, and that: 
…not even the most lucid understanding of the peculiar force of a medium can 
head off the ordinary “closure” of the senses that causes us to conform to the 
pattern of experience presented.37  
However, as signalled earlier, McLuhan while providing this seminal tool of cultural 
analysis does not follow through on its deeper implications. While he draws key 
distinctions between the mediums which have at any given time dominated social life, 
he fails to scrutinise the more embracing medium, the culture as form, which shapes and 
misshapes social, ecological and individual life. Instead, he cites the mechanical order as 
the most dominant pattern in the modern world. Having been drenched in mechanical 
forms, we, as beings, have become subject to and shaped by the logic of the machine. 
As a consequence, the operations of production and the market place – those of 
centralisation, fragmentation and exchange value – have come to characterise human 
relations. The mechanical form is to be distinguished from the use value and holist 
orientation that McLuhan suggests formerly characterised tribal life. However 
overtaking both the holist and the mechanical is what McLuhan names as the current 
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‘electronic’ form of human extension, a form characterised by what he refers to as ‘cool’ 
mediums, those mediums which are high in participation or ‘completion by the 
audience’.38 Hot mediums, by contrast, are those that characterise mechanical forms of 
extension and are low in participation and do not require ‘completion’ by the audience. 
The cool medium of the electronic, against the hot and rigid mechanical, is one that 
McLuhan suggests makes available freedom of choice, freedom of opportunity and self-
reinvention. 
However what I suggest is occurring, in the production of late modern life, is a 
phenomenon that supersedes McLuhan’s distinctions between the electronic and the 
mechanical. This is apparent to the extent that the space for relational experience is 
closing down whilst consumption as the primary mode of experience is becoming the 
norm. In this respect, experience of the world through electronic or mechanical means, 
is subsidiary to the practise and process of consumption itself as the primary experience. 
Further, the supposedly free and available space of the electronic age that McLuhan 
outlines, stands in stark contradiction to the everyday reality of an increasingly 
constrained, controlled and frantic populace. If the medium is indeed the message then 
the story it tells includes not simply the purpose it serves and the ways of behaving that 
gather around that purpose, but its elemental logic. What we are witnessing and 
participating in, is the domination of neither a mechanical nor an electronic medium, 
nor any medium that is merely derivative of technological capacity, but the domination 
of the medium of consumption itself, as the mode and practise of being human. The 
idea is of course that ‘you’ can be anything you so choose – retro, hipster, geek, 
Christian, Muslim, vegan, carnivore. But how you become or choose between these 
identities is through the choice of the kinds of things, experiences, sights, sounds, 
smells, you consume. Implicated in the very logic of such ‘choice’ is non-attachment to 
any one decision, the consumer is ultimately king, reigning over his palace of available 
goods and experiences. To be so unattached is to be not within the experience, 
connected and committed, but to stand always outside, to choose one’s ever tenuous 
identity and never have that choice taken away by the influence of the human and other-
than-human world. Transpiring in late modernity is not then a technological 
progression, an ‘all at once’ that makes multiple forms of being possible, but the 
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inevitable conclusion of a cultural logic that increasingly makes only one form of (non) 
being possible – the form of the object. 
This logic was, until more recent times, restrained by the presence and participation of 
the natural world in human texts. Place as a necessary component of what was, for a 
long time, a primarily rural existence could not be abstracted nor systematically 
destroyed, as it came to be in ensuing centuries. Even while, during much of the 
development of the western mind, the definition of the human remained enlisted to the 
theological, separation from the earth, while epistemologically claimed, was not in real 
terms available. Daily engagement with other species and with the local places within 
which one lived was still a component of everyday life. With little change in place came 
little change in modes of being human. Yet as the well documented rise of merging 
industrial, technological and political revolutions testifies, structured separation from 
relationship with other creatures and earthy life soon infiltrated every human modality. 
As political revolutions gave form to the individual and the mechanics of industrial life 
situated the person within human dominated, regulated and controlled systems physical 
‘evidence’ of separation started to accumulate. With each new and more efficient form 
of technology the ontological premise of human exclusivity was reflected and reinforced 
in the place(s) where people lived. Consequently place increasingly reflected a certain 
kind of human, a certain kind of self.39  
This kind of place and kind of self finds its most ‘perfect’ instantiation’ ‘in the 
permanent, unchanging, picture-perfect, ‘purpose-built’ town in Florida, North-America 
named Celebration. This Disney built contrivance houses 11,000 people over 30,000 
acres in a master-planned, tightly controlled project which does its best to avoid, 
dependence on, responsibility for and connection with, reality. In Celebration the: 
…streets are lit by olde world lanterns and you are followed everywhere by muzak 
from the 40s and 50s piped out of speakers hidden beneath palm trees. Jingle Bell 
Rock, Santa Claus Is Coming to Town, Oh Come All Ye Faithful – the theme is 
unrelentingly Christmas … The 40ft Christmas tree has plastic needles. The ice 
rink in the central square is a sheet of white plastic. At first glance the snow that 
falls on the hour, every hour on winter evenings looks as convincing as fake snow 
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could, until you realise the artifice is double-layered: it’s not artificial snow but 
shaving cream.40 
The town, where all is artifice, including a strict code for behaviour, even personal 
greetings, an absolute adherence to aesthetics, and commitment to appearance, 
symbolized in the manmade lake in the centre of the town (sufficiently elevated to 
prevent the inflow of surrounding swampland which was destroyed to create 
Celebration but exists still at the margins) is the ultimate product, fixing the citizens and 
the place to a life-denying, pseudo-reality that in the illusion of living in real peace, 
community and reality devours and destroys the life, vitality, diversity and safety of the 
actual creatures and places from which the production of this illusion feeds. 
The idea(l) of Celebration is one that in freezing place, freezes chance, change and time. 
In this way it reflects and reinforces the ongoing cultural changes in relation to time, and 
space that symbiotically and collectively closed down connection with other-than-
human places and other-than-human beings. Jay Griffiths identifies the way in which 
time (like place) as a key constituent of our daily experience and identity formation, has 
too become subject to the lineal, fragmenting, and homogenising fabric of modernity: 
…in the West, since the early years of this century, time has been increasingly 
homogenized … more than anything, modernity’s time, – the global present – is 
increasingly standardized, increasingly the same.41 
This homogenization of time is, as Griffiths observes, at odds with the natural world’s 
nuanced, particularised and embedded time. Nature’s time, unlike clocked time, places 
you, in relation to the seasons, to light, sounds, smells, to migrations, hibernations, 
nestings, fruitings, flowerings, shedding and dormancy. Modern time by contrast is 
“linear, artificial, over fragmented, modelling itself in the image of its machinery.”42 
Within this framework, clocks as Griffith’s points out are needed precisely because there 
is no other way of telling the time available, there is no other way known. In this way we 
can see that time, like place, is moulded by the ontological premise of separation. 
Like place, time has become separate from the subject and from subjective experience, a 
minute, for instance, is not the same as any given experience of that minute, rather it can 
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be anything to anyone, it is Aldridge’s free, open and empty space of possibility, as such 
it is ready to be consumed. This time consists of units that are more or less well ‘spent’, 
or in fact ‘wasted’. ‘I have wasted so much time today” or, “I have spent too much time 
on this,” are readily familiar ways of expressing the experience of one’s days/ months/ 
years, indeed one’s life. But how is it possible to spend or waste time? Time is not a 
currency to be cashed in, to be exchanged or traded, but is the continuum within which 
we dwell. Yet in the same quantitative vein we perceive those who have more time to be 
of more cultural value – these include the young – who have an open future to be 
‘spent’ potentially any way they wish, and the wealthy who ‘spend’ their time how they 
please, who have consumer ‘choice’ in relation to time. To the contrary those, such as 
the elderly, who have little time left, are accordingly devalued. This is in stark and 
obvious contrast to indigenous cultures who have a radically different relationship to 
place and endless, circling time and who, as a consequence, value their elderly over and 
above their young for the qualitative value they bring to community, as compared to the 
quantitative ‘potential’ that more time offers.43 Time in the Westernised sense ceases to 
be a context within which life unravels but becomes an external other, an object and a 
tally against which life is assessed, often a thing against which one ‘races’. Consequently 
in charting the course of fixed, lineal, fragmented time, as a separate phenomenon from 
nature’s cycles and rhythms, we have created this fixed, lineal and fragmented character 
as the nature of lived time, as the experience of our lives. To our clocked consciousness 
it presents as true and eternal and validates, in the process, the lack of consideration 
given to the times and the places of the natural, uncounted world. It is as Griffith’s 
remarks, synthetic, and to “live in a synthetic ever present-present is to live not in the 
fullness but in the emptiness of time.”44  
It is this emptiness and endlessness that marks the void. That we have produced the 
void in three dimensions should come as no surprise, for it is the void that we have run 
from in horror, moving all the while against that which proffers consolation, against 
kinship and union with the earthy world. In the void as Abrams observes, “no part … 
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can be created or destroyed, and no part can be distinguished from any other part.”45 
This signifies the state of non-being (death), for a living person like a living culture must 
be capable of being both created and destroyed.46 Yet the void here also signifies the 
death of subjectivity, the loss of knowing of being. For insofar as no part is 
distinguishable from any other part one is unable to know ‘one-self’ as separate, as 
definable from anything else, one cannot in fact know that one exists. In the anonymous 
abyss and its geo-physical counterparts, is the dissolution of self in life, where the self is 
confirmed of its insignificance in the yawning face of an indifferent, abstract and 
unknowable cosmos. In the emptiness of time and emptiness of place, divested of 
relationship, diversity, unpredictability – there comes the driving need to fill this space, 
to consume. In such emptiness the hungry, voracious self roams, seeking to become 
real, substantial, present.  
To suggest we are approaching the void is not to say something about the universe. It is 
not to suggest that the universe was once caring and is no more. Rather it is to suggest 
that caring and meaning cannot be understood in universal terms but need particularity 
and place. Reality as Borgmann observes needs its proper scale.47 Without such we are 
left in the face of an increasingly undifferentiated cosmos, nowhere in particular, as no 
one in particular. This is the ‘reality’ against which we shrink and falter, the reality 
against which we seek proof. And it is in this search that we destroy the very places and 
creatures where knowing, where being, where self can be located. Tragically the 
destruction of the earth is now implicated in the functioning of our epistemological 
system, for it is by such destruction – and the idea that we remain all the while intact, – 
that our human being is finally established. If the earth is not fit for human life, it is not 
therefore, our place of belonging, our home.  
The emptying of the self is due then not only to processes of externalisation that 
remove as it were interiority but is also a reflection and reinforcement of the emptying 
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of time and place. The self, existing in relation to these states and the forms they take, 
both bears and engenders the consequence of their transformation. The empty self is 
necessarily voracious. Consumption in this setting functions as an attempt to re-build 
context and to rebuild a self. Of particular importance here is the way in which the 
nature of consumables and the nature of consumption as a process has come to shape 
the nature of the human. In the pathology of consumption the qualities that characterise 
the consumable, discontinuity from time and place, homogeneity in purpose, 
transferability, fixedness in form, disposability and impermeability – not subject to wilful 
change, a certified product, have come to characterise the consumer. The modern 
consumer is one who is increasingly disconnected from place, from natural and 
historical time and from any particular place or time. Being everywhere at once s/he at 
the same time is nowhere at all – seemingly omnipresent s/he fails to be present to the 
changing, living, finite world. Increasingly fixed to the role of consumer the modern self 
is impermeable to the pulsing, animate world and other modes of being. Consequently 
what is cultivated and reflected in the society at large are those aspects of the self that 
can be fixed, transferred reproduced and disposed of, those aspects of the self that can 
be made over into object, not prone to change and if so desired could be ‘held’ forever. 
 
The Next Baseline Shift – Constructing the Impermeable Self 
A transition has thus occurred where consumption once one mode of experiencing the 
world, has now become the mode of experience, within which experience itself is a 
consumable. Where consumption is the primary mode of being human, available to the 
late-modern self, (including ‘green’ consumption) all experiences, things, states, become 
points of consumption. This is analogous to the way in which religion, when it was the 
primary vehicle through which human being was established, collected all acts, 
experiences and states, under the measure and management of God. Thus in the current 
setting life is reduced in all its facets to those elements and dimensions that meet the 
criteria of the consumable object, translating the sacred into the profane, the 
pedagogical into the product and the philosophical into the technical. Thus we see the 
search for spirituality conducted through the collection of iconography, through gold 
crosses, incense, dream webs, dot paintings and assembly line Buddha’s. Nuanced, 
particularized, patient, trusting relationship with the other is no longer the primary 
pathway to such experience. Education is increasingly becoming a vicarious and 
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performative pursuit, indeed a business reliant on students as clients or consumers and 
as Hougan relates the very space for lateral thinking has been swept away in the flurry 
for closure: 
Like most other activities, thinking has become the province of technicians. And 
since the business of technicians is the rationalization of means, contemporary 
philosophy is devoted largely to the analysis of its own methods and the ways in 
which it gets work done. The answers which it seeks are critical solutions to 
methodological problems, preferably ones which have industrial applications … 
problems of epistemology and consciousness are no longer subjects of ethereal 
speculation, but technical conundrums whose solutions are essential to the 
development of … Next Generational computers.48  
In the shift from the self as consumer to the self as consumable, the self has likewise 
become a nexus of production and reproduction. In this production and reproduction is 
the record and in the record is proof.  
Taking place in practises such as the now normalized, albeit pathological, process of 
videoing any and every moment is the act of objectifying and thus consuming 
experience and in this collating and constructing material evidence of a self. As 
Grindstaff observes (without however theorising past this observation), “the possibility 
of being on camera is considered seductive because self-exhibition is a validation of 
existence.”49 Yet in the very act of so doing, context is lost and the space for 
subjectivity, for self-hood is further diminished. In recording, for example the moment 
of birth or marriage, the recording both literally and metaphorically stands in the way of 
being present to the experience. Neither the recorded nor the recordee can be within 
the experience, for both are engaged in a however momentary staging of the experience. 
In such both partake in the process of objectification and in so doing break the spell of 
the sensuous. In filming a wedding for instance, neither the bride and groom – nor the 
friend, relative or hired hand – are in the givenness of the now rather each is poised to 
capture the record of the constructed moment. As such they are attending to the 
background, the light, the stance, the smiles, the pose and are necessarily disengaged 
from the unfolding of unconstructed time and unconstructed place. They are, as it were, 
centre stage to the scenery of a wedding.  
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Neither does the record only stand in the way of the experience but as the spectacle of 
the Great Ocean Road testifies, the record increasingly becomes the experience. Rather 
than capturing the moment the camera has come to claim the moment, and the 
uncaptured moment fails to exist. In this the experience collected, collated and held, 
makes other forms of remembering and other forms of knowing invisible and hence 
redundant. Compounding this, is the fact that subjective memory held in other forms is 
culturally rendered unreliable, uncertain and invalid. The proof is in the record.  
Where the urge to record was once reserved for significant occasions, it is now 
becoming the measure of every moment, for to know a moment, to know life as an 
accretion of moments, is to have it on record. We now know ourselves, or rather seek 
but fail to know ourselves, as reflected in the object and this means at a cultural level the 
qualities that we covet and value are primarily those qualities of the self and those kinds 
of (celebrated) selves that can be, and are, materially represented and reproduced. What 
is central here is not the particular context, location of time and place – the beach, the 
party, the Himalayas – but the repeated content (‘me’) and the reflective and 
reproductive capacity itself. Within this exchange what is passing (the subject) is taken 
for what is fixed (the object) and the ‘other’ (organic life) that is known as passing and 
finite is, literally, backgrounded and devalued for this very reason.  
It is no accident that social media sites have proliferated in response to this trend with 
every banal detail of any and every moment being recorded, tweeted, blogged, snapped. 
This is through sites, such as the not accidentally named face-book – the story of the 
face, my-space, you-tube, twitter, flicker, my life, sites which in capturing and freezing for 
eternity ephemeral moments, thoughts, images, tweets, blogs, posts offer the illusion of 
permanence, of certainty, of identity and – for what it’s worth provide visual 
permanence. One’s facebook profile persists after one is dead. 
Significantly however this quest for proof depends not only on the collation of visual 
snapshots of one’s life, with the hoped for continuity that such documentation provides 
– fruitless as this is, for the very nature of the object is that it is discontinuous with and 
suggests a freedom from time and place – but this quest also revealingly depends on the 
public distribution of these images. These productions of the self to produce proof of 
self, need to be seen, importantly they need to be consumed. The self, the subject, must 
for all epistemological intents and purposes, become object.  
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Within this logic, the more one is viewed, both by the equally faceless public and by the 
self, the more one, within modern epistemological definitions, exists. A quantitative 
difference has led to a qualitative distinction. Unsurprisingly therefore celebrity, the 
celebrated ‘seen’ self, is in our culture the yearned for state. This is not fame for any 
particular talent, skill or virtue, for inventing a life-saving device, for being a 
consummate actor, for striving towards world peace. It is celebrity for celebrity’s sake. 
The goal is simply to be known and be seen by millions. The vacuity of the everyday, 
the widespread nothingness to which celebrity offers relief has been increasingly 
documented. Arthur Miller, writes in Timebends: A Life that, “it was not so much death I 
feared as insignificance,”50 mirroring the sentiment that where alternative modes of 
knowing have dissolved, a life unknown, is a life without significance. Likewise Berman 
in his study of disenchantment,  cites Dr Darold Treffert’s  observation, that millions of 
children and young adults are today tormented by a, “gnawing emptiness or 
meaninglessness expressed not as a fear of what may happen to them, but rather as a 
fear that nothing will happen to them.”51 Existing in logical and epistemological 
relationship to the fear of anonymity the production of the celebrity accelerates. This is 
apparent in the increasing obsession with celebrity’s lives and the glut of reality TV 
programs, which offer to the ‘anyman’ the allure of becoming real. And indeed any and 
every ‘man’ is in on it. As Grindstaff, writing in 2007, observes: 
One in every six American families now owns a camcorder, and, as the critics 
observe, it seems as if all of them want their tapes on television. The producers of 
America’s Funniest Home Videos receive more than 2000 tapes each day and local 
news stations have begun flashing video hotline numbers at the end of their 
newscasts.52 
Elaborating on this in reference to reality t.v in particular, Grindstaff notes the way 
guests willingly partake in their own degradation so long as it gives them the ‘promise, 
however brief, of celebrity exposure’. Here, Kurt Anderson agrees, commenting that: 
These days it has become standard for all sorts of people to flaunt not just their 
physical oddities but their stupidity, vulgarity, or sinfulness as well. … They 
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51 Morris Berman, The Reenchantment of the World (London: Cornell University Press, 1981), 27. 




volunteer, in exchange for attention or a few bucks, to suffer sneers and outright 
ridicule, so long as the medium is sufficiently mass.53  
Emphasised in reality TV and celebrity worship is then not the talent, craft, and 
definitely not the individuality of these people, where this exists, but the status of being 
‘seen’. As Ian Buchanan observes what the ‘star’ of reality t.v seems to be enjoying is, 
“something inaccessible to us, they are enjoying being looked at.”54  
However what the celebrity is celebrated for - climbing out of the mass of anonymity 
and reaching, however temporarily, the state of being knowable and known - is not that 
which sets them apart from our own reality, but firmly within it. Consequently the 
increasingly searched for and reported on details of the celebrity are the dating/ dieting/ 
hairstyle, lifestyle changes, the everyday trivia of their lives. Likewise, in the staged 
dramas of reality t.v, it is the ‘drama’ of the everyday that is screened, moments of 
eating, fighting, having sex, even the monotony of doing nothing. The only factor that 
excludes such figures from the anonymous mass is that they are seen and they are thus 
known. Yet the fame of celebrity is a consumer pursuit, one object, of admiration, 
beauty, intrigue, is quickly ingested and passed over for another. The quest then is to 
continue to be a desirable, eternal object, to maintain worthwhile viewing.  
While it could be argued that celebrity culture is a continuation of the age old tradition 
of hero worship, this new cult indicates a cultural shift markedly different from hero 
worship of former times. Today’s celebrities are not celebrated for their moral fibre, 
prowess, performance or any other exceptional quality but because they are seen to be 
an object fit for celebration. Another distinction from historical celebrity, where the 
cause for adulation was a particular quality of a particular person, modern celebrity 
advances the idea, and social media sites and reality t.v perpetuate the idea, that visibility 
is available to anyone. However the visibility of the celebrity is precisely that which 
cannot be available to everyone for it depends on and feeds off the anonymity of the 
invisible, unknown mass. To have identity is to step out of the unseen, unknown 
multitude and become one of the seen, known few. What thus confers knownness and 
attributes reality to the celebrated is the spectators, not the spectacle. The irony herein is 
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that the lives and lounge rooms of the spectators is an empty space that no one is 
interested in watching. Indeed the only compelling aspect of the screened lives and 
screened reality is that it is watched. It is the watching that transforms the mundane into 
the watchable at the same time that it renders mute and invisible those that watch. 
Everyday reality is diminished and de-participated in by passive participation in 
reflections of a virtual reality in the same way that the everyday person is diminished by 
the obsessive preoccupation with the lives of the celebrated few. This pseudo-reality, as 
Nicholls writes, exists in the space of a non-world: 
The ebb and flow of detached consumption, distracted viewing, and episodic 
amazement exists in a time and space outside history, outside the realm in which 
physical, bodily engagement marks our existential commitment to a project and its 
realization.55 
Nicholls, in speaking of the idea of a project, is referring to Sartre’s idea of an ‘engaged 
and committed life in the world’. In this context all experience has significance because 
each experience is part of this real world. Yet it is this very significance, and 
membership to a given and embracing context, that reality t.v denies. In such, reality t.v 
“plays a complex game, It keeps reality at bay.”56 Indeed the virtual is key to its appeal. 
As Elizabeth Seaton wryly concurs, “the virtue of virtual reality is that no one really lives 
there.”57  
Clearly then, celebrity rather than facilitating processes of identity construction for the 
‘anyman,’ requires, creates and feeds off the ever enlarging constituency of the unknown 
and increasingly unknowable mass. At the same time, the everyday person is ever more 
situated in unknowable, abstract, homogenous space – in the void of non-place. The 
construction of non-place is itself necessary, both for the celebrity, and the self as 
object, for to be a product one must be accessible to any and every one and hence 
discontinuous from particular place and particular time.  
Dis-embedded, unknown to others and unknown to oneself, the late modern self fails to 
exist. Thus, in our successful, and for most, convincing, remodelling of the world, we 
see material evidence of control, separation, fragmentation, fixity, impermeability all 
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around us, forgetting in the process that we ‘become what we behold.’ And what we 
behold is not human, not animate and not, in fact, proof.  
What we are experiencing therefore is the formation of a culture that cannot sustain 
subjectivity. Lacking subjectivity we come to rely on the development of a particularly 
different form of human being, an impermeable self, one that in the lure of becoming 
object, becoming permanent, placeless, timeless, omnipresent and eternal, is locked in a 
closed, purely self-referential system. The impermeable self indicates a shift away from 
the reflection and representation of the self in product (consumption theory) to the self 
becoming product.58 In this shift the self, or rather the construction of self that stands in 
for self, takes on the qualities of the product (permanence, certainty, rigidity, 
impermeability) it seeks identity in. 
 With the emergence of the impermeable self, there is a further shift in the baseline of 
what it is to be human. In this shift subjectivity is radically diminished and the self, the 
subject, is slowly but inexorably becoming object. Within this system we can ‘know’ that 
the earth, the other and ‘we’ are in trouble but can really do nothing about it. For our 
very ways of knowing through which we mediate the world are locked in the closed 
space of the self, relying on and fostering a radical disconnection from all that is not 
self. And further within this same world the self is all that is seen to exist. As a result 
what we are increasingly witnessing, is that regard for, indeed consciousness of, the rest 
of the world, is slipping, completely, away.  
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The argument of this thesis is that, rather than being distinct phenomena, ecological 
destruction and the loss of subjectivity are deeply implicated, they pivot on the same 
ontological axis. It may, at first, appear surprising that ecological destruction remains 
largely unaddressed within cultural theory. However, in this lapse is the presumption 
that the state of the planet is something with which environmentalists, scientists, 
technicians, policy and planning officers are concerned. It is not a question of, or a 
problem for, ‘culture’, in its distilled form, but is a problem that belongs to ecology. 
This mirrors the same absence of dialogue concerning the loss of subjectivity within 
environmental discourse. 
Dealing with these phenomena in isolation presents serious problems, ones which 
ultimately reinforce the very conditions by which they have emerged, (fragmentation 
and hyper-separation being two of these). Chapters Two and Three examined the 
limitations of the ‘ecology only’ discourse in redressing the formative logic and the 
cultural deformations that produce ecological and self distortion. Chapter Four analysed 
what I name as the search for proof and the making of the impermeable self. It looked 
at the way in which this search (and this kind of self), emerges from alienation from the 
other-than-human world. This chapter examines the ‘culture only’ discourse insofar as it 
responds to and comments on the loss of subjectivity in late modernity. I argue that 
while much of this discourse is deeply insightful, the failure to identify the natural world, 
not as a backdrop for social action, but as a core constituent of human being, results in 
circuitous and culturally reproductive outcomes. 
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To discuss cultural theory is to welcome numerous theorists to the table. While many 
theorists have proffered, and continue to proffer, valuable insights into the cultural 
changes that have ensued in the preceding centuries and in contemporary times, the 
focus of this chapter is restricted to those who both diagnose and describe the crisis of 
subjectivity in late modernity. Our group then suddenly becomes smaller. It shrinks even 
further when confined to those who make some attempt to consider the natural world 
in the making of the social and the making of the subject. Here I consider those who I 
feel ‘capture’ the late modern scene most completely, drawing attention to the seminal 
elements that warp day to day life. While inevitably I will have left out someone’s 
original and compelling contribution I hope that the selection I have made and the 
pattern of thinking and critique it represents suffice for the purposes and the clarity of 
my analysis. What I wish to draw attention to above all is not the particular details of 
any one theorist’s thought (though these are both valuable and important) but what is a 
tendency, a pattern, within cultural theory itself. The fact therefore that those who are 
least likely to express this tendency still do reveals something subterranean.  
My suggestion is, that this tendency and pattern, is no accident as it is one that derives 
from the very foundations of the culture to which such theory speaks – namely the 
tendency to marginalise and render insignificant the ecological and the material in any 
analysis of the social and any analysis of the self. A further consequence of this is the 
misrepresentation of the current nature of the ethical and its power (or lack of) to 
execute change. The emphasis in this theory is on a despairing, anxious and crisis-ridden 
self, who, while inhabiting a fragmented, distorted and dying world, is nonetheless still 
‘intact’. The notion that this integrity, this wholeness, can pertain in a fragmented, 
distorted and dying world carries the problematic assumption that the self is 
fundamentally separate from the world. This allows for the assumption that, in this 
separation, the ‘moral self’ (while misled, distracted, and compromised) nonetheless 
remains fundamentally whole and can be sufficiently retrieved and relied upon to initiate 
change. To imply that the self is separate from the other-than-human and the humanly 
composed world is, I suggest, to make a fundamental ontological error and this lies at 
the heart of the current crises. Insofar as this is the case, the moral self, suffers the same 
fate as the ‘self’, not merely distraction and confusion but dissolution. 
The key theorists I have selected for the exploration of this terrain are, Albert 
Borgmann, Zygmunt Bauman and Kenneth Gergen. All three testify to the current era 
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as being one of late, liquid or advanced modernity. They all therefore believe that the 
place we are in is, in fundamental, structural respects not entirely different from the 
period named and known as modernity. This is quite a different perspective from those 
theorists who interpret the cultural landscape as one where modernity has been 
exposed, decried, essentially discarded and superseded. The group committed to this 
latter perspective are loosely known as the post modernists. Such thinkers, do not 
consider the self to be in crisis. To the contrary they write as though current conditions 
warrant celebration. Loosely allied with the post-modernists are the post-structuralists, 
authors such as Foucault, Lyotard and Derrida who argue against the meta-narratives 
typical of modernist theory in favour of a more contingent and fluid interpretation of 
history and society. While neither group will be included in the core analysis of this 
chapter the way in which they exacerbate given conditions of hyper-separation and 
solipsism, in both facilitating a pathological relativism and in sustaining the excision of 
the ecological from epistemological, ontological and ethical questions, and the way they 
have helped therefore to stage the setting that my chosen theorists critique, bears some 
consideration. 
 
The Post-modern, Post-structuralist Intervention 
While post modernism and post structuralism overlap and interpenetrate each other I 
will here for arguments sake draw a line between the aesthetic relativism to which post 
modernism gives shape and the ethical and epistemological relativism that post structuralism 
validates. Taken together, post-modernism and post-structuralism maroon the already 
unanchored self and in the process establish that there is no safe shore to return to. It is 
to this lost, anxious, forlorn self that Borgmann, Bauman and Gergen speak. 
Cahoone traces, the first use of the term, ‘postmodern’ to the German philosopher, 
Rudolf Pannwitz, who in 1917, used it to describe the nihilism of western culture.1 
Some twenty years later the term postmodernism was employed by Frederic de Onis to 
highlight a reaction against the cultural movement of modernism.2 According to 
Cahoone, this was primarily an assault on the literary forms of modernism, where 
                                                 
1 Lawrence Cahoone, ed., From Modernism to Postmodernism: An Anthology (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1996), 3. 
2 Mike Featherstone, Consumer Culture and Postmodernism (London: Sage Publications, 2007), 7, 
Cahoone, From Modernism to Postmodernism. 
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literary modernism was itself a movement that was a reaction to the forms and 
assumptions implicit in modernity. However it was not until the literary movement 
against aesthetic modernism in the 1950s and the following cultural movements in 
painting, music, architecture, theatre and film in the 1960s and 1970s, that these trends 
developed into the movement we now call postmodernism. This movement, Featherstone 
points out, did not position itself as the temporal consequent of modernism. Rather it 
sought to define itself in opposition to the time, traits and thinking of modernism and 
modernity. Its rhetoric and its tone were revolutionary in nature, the faultiness of the 
old order jubilantly declared and the alternative salve of postmodernism offered in its 
wake. The alternative it offered was a multiple, undefined, unpredictable, unclassifiable 
and above all uncertain reality. It was anti-modern. This was achieved through the 
subversion of accepted techniques, styles and associations whose displacement 
challenged the notions of order/ certainty/ linear narrative/ structure and truth that 
were taken as somewhat immutable givens in the canons of modernity, (a challenge 
which post-structuralism expanded). The literature, art and architecture of the 1960s and 
1970s turned such constructs on their head, revealing in the process their ‘constructed’ 
nature. Within artistic and literary genres this movement reinvented processes of 
relation and inter-relation, creativity, expression and interaction. The post-modern 
character born from such developments was one of hybridity, spontaneity, pastiche style 
combinations and fluid movement between genres.  
What came to be the detached, cavalier yet curious style of being post-modern neatly 
fitted into and attenuated the advanced capitalist framework, a framework that 
manufactured desire for change as much as it manufactured ‘consumables’. In time 
technologies evolved to further interpret and reinforce the exchangeable reality that post 
modernism promoted.3 Key to the creation of the unattached, collage style mode of 
being was the breaking down of the distinctions between high art and low art and the 
emergence into the artistic sphere of pop culture. Warhol’s much celebrated subversion 
                                                 
3 The most prominent technology in this regard is of course the internet, with its modus 
operandi of commitment free browsing and the social media it makes available by which people 
can incessantly narrate and reinvent their world. Hamilton describes the internet as the “epitome 
of the post-modern attitude to truth … the text of post-modernism par excellence”, facilitating a 
mass, uncensored participation in the construction of truth it interprets and delivers the 
boundary-less relativism of the post-modern mindset. Clive Hamilton, Clive Hamilton; “Reclaiming 
Morality from Conservative Dogma and Post-Modern Indifference,” http://clivehamilton.com/ 
reclaiming-morality-from-conservative-dogma-and-post-modern-indifference/ (last modified 
August 12, 2008). 
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and re-creation of that which was known and traded as art is key to this transition and 
the authentication of popular culture. This celebration of popular culture alongside the 
dethroning of high culture, implied the dissolution of the latter as the arbiter of value 
and the related imposition of any and every individual in this role. Evaluations of the 
good, as they pertained to all forms of creative and public expression became simply a 
matter of personal taste, accordingly, what now ‘counted’ as culture was a matter of 
personal interpretation rather than public authority. The influence these changes would 
have on the retreat into the (self-constructed) self, in concert with other social and 
ecological developments, is not to be underestimated. Here post modernism harnessed 
and ran with a certain ‘temper’, and in the process further advanced changes in the self 
and the social that were already in the making, while post structuralism, in posing a 
theoretical challenge to the philosophical foundations of our culture, authorised the self 
as the centre of all value.  
 
Post-structuralism and Place – A Preview 
Post-structuralism is a term used to group together the thought of key French theorists 
of the 1960s and 1970s. Chief amongst these are Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, 
Gilles Deleuze, Julia Kristeva and Jean Francois Lyotard. Post-structuralism sought to 
undermine all meta-narratives, the idea that any one story, be it - God, capitalism, 
linguistics, could explain and account for social and political reality. In this respect it was 
a reaction to structuralism and the meta-narratives contained in the social, particularly 
Marxist, and linguistic theories of the time. For these theorists ‘truth’ was not to be 
found in rational argument rather each epoch and more specifically each ‘site,’ 
perpetuates its own truth, discursively constructed.4 Interesting to observe here is the 
historical period within which these theorists were writing and their response to this 
historicity. The period within which post-structuralists and post-modernists were 
developing theory was one in which the weight of the Holocaust hung heavily over a 
depleted and disillusioned Europe. The Holocaust’s details and incomprehensible 
horrors were becoming in the 1960s and 70s widely available to the European public. 
But on this particularly alarming atrocity these theorists remained silent. This silence is 
at once surprising and revealing. It is surprising insofar as the theorists who attempt to 
                                                 




mine the foundations of western thinking can leave unremarked one of the most 
profound, and for their time, recent distortions of human behaviour the world has 
witnessed. Such silence draws attention to some of the assumptions within which their 
theory is embedded, assumptions which produce a parallel silence regarding ecological 
devastation. Given that the breathing world is under serious and increasing threat, and 
that Europe was, in their time, cloaked in post-holocaust disillusionment, and that 
neither of these are seen as pivotal to social and cultural theory, indicates the extent to 
which post-modernism and post-structuralism are able to divorce their considerations 
from the most pressing issues facing the planet and with it the implications for the self 
in those conditions. In such dismissal the self recedes further and further from the flesh 
of life. This lapse is explainable insofar as the type of self to which the post-
structuralists refer is, in important respects, a disembodied, ethereal self. It exists 
between conceptual spaces and remains unaffected by not only a post-holocaust despair 
but by the linked despair suffusing a post-enlightenment world, where hope, direction, 
trust and certainty have diminished, where the future no longer compels. In this the 
relation between the self and the world is made redundant, since the capacity to perceive 
and comment on this relationship is severely diminished.5  
It must be noted however that one of the most well-known and influential post-
structuralists, Michel Foucault, included with the death of truth, knowledge and 
certainty, the death of the humanist self. In this, he seems to reference the effect of 
world dissolution on the self. Yet in this death the sole alternative remains a return to 
the same such self as the point by which both awareness of oppression and techniques 
of subversion can be enacted. This is not however to imply that Foucault’s self was in 
any sense constant or essential. The self which has died is the sense of the ‘core’ self 
that persists through time. In its place is a discontinuous self, with no essence. It is a self 
that is constantly being re-made according to changing currents and events.6 The point 
here is that his insights, alongside Derrida's, Deleuze and Guattari’s, amidst others, 
deconstruction of traditional notions of truth, knowledge, and reality, bear the social 
                                                 
5 There is a parallel here with the emergence of the Romantic sensibility and its turn to the self 
following the assault of industrialisation and the bloodshed and moral chaos of the French 
Revolution. Again the regimes of power and influence could no longer be seen as purveyors of 
knowledge, of truth, the good or the right. However the Romantics made an explicit case against 
the disenchantment of the world wrought by social and political changes whereas the post-
structuralists, expressed not disappointment, dismay or sorrow but simply focused on the 
discursive construction of truth, knowledge and the good life.  
6 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things. 
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consequence of legitimating an epistemological turn to the self as the only viable 
position, making in turn the micro-narrative of the self the only viable story, (a 
phenomena which has had exponential consequences, as I have recounted, in the age of 
Facebook, Twitter, Myspace and the cultural pilgrimages to reality t.v).  
In presenting knowledge, truth and morality to be (essentially hollow), discursive 
constructs,7 invested in narratives that are geared towards ordering, shaping and 
controlling our world, post-structuralists undermine any position from which any such 
self determined truth or morality can be critiqued. There is no reliable authority against 
which knowledge claims and questions of value, of morality, can be tested, none that at 
least cannot be deconstructed in terms of their own internal logic.  While the post-
structuralists launched a convincing argument against the regimes of truth, knowledge 
and morality on their own terms, and while I agree with many of their insights, I do not 
agree with the foundations of their premises. I concur that the ‘hollow’ nature of our 
dominant narratives exists, not simply because they are constructed in ways that are self-
reproducing of specific power and knowledge relations, but because they cast the 
ecological and the material outside of their narrative. In this regard I maintain that truth, 
knowledge and the good are not individually constructed but are coherent to the extent 
that they are the unfixed, fluid and emergent properties of deep, abiding relationship 
with the other-than-human and the organic human world. 
The post-modernist’s project of returning the seat of all value to the individual, a project 
that began with aesthetic value and with the dissolution of the ethical gradually morphed 
into all value, and the post-structuralists denial of the legitimacy of any claims to shared 
truth, value and meaning, together reinforce the cultural logic that excises the ecological 
and the material from processes of self (and social) constitution. Such excision 
backgrounds the physical objects, centres and structures of modernity both in their 
power to order and shape human experience and in their dominance over natural 
systems. The cultural repercussions of post–modernism, in particular, have been the 
collective endorsement of the free floating, (chameleonesque) responsibility free, 
                                                 
7 Hamilton contends that, “so overwhelming were the criticisms of the old [1950’s and before] 
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If so much of the traditional ethical code could be shown to be an arbitrary instrument of 
oppression, perhaps the whole code was tainted and all ethical rules must be invalid.” Hamilton, 




subjectively determined and endlessly reinvented, late modern self. If truth does not 
exist, if the good can really not be known or located, if nothing is certain and all is a 
potentially vested cultural production then what is the self to do but to please herself, in 
all she thinks, believes and does? This is particularly so when the core activity of what 
she does is to obsess over the way she reflects and re-presents her ever-changing self. 
The only catch is that this self is rarely in fact pleased, rarely satisfied in what she 
believes in, knows and does. Rather it is despair, disillusionment and anxiety that came 
to characterise this self. This self is in crisis.  
 
Late Modernity and its Surveyors 
Now, in the twenty-first century, postmodern and post-modernism as terms and 
concepts are, outside of academic circles, rarely mentioned. In his second edition of 
Consumer Culture and Postmodernism, Featherstone claims that: 
…the stock of consumer culture has risen and postmodernism has fallen … 
postmodernism, has dropped out of site and is no longer a fashionable term, 
indeed for many it is decidedly démodé.8 
This is not however the case for post-modernity, a term used to characterise the cultural 
climate within which we are said to live today. Alternative descriptions of this period 
mark an important point of theoretical divergence. Those like myself, and the cultural 
theorists to be discussed, who describe this period as late, liquid, advanced or post 
modernity do so in the belief that what has occurred, rather than a shift in epochs, is a 
reinforcement of modernity’s premises and core machinery.9 While I argue that there is 
a threshold change emerging this change is not ‘epochal’ in nature, it derives rather from 
the climax of a sustained cultural logic, one which populates pre-modernity, modernity 
and late modernity. What characterises late modernity in this view is not the demise of 
modernity but a discernible shift in cultural temperament, mood and self-world 
orientation. The theorists who take this view all describe this condition as one that 
challenges the formerly reliable, consistent and reassuring frameworks of selfhood. 
                                                 
8 Featherstone, Consumer Culture and Postmodernism, xiv. 
9 Anthony Giddens likewise argues that, “rather than entering a period of post-modernity we are 
moving into one in which the consequences of modernity are becoming more radicalised and 
universalised than before.” Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1990), 3. 
 
145 
There is the sense that we now live in an unstable world where the self is in an unstable 
condition. Against the perception then that we are confronted by an ecological crisis but 
the self is otherwise intact, they argue (without in main theorising the ecological crisis) 
that the self is not, in fact, intact. Further they suggest that the measures employed to 
assess individual and collective wellbeing conceal as much as they reveal and are not 
accurate or incisive indicators of the subterranean field of human emotion and 
motivation. 
The theorists, Zygmunt Bauman, Albert Borgmann and Kenneth Gergen, take their 
place within a wider discourse that includes Daniel Bell, Christopher Lasch, Marshall 
McLuhan, Mike Featherstone, Jurgen Habermas, Antony Giddens and Charles Taylor 
among others. However, as fore-stated, I have chosen these theorists for the way in 
which they are broadly representative of this vein of thought and the way in which they 
diagnose the crisis of the self in late modernity, diagnoses that are particularly close in 
important respects, and distinct in others, to my argument. These theorists write at the 
intersection of culture and the self, and it is this intersection and its silenced other – 
place in which I am particularly interested. This meeting point, whose boundaries 
overlap, inter-penetrate and variously populate the social, the personal, the textual, the 
technological and the three dimensional forms of the urban is one that the theorists 
who detail the ‘ecological crisis’ fail to examine. Such an oversight means they fail to 
explicate the full spectrum of the crisis in which they are interested, for one cannot 
identify the distortions of our world, and our relationship to this world, until one can 
identify the distortions of the self within it.  
Key to all three theorist’s understanding is the perception that the times we live in are 
not characterised by optimism or hope but are characterised by a kind of despair. To 
diagnose despair, as a cultural phenomenon, in a culture that is comprised of individual 
hyper-separated selves, is no small task. Within the culture at large despair has a range of 
manifestations including depression, drug addiction, alcoholism, obesity, vandalism, 
over-work. Most of these forms are subject to expert scrutiny and expert management.10 
However, in such, they are scrutinised as separate phenomena, and are not seen to be 
related to ecological conditions, and are certainly not seen to be the outcome of a 
                                                 
10 This is not to suggest that all these conditions in every instance are caused singularly by a 
culturally infused despair but rather that cultural dysfunction is a mediating factor in personal 
dysfunction, it embraces subsequent causes. 
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culture of despair. To identify a diffuse, cloudlike despair in a culture reluctant to admit 
its existence, is to identify that its form often does not look like despair as mediated by 
an individual person. It may look like the described conditions yet it can also include 
behaviour that presents as the inverse of despair, active states that include hyper-activity, 
consumption, self-reproduction, ambition, over-production and resentment. What 
accretes at the collective, subterranean level has varying effects at the level of the 
particular. To check the cultural pulse therefore one needs to observe the connections, 
patterns, relations and syntheses between otherwise ostensibly unrelated structures, 
events, and behaviours. From this perspective the quest to be known, as discussed in 
Chapter Four, is not a successful act of person-shaping inasmuch as it is a somewhat 
desperate search for proof of personhood.  
 
On Borgmann and the Sullen Self 
In Crossing the Postmodern Divide Albert Borgmann suggests this despair and the 
superficially incongruent behaviours that demonstrate it partake in a distorted reality. 
Arguing towards a ‘postmodern realism’ he suggests that what we, as postmodern 
consumers, currently experience is a reality that has lost its proper scale.11 As noted in 
Chapter Four, this loss of scale reflects both a distortion in perception and a distortion 
in experience.  
Any credible view of reality must be consistent with the cosmological and 
microphysical conditions so far uncovered by physics. But the reality that finally 
matters lies between the physical micro scale and macro scale. It must be granted 
its proper scale like a painting that would vanish as such if viewed through a 
microscope or from a satellite.12  
In the same way that microscopic and macroscopic lenses give information but warp 
our perspective so too does the lens of hyperreality through which we view the late 
modern world provide information but in the process distort such information. 
                                                 
11 David Malouf, in his discussion of the changing discourse of happiness, makes a similar point, 
suggesting that the ‘problem’ of technologies is not “a question of whether our mind can 
accommodate itself to new ways of seeing, to new technologies and realities that are abstract or 
virtual – clearly it can – but whether emotionally, psychologically, we can feel at home in a world 
whose dimensions so largely exceed, both in terms of the infinitely great and the infinitely small, 
what our bodies can keep in view.” David Malouf, The Happy Life: The Search for Contentment in the 
Modern World, Quarterly Essay 41 (Collingwood, VIC: Black Inc., 2011), 22. 




Hyperreality is reality clarified, distilled, rid of all contingency, and undesired 
interruptions. Hyperreality is brilliant, rich, dramatic in sensory contrasts but less 
dramatic in ‘reality.’ It is screened, safe, contained. It is also pliable, entirely subject to 
personal desires and manipulation. Hyperreality is the world of hyperreal glamour.13 It is 
the world of the commodity and of commodious individualism. It is a disposable, 
discontinuous world that relies on and promotes erasure from the ethical demands and 
connections to place and community. As Borgmann notes: 
To be disposable, hyperreality must be experientially discontinuous with its 
context. If it were deeply rooted in its setting, it would take laborious and 
protracted effort to deracinate and replace it. Reality encumbers and confines. 
Disposability and discontinuity are marks of hyperreal glamour, and glamour in 
turn is the sign of the perfect commodity.14  
Not only does hyperreality free the individual from any one setting, it also cultivates the 
illusion that hyperreality itself is free from dependence on mechanical, industrial and 
geo-physical systems. Here Borgmann contrasts the current epoch, with the industrial 
age of mid to late modernity, where the raw means to sophisticated ends were visible, 
noisy, polluting and generally obtrusive. In contrast to this, the technological operations 
that produce hyperreality are for the most part completely hidden from view. And given 
that the visual is the primary mode of experiencing this reality their visual absence 
suggests a physical absence. Building on this perspective we can see that the ‘invisibility’ 
of these connections and their concealment (one that incidentally is in distinct contrast 
to the exposition of technique, structure and machinery that characterised the modernist 
Bauhaus art movement and subsequent interpretations) rids hyperreality’s overseers and 
its participating members of any responsibility for the ‘reality’ that is sacrificed to make 
hyperreality possible, taking them glamorously away from the messy, imperfect, 
confronting equations of life. 
When the life of regular reality is returned to it is met with, what Borgmann describes 
as, an attitude of sullen resentment. This is because, the cumbersome, confined, limited 
and demanding contours of reality are an unwanted contrast to the shiny, immediately 
gratifying, responsibility-free contours of hyperreality. Regular reality when positioned 
against hyperreality, appears inferior, dull, backward and restraining: 
                                                 
13 Borgmann, Crossing the Postmodern Divide, 87. 
14 Borgmann, Crossing the Postmodern Divide, 96. 
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…it is typically a resentful and defeated return, resentful because reality compares 
so poorly with hyperreal glamour … defeated because reality with all its poverty 
inescapably asserts its claims on us.15  
Consequently, where possible, reality is avoided, diminished and discarded. In its place 
hyperreality emerges all the more omnipotent and alluring. The post-modern self is thus 
faced with the seemingly irreconcilable post-modern divide between the pull of 
hyperreality and the push of a pedestrian, grinding, regular ‘reality.’ Borgmann believes 
that, as things stand, hyperreality is likely to win out with the hyperreal overlay choking 
“off the underlying reality and [reducing] it entirely to a mechanical and marginal 
condition,”16 much like an out of control weed dominates an ecological system that is 
out of balance. He suggests, however, that what can help avert this outcome is the 
cultivation of postmodern realism. Postmodern realism is not anti-technological, it 
accepts and in part celebrates the role of technology in modern life. Borgmann concedes 
that “technology’s provisions have become central to human life and it would be wrong 
to wish them away.”17 While accepting the techniques of late modern life post-modern 
realism also embraces the world of ‘eloquent things.’ Borgmann suggests that the world 
of eloquent things was one that was accessible on a daily basis prior to the rise of 
Enlightenment science, Lockean liberalism and capitalist values. It was the Gilbert 
White world where, tradition, community, place and person existed in comfortable 
symbiosis. While Borgmann does not elaborate on this, it needs to be remembered that 
this was also a world where ethics and epistemology were found in the inter-relations 
between person, place and the theological order. Knowledge in this setting was 
ultimately referenced to knowing God and by association his way and his works. To 
know of his way and his works was to know of the good and to thus cast one’s worldly 
pursuits into a purposeful context. Borgmann does not imagine that the pre-
Enlightenment world could, or should, be returned to but argues that a world that extols 
the qualities of eloquent things can still be realised.  
The world of post-modern realism, he argues, can be found by the practice of patient 
vigour, focal realism and celebration, all of which puts one in touch with the world of 
eloquent things. In this state one can bridge the divide that breaks reality into two 
dysfunctional halves – that of hyperreality and a comparatively diminished regular 
                                                 
15 Borgmann, Crossing the Postmodern Divide, 96. 
16 Borgmann, Crossing the Postmodern Divide, 119. 
17 Borgmann, Crossing the Postmodern Divide, 119. 
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reality. Through postmodern realism one can reclaim the human value that the 
instrumentally driven program of modernity ripped apart. 
In reclaiming human value through the realm of eloquent things, we find a place where 
things speak to us and are in turn spoken to in a rich process of intimacy and 
engagement. This includes the qualities and life forms of nature that are communed 
with through bushwalking, swimming, gardening, cooking, pet-keeping. It also includes 
the elements of community that are sacralised through celebration, food sharing, task 
sharing, dancing, playing and grieving. These, for Borgmann, are always ‘real’, embodied 
experiences connected to place. Borgmann cites the wilderness experience as one of the 
most immediate and potent conduits of eloquent reality. It has, he claims, the clearest 
voice among eloquent things and in such, “speaks to us naturally.”18  
While Borgmann hopes to make plausible the possibilities for a post-modern realism, he 
is well aware of the difficulties this involves. Uniquely amidst the theorists considered 
here he draws attention to the silencing of the ethical, material, and ecological 
conditions that preface and reinforce the maintenance of our current reality.19 It is, he 
observes, the material conditions, secured in technological, mechanical and geo-physical 
dimensions that have produced and will continue to produce both hyperreality and our 
responses to this state. The failure to acknowledge this, he says, is one of the major 
failings of contemporary theory: 
What remains unexamined all the while is the power of products, of the material 
results of production, to shape our conduct profoundly. Any moral theory that 
thinks of the material setting of society as an essentially neutral stage is profoundly 
flawed and unhelpful, so in fact, is most of modern and contemporary ethics.20  
Borgmann similarly critiques the pattern within sociology and cultural theory of 
backgrounding the natural world, assuming that it is of no significance to processes of 
self- construction nor to processes of cultural construction. This means that: 
Post-modern criticism gets arrested prematurely … when having considered 
critically the modern arrogation of reality, it accepts naively the legacy of that 
                                                 
18 Borgmann, Crossing the Postmodern Divide, 120. 
19 Interestingly Giddens makes a similar observation, decrying sociologists for their lack of 
ecological consciousness: “Ecological concerns do not brook large in the traditions of thought 
incorporated into sociology, and it is not surprising that sociologists today find it hard to 
develop a systematic appraisal of them.” Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 8. 
20 Borgmann, Crossing the Postmodern Divide, 111. 
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arrogance, namely the disappearance of reality. Worse, post-modern criticism gets 
caught in dogmatism when it restricts the post-modern conversation to humanity 
and dismisses without further thought the possibility of eloquent things … The 
post-modern theorists have discredited ethnocentrism and logocentrism so 
zealously that they have failed to see their own anthropocentrism. Why reject 
apriori the very possibility that things may speak to us in their own right?21  
Borgmann’s attention to the influence of material reality on the self’s behaviours and 
relations, and on how this in turn leads to the space of eloquent reality, where one can 
engage with ‘natural things,’ is largely unprecedented.22 Here he breaks the cycle, found 
in postmodernism and most cultural theory, where it is presumed that it is only cultural 
products that are central to the construction of the self. In so doing he attests to the fact 
that it is the relations between the cultural sphere and the world of both material and 
eloquent things that we need to attend to if we are to avoid the atrophying effects of 
hyper-reality. Hence, Borgmann seems to depart from the ‘culture only’ discourse that 
dominates cultural theory and severs self from the world, and in this his position 
appears, at first glance, to resonate with the argument of this thesis. 
However, there is a paradox at the centre of Borgmann’s thesis. For while he 
acknowledges the power of the material and the ecological to shape the self, by invoking 
an ‘intact’ self, amidst ecological deterioration, and a closed, disconnected materiality, he 
effectively occludes the fundamental influence of the ecological and the material on the 
self. Borgmann’s self while dishevelled by the world, is not broken. The world’s 
diminishment, is not, fundamentally, his or her own. This self is epistemologically 
integrated, she knows what it is to be a self. And indeed what it is to be a self, this kind 
of self, is to be separate from the suffering earth. In this respect Borgmann returns us to 
the ontological foundations of our culture. And one worries that the world of eloquent 
things are actually, objects that bear no inherent relation to human being.  
While Borgmann acknowledges that the transition between hyperreality and eloquent 
reality is difficult he does not suggest that it is impossible – at least at this stage. For him 
the terms of engagement that give eloquent reality ‘voice’ can be re-awoken once hyper 
reality is not in the foreground. Yet this supposed reawakening is deeply problematic. 
                                                 
21 Borgmann, Crossing the Postmodern Divide, 117.  
22 Bauman too, considered in the next section, comments on the power of material reality to 
shape human experience, insofar as human understanding is largely what he names as, 
praxeomorphic, in nature. Yet unlike Borgmann, Bauman does not include the natural world in 
this epistemological exchange. 
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On the one hand it is uncertain as to how hyperreality, in a hyperreal world, is to be 
backgrounded. What kind of consciousness shift is needed for this to happen? Such a 
shift appears even more unlikely, when considering Borgmann’s hope that it is the 
sullen, resentful self who will somehow seek out the world of eloquent things. Indeed it 
is this self who rejects the contours of regular, pedestrian reality. Yet a consciousness 
shift is what is needed, for the world of hyperreal glamour is not a cultural accident but 
the result of deep seated cultural patterns, a fact that Borgmann himself acknowledges 
even though he does not draw a connection between these patterns and the ontological 
premises of our culture. 
I suggest this consciousness shift and search for eloquence is not available, for the sullen 
self is searching desperately, not for eloquent things, not for conversation, but for proof 
of his existence. He is searching for a sign, a reflection of himself in the world that 
shows that he does in fact exist. Further this self (by Borgmann’s own admission) is 
shaped by the materiality of modernity, and thus in important respects reflects and 
reproduces the qualities of this world. And the primary quality of this post-modern, 
hyperreal world is its impermeability. The material spaces within which the sullen self is 
immersed are each shut off from the other, fixed, homogenous, repetitive, vacuous, 
lifeless, impermeable. What then emerges from such spaces is not the eloquent but the 
impermeable self.23 Such a self is not one who is open to the ‘commanding presence’ of 
eloquent things. Indeed such things fail to command, obsessed as this self is with the 
world of self-reflection. 
In the assumption that the modern self can go out, and will go out, and converse with 
nature and thus retrieve the inner self, Borgmann falls prey to the mistake of the deep 
ecologists, that is, he, like they, believes that while the cultural (and natural) world is 
distorted, the self in important respects remains separate from this world and remains 
                                                 
23 I am referring here to the spaces in modern life in which we work, pray, eat, walk, drive, 
exercise and rest. Particularly compelling examples of the impermeability such places present are 
those of the concrete surfaced, gridded forms of car-parks, toilet blocks, stair wells, city 
pavements, motorways and bus stations, Auge’s non-places discussed in Chapter Four. Even the 
less stark spaces have a corresponding rigidity and repetitive drain on the senses, such include 
supermarkets, sports ovals, fast food outlets, petrol stations, doctor’s surgeries, hospitals, lecture 
theatres, waiting rooms. All these spaces are impervious to relation, they prohibit connectivity. 
Key to such disconnection is the disincentive to rest or repose in such spaces, their lack of 
homefulness. For while they are rigid and fixed in place their function as Auge illustrates is 
largely one of transit, the self does not settle into such spaces, but passes through them, 
disconnected, adrift and restless. This late modern self, reflecting such spaces, becomes likewise 
disconnected, impermeable, unsettled. 
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therefore essentially undistorted. Unrecognised is the way, world is in self, as much as 
self is in world, and thus the way the harms and wounds of one exist in the other. This 
premise of disconnection also implies that the idea of nature and the natural is not 
subject to cultural distortion. In this way access to ‘nature’ is seen to be purely and 
simply available, unmediated by cultural influence. Borgmann’s suggestion that 
wilderness is the most ‘natural’ and ‘pure’ representation of eloquent things, showing 
“no trace of human intonation”24 is testimony to this. Yet, as has been argued in 
Chapter Two, the making and the mapping of wilderness reveals the ineradicable stamp 
of human intonation. To assume that the creation of the wilderness bears no relation to 
culture is to perpetuate the deep seated cultural assumption that to be human is to bear 
no necessary ontological or epistemological relation to the earth. This then, is to 
collapse again, into the assumptions that have given rise to both the culture of ecological 
destruction and the loss of subjectivity. A ‘pure’ wilderness uncontaminated by human 
influence is already a nature that is ontologically and epistemologically separate. Such a 
wilderness is not a place that we know and neither is it a place within which our 
humanity can be accessed or secured. It is not a place of eloquence but one of 
resounding silence. To visit wilderness is not then to bridge ontological and 
epistemological separation, for the nature/culture separation which defines us as human 
and nature as wilderness remains. The very fact that we cannot enter in such spaces 
without a litany of maps, compasses, global positioning systems, first aid kits, dried food 
supplies, bedding, and an epistemologically loaded backpack, full of know-how, is 
testimony to this separation. To overlook this is to ignore the cultural logic that is 
deforming ourselves and the other-than-human world. Indeed it is interesting that, 
increasingly, we cannot even navigate our own immediate surrounds without many of 
the same devices, such as phone apps, global positioning systems and street directories, 
and this is despite the orchestrated grid like formation of our streets. Likewise we would 
have little chance of securing food, clean water, heating or shelter if the systems that 
manufacture such for our ‘comfort’ failed. Alienation from the earth is not then simply 
from those places we fail to know it is also from those places and those ways of being 
that, in their empty repetition and impermeability, can increasingly not be known. 
 
                                                 
24 Borgmann, Crossing the Postmodern Divide, 30. 
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In brief, in assuming the space of eloquent reality is readily available, Borgmann fails to 
identify the deeper ontological foundations that have shaped modernity and continue to 
shape the late modern self. The pattern of being human that was executed and instituted 
at the indeterminate formation of western culture, one that has been reinforced and 
reproduced through changing epochs and has increasingly diminished the space for and 
thus the power of eloquent things, is one that has thereby shaped a certain mode of self. 
This self is one that is progressively more and more immune to the call of eloquent 
reality. Eloquent reality rarely ‘speaks’ to the late modern self, and rarely does the late 
modern self speak to it. What is more, to be human in our culture, is to know of the 
distinction that separates us from the world of eloquent things. The late modern self, 
moves not towards that which challenges our humanity, so defined, but towards that 
which reflects, repeats and celebrates the atomised self. He can be seen racing towards 
the bright lights, glamour and money back guarantee of a hyperreal world. 
The distinction Borgmann makes between pre-modern times of ‘cosmic-centeredness’, 
‘religious unity’ and ‘communal celebration’ and modern times of ‘instrumental 
rationality’, ‘individualism’ and ‘hyper stimulation’, further complicates his position. 
Under his interpretation these worlds are, in important respects, opposed. Yet the link, 
the decisive moment, that signalled the end of medieval modes of being and the 
introduction of modern frameworks is unaccounted for. For Borgmann this change is 
not explicable in terms of scientific, technological, economic, mechanical ‘advance’. 
These developments are always secondary phenomena. Instead, invoking the cultural 
subconscious, he argues that what determines change and what determines choice is that 
which has already been, on some level, culturally decided. Within this setting the 
modern human is significantly constrained for: 
Daily decisions are pre-formed by fundamental decisions. The fundamental and 
material decisions that have shaped the technological society leave little leeway to 
the daily decisions of the consumer.25  
While insightful and accurate, this leads us to ask, in what sense have the fundamental 
decisions of cultural life in modernity in fact been made? If we are returning to the very 
form and foundation of culture it seems that the decisions of cultural life derive from 
fundamental decisions about the nature of being human, and the paths taken to 
demonstrate, build on, and develop this nature, having already been set. What then 
                                                 
25 Borgmann, Crossing the Postmodern Divide, 115. 
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appears to be the case is that the ‘fundamental’ decisions that determine the cultural 
trajectory of modernity are the same as those which shaped and crafted pre-modernity. 
Given ontological primacy, it appears then that it is not modernity itself that has 
produced the sullen, resentful self but rather that the sullen self is an outcome of an 
enduring cultural pattern crafted by a culturally formative logic. If this is so, it follows 
that an alternative to the sullen self is not to be readily found. The loss of pre-modern, 
forms, relations, and modes of being, where eloquence was more available, was a shift in 
the baseline on the road to the late-modern, sullen, self. Hence we face not merely a 
troubling emergence against which there are remote but fledgling and viable alternatives, 
but a structural logic that is self-replicating, self-reinforcing and increasingly impervious 
to difference, including the difference that post-modern realism suggests is available. 
This failure to acknowledge the ontological foundations of our culture distortion, leads 
Borgmann to mistakenly believe that one can readily switch between realities – between 
hyperreality and eloquent reality.  
In invoking eloquent reality as a cultural alternative Borgmann seems to suggest that the 
post-modern self, while distorted in a hyper-real world, is, in fundamental respects, akin 
to the pre-modern self, that while the world has changed the self has not. And again in 
so doing he inadvertently affirms and reinforces the culture from which hyperreality 
springs. This is not to suggest that there are no liminal and mythical spaces and places 
left where eloquence can emerge between creatures, people, sand dunes, rivers and 
moonlight. These exist and are to be treasured and celebrated. However the nature of 
the eloquent encounters are, primarily, marginal and momentary. For while our culture 
has for the large part successfully forged separation into our ways of thinking, knowing 
and being, and while the world within which we spend most of our days and nights 
reinforces such separation, we are after all, not in fact separate and take on the 
properties of our world. In thinking otherwise we make an ontological mistake. What 
this means however is that neither are we in any true sense ‘individuals.’ The nature 
therefore of an individual encounter with the world of eloquent things does not, even 
where such individuals accrete in numbers, pose a real cultural alternative. This is why 
environmental gains, courageous in effort and extremely important, do not stem 
ecological destruction. They remind us what it is to be human but this reminder is 
quickly suffocated by a world made to tell a different story. While the founding logic of 
our culture remains un-interrogated, while the ecological is destroyed to produce and 
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prove the self, while that self is shaped by an impermeable world the cultural space for 
eloquence is not available. 
Our experience in late modernity is then not simply a novel phenomenon resulting from 
cumulative humanistic and scientific developments but a shift in the ontological baseline 
of an enduring cultural logic of separation. This logic has, in what was for some time a 
slow and incremental process, shaped the world to fit its premises. This process, having 
accelerated in modernity means we live in a world that daily on a cellular, 
epistemological and ontological level speaks of separation. Deep and abiding 
relationship with the world of eloquent things, from this position, is a utopian hope for 
eloquence in a long mute world has been lost to the roar of machines, the drone of 
networks and the static hum of the screen.  
 
On Zygmunt Bauman and the Anxious, Ambivalent Self 
What then are the prospects for such a world? From Zygmunt Bauman’s perspective 
this world is not one where the eloquence of things is able to speak to us. Nor does it 
provide the path by which we can counter and cope with the fast-forward surge of life 
in post-modernity. For him the alternative to post-modern malaise is not ecological but 
ethical.26 Amidst his insightfully painted landscape of despair, wilful disinterest and 
ambivalence, the only reprieve is to accept the state of ambivalence as the new world 
order and within this access one’s moral nature: a nature formerly suppressed by the 
authoritative dictates of modernity.  
Bauman’s densely documented analysis of the human condition suggests that modernity 
is still an abiding force with some of its structures being more ‘solid’ than ever.27 What 
identifies the onset of post-modernity is not the loss of modernity’s influence but a 
collective loss of faith that the power and influence of modernity will benefit the 
everyday person. Dennis Smith suggests that for Bauman, modernity is characterised by 
the search for betterment, “being better, doing better, getting better.”28 The 
                                                 
26 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2000), Zygmunt Bauman, 
Does Ethics Have a Chance in a World of Consumers? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2008), Zygmunt Bauman, Culture in a Liquid Modern World (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2011). 
27 Bauman, Liquid Modernity.  
28 Dennis Smith, Zygmunt Bauman: Prophet of Postmodernity (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1999), 7. 
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synchronised forces of capitalism, the nation state and modern science all promise the 
better life. This life is one of production, gravitating on the mechanical axis of industrial, 
assembly line order and the social axis of certainty, prediction and control, where one’s 
social and familial role, one’s work and consequently one’s identity are firmly secured. In 
this setting, security exists where individual freedoms are contravened. With the arrival 
of ‘liquid modernity,’ the inverse becomes true, freedom emerges as the dominant motif 
and security rapidly diminishes. At once nothing is certain and everything is possible. 
Liquid modernity became possible once it was realised that the forces of modernity 
rather than serving the better life and producing good ends for the majority were just as 
likely to disserve such a life and produce as many or more bad outcomes as good. This 
realisation was, in Bauman’s view, not a cause for celebration as the post-modernists 
would have it, but issued instead in profound disillusionment and anxiety. It implies that 
everything that was once known, trusted, relied upon and understood is, in a 
fundamental way, no more. This change, Bauman suggests, has left the populace 
anxious and afraid, without guidance or measure, for “once the troops of normative 
regulation vacate the battlefield of life only doubt and fear are left.”29 
Bauman proposes, however, that the overall order of things is resilient and not subject to 
change, the changes that have occurred are simply in the qualitative value of these forces 
and in the freedom to decide questions of value and morality for oneself. Only the spell 
of modernity has been broken: 
The overall order of things is not open to options … between the overall order 
and every one of the agencies, vehicles and stratagems of purposeful action there is 
a cleavage a perpetually widening gap with no bridge in sight.30  
Bauman refers to this switch of faith, perception and form as a liquidifying process. 
What makes modernity liquid is: 
…its self-propelling, self-intensifying, compulsive and obsessive ‘modernization’ as 
a result of which, like liquid, none of the consecutive forms of social life is able to 
maintain its shape for long.31  
                                                 
29 Bauman, Liquid Modernity, 21. 
30 Bauman, Liquid Modernity, 5. 
31 Bauman, Culture in a Liquid Modern World, 11. 
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In this he describes the way in which the old order, those modes of being and behaving 
that were linked with tradition, community and ritual, were through the emergence and 
subsequent domination of modernity, melted. In their place an impenetrable and more 
solid order emerged, one that liquefies all else that fails to correspond to its economic 
rationalist demands. A sea of change thus grows around an immutable anchor. In the 
modernizing process some of the first forms to be melted were ethics, politics and 
culture. As such, economy was isolated from their influence and came to be a self-
replicating and self-reinforcing monolith. It soon became normalised that whatever was 
not concerned with economics was considered to be irrelevant and/or a matter of 
purely subjective (and fickle) opinion.  
 In this process, the once solid, immutable fixtures of social and political life – truth, 
certainty, order, control, – become ‘fluid,’ inconsistent, shape shifting and on the move. 
Discontinuity, disorder, uncertainty, lack of control, spiralling risk and instability 
become the norm. Things, people, states, relations started to move, evaporate, change 
form –liquidify. In one sense this new fluid state is a liberating phenomenon for it frees 
us from the premise of mutual social benefit and a given future that earlier social models 
engendered. Yet at the same time it removes the authority that modernity in the 
maintenance of such narratives supplied. And since modernity has, in its world-shaping 
work, progressively ‘deanimated’ nature, humans in this process have also come to be: 
…increasingly ‘naturalised’ so that their subjectivity, the primeval ‘givenness’ of 
their existence could be denied and they themselves could be made hospitable for 
instrumental meanings; they came to be like timber and waterways rather than like 
forests and lakes.32 
In a liquid world, the individual subject, bereft of the ‘givenness’ of her existence and 
the moral know-how which had characterised life in earlier community settings, is now 
in an ethically and epistemologically forlorn position. The responsibility of making 
decisions on one’s own and hoping these are the best ones, characterises the anxiety 
driven, burdensome state of liquid modernity. Such anxiety is further compounded by 
making such decisions in a constitutionally uncertain, unstable world, brimming with 
temptation and enticement. Bauman suggests that the response to this is twofold. The 
first response is one of ambivalence. The post-modern denizen tries not to think or to 
care too much, remaining suspended between alternatives or only very loosely attached 
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to the alternative that has, for the moment, been chosen. Thinking too much and caring 
too much in an out of control, unpredictable, uncertain world are, after all, imminently 
hazardous pastimes. The second response is to shop. Shopping in the space of liquid 
modernity, has, Bauman observes, become not merely an obsessive pastime but a way 
of life.33 Akin to my argument that consumption has become the dominant mode of 
experiencing life in late modernity, Bauman suggests that the self in liquid modernity, 
whether choosing between hairstyles, therapists, university courses, or holiday locations, 
is always in the process of scanning. In such scanning she is selecting, discarding, trying 
on identities. These are never ‘once and for all’ secured but the temporary certainty and 
satisfaction that shopping provides is enough to forestall and gloss over the deeper 
more disturbing implications for the self in an unstable world.  
Bauman argues that the implication of the non-committed, shifting, disengaged and 
unattached act of shopping is the production of the same sort of individual. For “the 
way human beings understand the world tends to be at all times praxeomorphic, it is 
always shaped by the knowledge of the day, by what people do and how they go about 
doing it.”34 Ways of being determine ways of knowing and the latter in turn reinforces 
the former. If, then, what people do is to ‘shop’ by processes of scanning, selecting, 
exchanging, discarding then this reproduces the shifting, unstable, fragile self who, in 
her despair, returns to more, scanning, selecting and discarding. 
Bauman’s portrait of our culture is intuitively and experientially resonant. This is a world 
in which the (apparent) plethora and responsibility of choice overwhelms and burdens 
the floundering subject while at the same time on a deeper level there is no choice at all, 
for the substructure cements the space within which all other ‘choice’ is made. His 
descriptions here parallel Borgmann’s description of hyper-reality, the lack of stillness, 
engagement and interconnection, and the way in which the capacity to authentically 
choose is constrained, due to the dictates of fundamental decisions having been made. 
But, unlike Borgmann, Bauman does not invoke a postmodern alternative, a 
conversation with the world of eloquent things. Rather, his solution is to adopt a stance 
within this landscape that is both ethical and attitudinal. This means the acceptance of 
ambivalence and with it the acceptance of the uncertainty and instability this world 
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presents. For Bauman ambivalence, uncertainty and instability are tenable states for 
beneath them is the solid, reliable centre at the core of human being. In other words, 
our moral nature. This nature, when released from the constrictive and prescriptive rule 
of modernity with its “command-issuing, order-making powers”35 can rise phoenix like 
out of the ashes. We can feel with this new freedom, “our moral nature springing back 
to life with the same wonder that we might watch the leaves return to a tree after 
wintertime or press an ear against the bark to hear the sap rising.”36 
Bauman’s version of the ethical derives from a generous, basically optimistic, 
interpretation of the nature of the human and the social. He argues that society has 
evolved not in response to the Hobbesian command of bridling an inherently selfish 
and aggressive animal but rather in response to the kind of interpretation Levinas 
proffers,37 one where society provides norms to negotiate the conflict that arises 
between ones pre-moral sense of unconditional responsibility for the other and the 
reality of living in a complex social whole where self–interest will be in conflict with care 
for-the-other: 
…society is an arrangement for rendering the otherwise stubbornly and vexingly, 
harrowingly silent (because unspecific) ethical command audible – that is, specific 
and codified – and thereby reducing the infinite multitude of options such a 
command may imply to a much narrower, manageable range of options.38  
Bauman suggests that with the ‘death’ of society, the normative and restrictive structures 
given by modernity (and one can assume earlier, theologically prescribed periods) have 
been lifted and the individual is now free to decide their own moral ground. This does 
not present as an immediate problem, given that for Bauman, human moral nature is 
profoundly internal, both spontaneous and core to the human condition. But for this 
very reason spontaneous moral responses have the potential to drench one in moral 
concern for the other. If our moral nature implies a moral responsibility for the other, 
one that we as humans all share, and if in liquid modernity such responsibility is not 
determined by society, it seems that in this setting people may hypothetically be 
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Tamara Wright, Peter Hayes and Alison Ainley,” in The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other, 
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compelled to care-for the other on a rather relentless, daily basis. However, clearly this is 
not the case and in fact the inverse is more correct. This is where, in liquid modernity, 
the sense of concern and choice is in fact problematic. While moral care may be 
spontaneous, the space of moral deliberation and decision is a secondary phenomenon and 
this is where society – and in liquid modernity, the market – intervene.  
Bauman accounts for this lack of moral action (not we must remember the lack of moral 
essence) in liquid modernity through a two-step process that begins with the culture of 
consumption and ends with transference of care for the other to care for the self. He 
argues that in liquid modernity the corrosion of ‘value’ as a social text puts the 
individual in the daunting position of having to decide each and every question of value 
for herself. In this setting she is never quite sure that her choices are adequate or that 
she is fully qualified or informed enough to so choose. This is a highly anxious space 
and it is one that the consumer market capitalises on. At a fundamental level consumer 
markets operate similarly to earlier authorities in providing, suggesting, and stipulating 
clarity in what seems otherwise a hopelessly ambiguous and complex situation – how to 
decide? The techniques of consumerism are however different from those of former 
regulation. Where norms and duties once helped to maintain the social whole, 
consumerism pivots on the ‘care’ of the individual. In giving false comfort to existing 
uncertainty and anxiety and in ‘selling’ further needs and desires consumer society shifts 
the emphasis from care and responsibility for-the-other to self-fulfilment. To be 
successful in this regard and to stand in as a moral arbiter the market needs to be trusted 
and seen to be effective in its capacity to meet needs. Bauman suggests that this is 
achieved through the cultural link that liquid modernity forms between moral care 
(gifting) and consumer goods. In this context consumerism (rewarding of the self) is 
justified as a moral act by the transfer of the ethical inclinations rooted and developed in 
the context of care for- the-other into the responsibility and context of care for-the-self.  
This is achieved in two ways. Firstly, moral care is co-opted from social engagement and 
doing-for-the-other into material acts of gifting the other. While this includes donations 
to charities, environmental organisations and third world populations, Bauman’s focus is 
particularly on gifts to ‘others’ within our own community. Increasingly, money, things 
and presents take the place of a practice of care. The capacity to gift thus reflects a 
person’s capacity to be a good person. And since to gift requires financial means, the 
moral subject now needs to sell herself to the market, to become, as it were, product. 
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Here is the twist. In order to sell oneself for economic/moral worth, one needs to 
invest in oneself. This investment is by nature endless and takes multiple forms, given 
the uncertainty and changeability of liquid modernity. Key to this pursuit then is the fact 
that such investment is never complete, the self is never as ‘full’, satisfied, interesting, 
healthy, educated, set-up, secure as she could be. Indeed the search alone leaves the self 
exhausted and in escalating need of consumer rewards, treats, indulgences. Since I can 
only be there for the other once my needs have been satisfied, and since in a consumer 
society full of uncertainty and endless possibility, my needs are never satisfied, it is not 
possible to fully be there for the other. Responsibility for the other becomes simply 
responsibility for oneself, one’s happiness, one’s health, one’s wellbeing and 
independence, “…the collateral victim of the leap to the consumerist rendition of 
freedom is the Other as an object of ethical responsibility and moral concern.”39 
This is an astute observation and the damage can be seen to be further exacerbated by 
alienation from the other as a condition of life in late capitalist liquid modernity, an 
alienation that is particularly problematic given that, in Bauman’s account, one’s moral 
nature, being there for the other, is first summoned by proximity to the other. Yet in the 
hyper-fragmented contours of post modernity such proximity is only accidental and 
fleeting. The other remains categorically remote whether the separation is streets, 
suburbs, continents, or species apart. Here, unfortunately, Bauman’s position becomes 
itself trapped in the rigidity of early modern forms. For the ‘other’ to which he refers is 
simply that of other people. The other-than-human world as compositional of our 
moral and human ground is decidedly absent and it seems thus that our moral nature 
(and our human nature) bear no inherent relationship to nature itself. Redress then of 
ways of being human that destroy the earth and subjectivity are not available in his 
theory. 
Further complicating his position is the fact that his hope and belief in our moral 
natures as a plausible and emancipatory possibility rests in the individual moral agent 
reconnecting with his true moral nature. In this emphasis on the individual Bauman 
inadvertently reinforces a culture within which the ethical, in my view, is not in fact 
available. What the cult(ure) of the individual in fact represents is the loss of ethical 
knowing available to culture and in its place, the invocation of ‘objective’ rights and the 
personal, subjective ground of choice and opinion. And yet within late, or liquid, 
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modernity subjective knowing has already been invalidated by the culture at large, 
deemed unverifiable, unsubstantial and ever-changing. This means the ‘subjective’ 
nature of one’s ethical opinions can do little to transform culture and offer cultural 
alternatives. Further, as detailed in Chapter Four, subjectivity as a form of being has in 
late modernity been severely diminished with the self, approaching instead, the state of 
the object. The lack of efficacy of social and environmental groups to challenge the 
pattern of culture and achieve lasting change is a testimony to the dissolution of 
subjectivity as a culturally viable, epistemological form. 
 In reinstating the individual and the ethical promise incumbent in her, Bauman also 
returns us to the ontological foundations of western culture, those that exclude the 
other-than-human from the processes and practices of self-building, (or self-melting), 
from the template of being human. Like Borgmann’s assumption that the self is 
fundamentally intact despite the social and ecological deformations of our world, 
Bauman fundamentally and inherently assumes that the self, while proximate to, 
distracted and persuaded by the forces of our culture, is not misshapen. The self 
remains somehow separate. Despite his many powerful and compelling insights Bauman 
thus fails to challenge the epistemological perimeters that produce and perpetuate the 
loss of subjectivity.  
The late modern worlds of Borgmann and Bauman, ones of discontinuity, endless 
change, ambivalence, sullenness and hyperactivity, are then not ones where the voice of 
eloquent things can be heard, sustained or engrained in daily relations, nor are they 
places where re-enchantment and reprieve can be found by accessing an apparently 
fertile ‘moral nature’. The patterns of being human, cemented into daily life, ones where 
discontinuity, ambivalence and hyper-reality reign, prohibit the emergence of alternative 
modes of being human that lay dormant in the natural world and our long forsaken 
relationship to it.40 
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On Kenneth Gergen and the Saturated Self 
In order to move away from the premises and patterns of the ‘culture only’ movement 
we need to shift our focus from the individual self and the martyoshkan selves it 
contains, towards an understanding of the self that is beyond the boundary of skin and 
mind. This kind of self is embedded in the world, permeating and composing identity 
and being with the other. Kenneth Gergen, in his discursive exploration of the post-
modern saturated self,41 suggests this kind of self is now the norm. This saturated self is 
apocalyptic. In surviving the disintegration of promises of certainty and truth and 
reliability that, apparent in early modernity, are washed away in the uncertainty of late 
modernity, and in surviving the confusion, exhaustion and disconnection that the 
saturation of self (by social technologies) in ‘post’ modernity brings, s/he emerges victor, 
in the acquiescent and liberated rapture of ‘multiplicitious being.’ 
While Gergen, in some respects, surveys the late modern landscape in parallel fashion to 
Borgmann and Bauman, suggesting that “daily life has become a sea of drowning 
demands, and there is no shore in sight,”42 he diverges from the individually focused 
alternatives offered by these theorists by suggesting that the outcome for late modernity 
is the ultimate erasure of the self. It may thus seem that such a perspective is resonant of 
the ‘ecology of mind’ of which Gregory Bateson speaks, a step away from culture only 
discourse, towards a mode of speaking, thinking and being in which the self is no longer 
a helpful metaphor. At least it would seem so if the ‘natural’ world were part of this 
multiplicitious being, rather than such possibilities being determined purely by a late 
modern, technological, human centred space. 
Gergen traces the evolution of the saturated self to the demise of both the Modernist 
and the Romantic self as cultural forms. According to Gergen, the Romantic self had an 
essence, a purpose, a ‘calling.’ It was by the discovery and the articulation of this voice, 
this essence, this passion, that one actually came into being, into selfhood. This was so 
even when the depths of feeling drove one into despair or madness. As individuals 
partook in the story making of their own particular self each story was by necessity, like 
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each self, different and unpredictable. One thus, as a person responsible for crafting the 
uniqueness of one’s nature, had both the burden and the blessing of ‘selfhood.’ Further, 
the greater one’s passions and insights the greater one’s burdens and blessings. Gergen 
suggests that with the onset of modernity and the machinated human this kind of self 
was set aside. The emphasis was no longer on the unique self and her full expression, 
the emphasis was now on the icons of ‘progress,’ and ‘development.’ This was the 
capital ‘S’ story in which not unique selves, but experts, contributed in their own 
particular way. In this new model an individual’s essence did not reside in the depths of 
one’s soul, but was constituted by activities, vocation, ‘character.’ For Gergen, “the 
modernist self is knowable, present in the here and now, just slightly below the surface 
of his actions.”43  
However with the arrival of the social mood and theoretical discipline that Gergen 
associates with ‘post’ modernity the machinations of modernity became exposed. It 
became evident that the world which modernity had promised had not and would not 
materialise. The enduring status of the ‘truth’, ‘justice’ and ‘equality’ that modernity had 
offered was found to be contingent, contextual and in some cases corrupt. 
Consequently, modernity’s questions and assumptions were challenged. As we have 
seen, the challenge posed to the knowledge claims of modernity soon extended to the 
basis of any claim to truth and certainty. For if the narratives of modernity are shown to 
be, of their essence, cultural constructs then it becomes apparent that all narratives are 
constructs. They are simply modes of negotiating and interpreting reality in one way 
rather than any other, equally possible and plausible, way given particular sets of 
circumstances. Thus the pursuit of an ultimate and enduring truth was foregone and in 
its place arose the self-conscious construction of individual worlds and a self-directed 
subjectivity. 
Gergen proposes that there was alongside the dissolution of the vanguards of modernity 
an important change that made the emergence of self-construction as an epistemological 
alternative possible. This was the explosion of social technologies made available by 
quantum developments in communication networks, publishing, and transport 
networks; achievements which have “produced a radical shift in our exposure to each 
other …  [and]set the stage [for] radical changes in our daily experience of self.”44 As the 
                                                 
43 Gergen, The Saturated Self, 47. 
44 Gergen, The Saturated Self, ix. 
 
165 
scale of these changes accelerated possibilities for, and exposure to, an unforeseen 
diversity, quantity and rapidity of communication, information and social representation, 
the self in becoming increasingly subject to such surroundings came, Gergen argues, to 
reflect these surroundings. This process of reinforcement and reflection has created 
what Gergen refers to as the saturated self. In producing and making available a multi-
phrenic array of cultural alternatives, spiritual possibilities, lifestyle options, these 
technologies undermined authority, decentred social traditions and invited doubt, 
ambivalence, uncertainty into every life detail. As Gergen narrates: 
These relationships pull us in myriad directions inviting us to play such a variety of 
roles that the very concept of an authentic self with knowable characteristics 
recedes from view. The fully saturated self becomes no self at all.45 
The saturated self thus approximates a multiphrenic form of being. The cacophony of 
external possibilities becomes a cacophony of internal voices that throw, doubt, anxiety, 
uncertainty at each decision made, each prospect considered: 
It is a sunny Saturday morning and he finishes breakfast in high spirits. It is a rare 
day in which he is free to do as he pleases. With relish he contemplates his options. 
The back door needs fixing, which calls for a trip to the hardware store. This 
would allow a much needed haircut; and while in town he could get a birthday card 
for his brother, leave off his shoes for repair, and pick up shirts at the cleaners. 
But, he ponders, he really should get some exercise; is there time for jogging in the 
afternoon? That reminds him of a championship game he wanted to see at the 
same time. To be taken more seriously was his ex-wife’s repeated request for a 
luncheon talk. And shouldn’t he also settle his vacation plans before all the best 
locations are taken? Slowly his optimism gives way to a sense of defeat. The free 
day has become a chaos of competing opportunities and necessities.46 
The anxiety ridden, inconclusive and distracting landscape that Gergen describes, not 
dissimilar to Bauman’s, is one deeply familiar to most of us who experience life in 
affluent western societies. Who, after all, is not ever more plagued by the multiple, 
competing calls to one’s attention, the ever expanding array of seemingly plausible 
lifestyle, hairstyle, holiday location, house location, clothes choice, cuisine choice, 
relaxation, recreation options that surround us, invite us, beguile us, distract and perturb 
us on every front? The sullen self of which Borgmann speaks and the despairing self to 
which Bauman refers is Gergen’s overwhelmed, splintered, saturated self. These selves 
are not mutually exclusive, they all co-exist and detail the corrosion of ‘truth,’ ‘certainty,’ 
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‘order,’ as reliable, consistent, culturally available states. But Gergen does not locate the 
saturation and consequent erasure of self primarily in the social, political and moral 
failures of modernity. Rather he suggests that such failures preface and inform the 
production of social technologies. It is these technologies that take hold of uncertainty 
and reproduce it in multiple and myriad directions. 
However despite the anxiety and ennui attending this state of multiphrenic living, 
Gergen argues in a somewhat existential vein, that what this saturation can produce is a 
form of unprecedented liberation. This is the shift from the state of ‘self’ as singular, 
defined and knowable to the embrace of no-self, the venture into multiplicitious being. 
In this state, rather than resisting wave upon wave of alternative modalities, the self 
succumbs to the flow, becoming a conduit, a shifting point in a network of multiple 
relations: 
As such technologies [of social saturation] become increasingly effective, we 
become increasingly populated with the identities of others and come increasingly 
to recognise the extent of our relational embededness. As this occurs the 
separation of self and other becomes diminished.47 
This partial erasure of the self is not a source for regret for it heralds the onset of a 
greater relatedness and the loss of constrictive and inhibiting boundaries. If true this 
could well present as a liberating and healing phenomena. However here we must ask in 
what, does such relatedness consist and whether such relatedness fed by technological 
multiplicity is an authentic and plausible phenomena? What are the splintered, 
fragmented parts, now separated from the ‘superficial’ coherence in meta-narratives and 
individual frameworks, in relation with? Certainly not with the other-than-human world 
through which being can be realised, indeed this world is the one on which a multi-
phrenic, technological space feeds. 
In this transition from the observable and convincing experience of saturation to the 
state of multiplicitious being Gergen reveals his reliance on cultural assumptions and his 
inability to move away from ‘culture only’ analysis. For the multiplicity of which he 
speaks is embedded in the homogeneity of a human-shaped world which, to support its 
apparent array of choices, relies on the destruction of the other-than-human world, thus 
destroying actual diversity and options for change. And if the self takes on the shape of 
its world, as Bauman and Gergen attest, then this self rather than being a point of 
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multiple relation, is, like its world, impermeable and as such, less and less capable of 
relation. A further complication of Gergen’s position is that in his interpretation the 
space for greater relationality is made available through an erasure of the self that is 
epistemological. The self Gergen describes disappears once he becomes unknowable to 
himself and unlocatable in the world. In this respect Gergen identifies epistemology as a 
correlate of ontology, to be a ‘self’ is to know of oneself as a discrete, integrated, separate 
entity. This creates a paradox for his model whereby relationality, by his definition, is 
not thus fundamentally defining of self but is to the contrary that which threatens the 
separated self. The space of total relatedness (even if it were available as he describes it) is 
a space where knowledge of the self, as a self, is erased. This once more, is the anxious 
self in search of proof. 
By invoking the self as first and foremost ontologically separate, Gergen not only 
reinforces the premises of western culture but reveals the way they operate to not 
facilitate but prohibit relation. Key to our cultural ideology and central to Gergen’s own 
logic, is selfhood as found in separation. To lose separateness is then to lose the self. 
This premise of ontological separation is not overridden by the fracturing and incoherence 
that Gergen cites as characteristic of post modernity. In fact such fracturing is, to the 
western psyche, further proof of separation. For the more connections between the geo-
physical structures that compose our urban spaces and the natural world are severed the 
more it seems we belong to the human and not the natural places, even if we belong to 
the former in a multiphrenic way. 
While Gergen observes that, “as we become increasingly conjoined with our social 
surroundings, we come to reflect those surroundings,”48 in casting these surroundings as 
only social and technological he overlooks the loss of connection (with the other-than-
human world) that  such conjoining implies  while also failing  to identify that where 
such surroundings that are dis-integrated, competing, incoherent, discontinuous in time, 
space and human experience, they can at only the most superficial, fleeting and 
inconsequential level make relation available.  
Ultimately the cultural critiques of Borgmann, Bauman and Gergen, while suggesting 
ethical and epistemological alternatives, fall short in making such alternatives viable by 
invoking an intact self in a highly damaged world and thus reinforcing the premise of 
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separation that has given rise to systemic ecological destruction and the loss of 
subjectivity. At the same time they fail to identify the impermeability of the late modern 
self and do not acknowledge that this self is (systemically) resistant to ecological, ethical 
and epistemological alternatives. Indeed within this setting alternatives and ‘solutions’ 
do not mitigate or heal but exacerbate the conditions which destroy self and destroy 
world. The line of fault in these theories is the failure to theorise the way late modernity 
shapes the impermeable self and how this is linked to the perpetuation of the form of 
worldlessness that characterises our culture. Where the world is invoked in these 
discourses it is insofar as the ecological crisis is a threat to material wellbeing, and a 
consequence of a dysfunctional culture. While this is true, the way in which the 
diminishment of world diminishes and threatens the potential for human being is not 
broached. That this threat then, endangers subjectivity, provoking the self into and 
against world once more, further diminishing place, and further diminishing the 
potential for cultural awareness of such threat and such loss is also occluded.  
At the same time materiality itself, the world in its geo-physical urban dimensions, is 
largely bereft of presence in these theories. This is despite the fact that it is these geo-
physical forms that in their impermeable, concrete dimensions reflect, reinforce and 
construct the (impermeable) self. The world then as form, as substance and as subject is 
lost. What this makes evident is that without an excavation of the very thinking that 
shapes our culture and the patterns and relations such thinking gives rise to we will fail 
in understanding the nature of the crisis. It is to this no small task, to the ‘ecology of 
mind’ that Gregory Bateson offers as a mode of moving towards understanding, that I 







Some say you are on the ride whether you want to be or not, but who wouldn’t want to 
be! You’d have to be crazy. Sure, some get to choose their own seats, others don’t, but 
hey it’s still a damn fine deal whichever way you look at it, and there are plenty of views! 
I am one of the seat people, I was organised, didn’t sit around waiting for someone to 
hand it to me. I went out and got it! Hit the ground running! 
Some people are pretty obsessed with getting a better seat, more comfortable, better 
view, more variety of seat positions and lighting, better service, gets a bit tedious for us 
up here. Though I spose they wanna feel that bit more relaxed, that bit safer, plus we, at 
the front, get there first. Can’t blame em, but not everyone can be at the front it’s just 
how it goes. 
Anyhow they still get to choose among refreshments and there is a hell of a lot of those. 
The mind boggles!  
Doesn’t even feel like you are on a train! Could be anywhere! Sicily! Morocco! Thailand! 
The choices. Life, it’s pretty easy, pretty comfy, can’t complain about that. And we are 
going somewhere, not Morocco, this time, but definitely heading somewhere, that’s for 
sure. 
I’ve forgotten at the moment just where, but the drivers, the conductors, they know, 
and fuck, do we need to be anywhere else? Things just keep getting better! 
A few hundred yards ago there were some people who wanted to stop the train. At first 
they didn’t even want to get on, can’t think why, then once they were on they were 
desperate to get off and spent the whole time staring out the window when there is so 
much to do and look at inside. Depressed, perhaps, psychotic, dreamer types, there’s 
always someone wanting something else. 
That was a while ago, they have quietened down now and no-one really thinks or talks 
about whatever they were rattling on about, no need. Besides they seem pretty content 
and comfortable, got with the program, so to speak. 
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The ride is pretty exciting, so stimulating. It’s an incredible mix of stereophonic, 
ultrasonic, panasonic. It’s all going on, flashing, beeping, whizzing, buzzing, scintillating, 
just scintillating. 
You can forget all your worries and lie back. The first class seats have 25 different 
positions. Incredible what they can do. 
Who would want to go back! Back to when you had to cycle or walk! So slow and 
arduous, tiring. The icy wind upon your face and then the heat, the flies, the ants, always 
having to look out for what you might step on or what might step on, bite or maul you. 
It was kind of steady, but ugh, boring, an early death for sure. 
No real rest. Nothing like the train, you can rest, rest, rest, feet up, feet down, feet 
folded, pointed, stretched. 
You can see a few people walking outside now. They certainly don’t seem very happy. 
Miserable in fact, they look tired. Hot and hungry. Should have caught the train. Mind 
you, good thing they didn’t, may have made it a bit crowded. 
Why they walking so close anyway? No food near the tracks, no water, just desert. Not 
even much shade. Maybe they like the desert, maybe they have come to see the train, 
“Wave, kids, wave,” “Smile”. 
Ahh, glad I got my ticket sorted, I was on to it. Can’t afford to be slack, only got 
yourself to blame, work it, work the system so that then it works for you. 
Glad I’m not out there, looks filthy, look at that rubbish, debri, the land, screaming for a 
drink, a nice cold beer – ha-ha, that’d quench her! 
 “Don’t stare Ruby, look, look at the tele, those whales, spectacular, how close is that 
boat? Spectacular!” 
We’ve got it all in here, everything you’d need, everything you could ever want. 
The only thing that gets a little frustrating is the constant checking of tickets. “Tickets! 
Tickets! Tickets!” I only have one date of birth, one seat number, one aisle number, one 
personal identification number, one reading light number and one temperature 
moderator number. How hard can it be? 
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And yet they always check, five times a day. And the waiting! Tickets for food, tickets 
for drink, tickets for screen time…waiting, waiting, waiting… 
Perhaps we will have a protest, a strike, we’ll stop buying their food. See how long they 
will last. 
We’ll go to the other cabin, then they’ll have to get more sorted. Mind you, it’s a hassle 
walking all that way, particularly at dinner time. I could miss my favourite show. Fuck. 
Well, we’ll give it a week, a working week, five days and if they don’t get the queues 
sorted, we’ll see, we’ll see. 
They wouldn’t like losing any business, wouldn’t like that at all. 
I hear they are on every train in Europe. Imagine if we could get them all to boycott at 
once. Wow. Then they’d have to be better organised. But I suppose everyone may get 
sick of walking to the next cabin. I spose that also means we have to hope the next 
cabins buffet is better set up. 
Somebody did mention that they all get their food from the same place, they just give it 
different names. Well, who knows? We’ll show em tho, we’ll show em. 
I hear they are looking at making the train even faster and more efficient. They have 
scientists and engineers working madly on it now. It’s incredible what they can do, 
improving optimum fuel efficiency, revolutionising brake control, feedback 
minimisation. They reckon one day you won’t even hear it go past. Not that we hear it 
anyway. But those people outside, won’t even notice, gone in a silent flash. They’ll be 
impressed no end. 
Look there they are again kiddies, “Wave, wave.” 
And comfort! One day we won’t even have to move from our seats, unless of course we 
want to. Everything at our disposal, food, entertainment, massage, at the flick of a 
switch or a voice command, probably eventually you will just need to think it. 
Someone, some company, I forget who now, but someone quite philanthropic, have 
been pouring research money into ways in which the trip can be made more 
comfortable still, and longer, much longer. They are talking about discovery 
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breakthroughs in the systemisation of air-stabilisation technology. Here it is, “cutting 
edge science is finding ways to streamline and monitor air flow so that the air 
temperature, humidity, and ion input of the air directly surrounding the human body can 
be regulated.” At the moment it is at a fixed location, your seat. But eventually they 
hope to find a means to do this while you are mobile, wherever you are on the train. 
Imagine that! 
For those who suffer from asthma and allergies and such, those not so suited to the 
indoors life, well they have discovered a way to inject antibiotics, anti-allergens and 
essential oils into the air flow itself. This is microbiology at its finest. And they are going 
to be able to provide it for free, or if not completely free, heavily subsidised. 
I might ask them if they can molecularise a nice dry ale into mine!! I guess, thinking of 
that, there is other uses they could put the technology to, hallucinogenics, opiates, 
biological warfare, but nah, not gonna happen. The people would revolt. 
And they need us. 
Imagine the claims, the insurance, the paperwork, their reputation. You would never 
hear the end of it. Particularly cause people talk a lot on the train. That’s one of the 
main things they do. There’s heaps and heaps of communication, all the time. It’s a 
communication revolution. There’s a forum on the screen at the front of our carriage, at 
the front of every carriage in fact, where, if you talk into your own seat-side 
microphone, your point of view shows up on the screen, then someone else can 
comment and that shows up on the screen. 
The great thing is you don’t know who commented, could be anyone, so no-one gets 
angry, it doesn’t get personal. There’s no falling out with people, that’s important, you 
wanna be able to enjoy the ride. 
When the screen gets full, all the people’s comments and viewpoints get stored and put 
into a coloured file depending on the subject. You can access it anytime when you want 
to revisit your thoughts or theirs, anyone can, it’s magic. Magic! 
This may need some improvement down the track, when one subject goes into another. 
But I hear they are working on it already. They are spending huge amounts of money, 
best brains in the country, to make the screens faster, more comprehensive, so you can 
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access all points of view at once, simultaneously. And the storage, tonnes more storage 
is going to be made available, you will be able to access comments from years ago. What 
a store of wisdom for future generations, our children’s children, what will they think. 
Wow. The people outside can’t use it of course, you have to be on the train, but that’s 
their choice, you live with your choices, each to their own. 
Most people are on the train anyway so it will capture most views, a good healthy cross-
section. 
I think someone smashed a screen once; he obviously got a bit personal. And it wasn’t a 
good idea cause then everyone knew who he was! Some people were a bit upset, others 
didn’t really care that much. 
Most of us couldn’t really see the point, what’s the use of smashing the screen, what’s 
that going to do? It’s only going to be replaced in a couple of days anyhow. You can’t 
go on smashing and smashing and smashing, won’t make any difference, just lots of 
mess. 
What’s wrong with just writing your view up and be done with it. You’ve had your say. 
That’s the best you can ask for. 
Reach more people that way, the whole carriage and eventually the whole train, one day 
all views of all carriage members will be available to everyone at once! Imagine that, 
being able to have your view seen by the whole train at once, just, almost, as you are 
thinking it. That’s freedom. That’s how you can make a difference, make yourself count, 
make yourself known.  













Crisis – noun (plural crises /-siːz/) – the turning point of a disease when an important 
change takes place, indicating either recovery or death. 
 
As I am writing this, in the Southern hemisphere, it is late in the year. I write in a land called 
Australia, an ancient, weary, wise old land that is being torn apart, mined, drilled, pumped, blasted, 
clear-felled by the young, unwise, unknowing culture that resides here. It is a frightening and a deeply 
saddening spectacle to witness. And to bear witness, often, indeed mostly, feels like all one can do, for 
there seems a certain monstrous irreversibility, dare I think or say, inevitability, to the logic of 
development, which is of course the logic of destruction, which frames this culture. One observes therefore 
somewhat paralysed, overcome and overwhelmed by the scale and scope, the systemic reach of this violence. 
I am writing in summer, early December, typically a hot, dry, time of the year that sees scores of 
children, families, adults, dogs flocking to the beach for relief. December this year, as it was last year 
and the year before is atypical – not quite recognisable in fact as summer. The sky is grey and 
darkening, rain is falling every other day and the air has a chill. Summer it must be said has not 
arrived, and we do not know what has – what effect these strange patterns will have on the fruiting, 
flying, nesting, sprouting, seeding life around us? One imagines that this life – the life that is connected 
and depends on and knows itself through rhythm, season, cycle, this life will be thrown off course. How 
does one sprout, seed, flower, migrate, when the knowing that brings this into being is itself displaced? 
We, however, the disconnected, will stay on our current course, changing the settings of our heating and 
cooling apparatus to account for the strange weather, importing grapes that have not ripened locally, re-
planning barbecues and being glad we now need to water the garden less. Nothing it seems has changed 
for us – not yet. 
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Scientists and conservationists, environmentalists, poets, gardeners, philosophers, to name but a few of 
the concerned citizens, have long been decrying destruction as it has been wreaked against the earth and 
its creatures. One of the now most well-known side effects of such behaviour has in the last ten years 
garnered a more broad public attention – and debate – this is, of course, climate change. Undoubtedly 
this has garnered attention because it promises to be the kind of change that affects indiscriminately and 
broadly, globally in fact. The prognoses have not been good, conversations, debate and passion has run 
high yet little change has been made on the personal or public level. Many alive today seem to have a 
certain, often smug or secret, and also on some level understandable, complacency that whatever effects 
climate change issues they will not be alive to see it – that place called the future is a place beyond their 
concern. Others of course believe that whatever disastrous possibility comes along to confront humanity 
science and technology will fix. This is, despite, leading scientists, warning to the contrary.  
In 1992 thousands of concerned citizens - scientists, NGO representatives and heads of states gathered 
in Rio to issue a warning that unless over-consumption, deforestation, species extinction, pollution and 
production of greenhouse gas emissions were radically reduced, life on earth would be in jeopardy. Since 
this time the culture at large has not only failed to cut back greenhouse emissions, deforestation, hem 
pollution and species extinction, but rather all these practises have continued and most have in fact  
accelerated.  
Three nights ago, in a relatively small place called Perth, in a relatively sparsely inhabited country1 
called Australia, it was announced once more on national television that global greenhouse gases in the 
last two years have continued to rise – the chief culprits being named as China and India, though of 
course these places pump out gases to produce the cheap consumables we in the West voraciously demand. 
The rise in gases is not necessarily of itself alarming, the public is used, if not immune, to such data. 
After this data however another announcement was made – this was a warning by the world’s climate 
experts that unless greenhouse gas emissions are radically reduced we will meet, in a mere five years’ 
time, in the year 2020, an unrecognisable planet. 
And yet… we do nothing. 
This thesis is not arguing for when or even for why the western psyche separated itself 
from membership to the animate earth – though I assume the reason is something like 
terror. Such terror, if the state of the world speaks to it, seems to have intensified the 
                                                 
1 I am using these terms to refer to the given assumptions and norms of what constitutes a 
heavily populated country. But of course these norms are blindingly anthropocentric and if the 




more rigorous our attempts at separation have become, the more alone and alienated 
from the animate earth we now are.2 It is ironic, but from a systems perspective 
inevitable, that the very fact from which we as a culture ran – dissolution of the self in 
death – is the very fact that we have created in life itself. This thesis is suggesting that to 
assume and search for separation was, and is, an ontological mistake of the highest 
order. This mistake is, in late modernity, resulting in an epistemological failure, a cultural 
incapacity to know of such error and entrapment in a circuitous, self-reinforcing and 
ultimately fatal system. From this failure to know, the impermeable self emerges, 
marking the crisis point of our cultural dis-ease. Unfortunately, due to key characteristics 
of the system it is moving not towards recovery but death.  
 
An Ecological System 
It is the insight of Gregory Bateson, David Abrams and Freya Mathews3 among others, 
and it is an argument of this thesis, that the possibilities and the limitations for knowing 
are determined by the possibilities and limitations for relation with the animate other-
than-human world. Knowing is in this respect a property not of the person, nor a thing, 
but a process that emerges between subjects, a process that brings subjectivity forth; a 
conversation the world has with another similar but different part of itself. This 
conversation may take the form of a wattle leaf’s sinewy edge encountering the firm, 
dense underside of a fore thumb, or that of the waves lapping caress meeting a 
quivering tail, perhaps a shining iris absorbing and refracting the sun’s morning light. 
Knowing is found in place, in all the composite of life forms that bring place to being, 
knowing is thus systemic and depends for its viability on the health, integrity and vitality 
of the system. To distort and damage the system is to close down and close off spaces 
for knowing to emerge. This thesis has traced this distortion and the exponential 
increase of such distortion over time, as each shift in the baseline removes awareness of 
                                                 
2 David Abram also suggests that, “most of this era’s transcendent, technological visions remain 
motivated by a fright of the body and its myriad susceptibilities, by a fear of our carnal 
embedment in a world ultimately beyond our control … vast in its analytic and inventive power 
modern humanity is crippled by a fear of its own animality and of the animate earth that sustains 
it.” David Abram, Becoming Animal: An Earthly Cosmology (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 69. 
3 David Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1997), Abram, Becoming Animal. Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature: A 
Necessary Unity (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1979), Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000), Freya Mathews, Reinhabiting Reality: Towards a 
Recovery of Culture (Sydney, NSW: University of New South Wales Press, 2005). 
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(epistemological and ecological) loss from the system. In this chapter I examine the 
implications of this distortion and loss from a systems perspective, in particular, I am 
focusing on the analysis of system properties and processes as described by Gregory 
Bateson and Donella Meadows. 
While there are many different understandings of what a system might be the system 
which I am talking about in this thesis is the complex, ecological system within which 
we, as humans, inhere. This is a Batesonian and Meadowian system in the sense that it is 
the processes and properties of the living ecological system from which Gregory 
Bateson and Donella Meadows draw their understanding of system dynamics. There are, 
as Bateson and Meadows identify, certain properties, patterns and processes that all 
living systems utilise to enhance adaptability, survival, life. One of the key features is the 
“capacity to process and respond to feedback in self-corrective ways, a characteristic of 
living systems from cells to forests to civilisations.”4 Processes of self-correction help to 
maintain the system in a stable state, preventing oscillations, destruction and chaos, 
preventing a runaway world. Understanding the characteristics and properties that 
sustain a stable system state is key to understanding when a system is in danger of 
collapse. 
 
Properties of a System 
There is an ecology of bad ideas, just as there is an ecology of weeds, and it is 
characteristic of the system that basic error propagates itself. It branches out like a 
rooted parasite through the tissues of life, and everything gets into a rather peculiar 
mess.5  
An ecological system, as Bateson informs us, in seeking homeostasis, stability and 
balance is self-corrective. Thus it is inherently conservative, for it seeks always to 
integrate or eliminate disturbance and error in order to maintain the truth of it 
propositions.6 To do so it must sustain both flexibility and diversity, so that change 
(news of difference) can be incorporated into the system without disrupting the balance. 
To be able to absorb difference the system must remain viscous, permeable, and open. 
                                                 
4 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, xi. 
5 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, 489. 
6 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind. 
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This conservative tendency means most systems, as Bateson and Meadows inform us, 
have “evolved or are designed to stay far out of range of critical parameters.”7 They 
manage to do so by the timely and effective operation of feedback mechanisms that 
regulate the system’s capacity for self-correction. To maintain what could be called the 
‘norm’, the baseline, or as Bateson suggests, the ‘truth’, of the system such systems 
include a goal, a governor – a signalling device that detects excursions from the goal and 
a response mechanism. Most complex systems have multiple combinations of these. For 
the goal to be maintained and the response effective the paths of communication 
between these states/nexus points must be both timely and accurate.8  
An example that both Bateson and Meadows use to explain this feedback is the function 
of a thermostat – whose goal is the maintenance of a certain temperature. Variations 
from this temperature are corrected by messages that are sent by the governor or 
measuring device to the furnace (response mechanism) which fires up or reduces the 
flame in correspondence to the message and thus meets the goal (the temperature the 
thermostat has been set to). The governor’s role then is to detect excursions from the 
goal (reports of error), triggering in turn the response mechanism to correct such 
excursions. If the required information cannot get from the governor to the response 
mechanism and back to the governor in a timely fashion this means that error cannot be 
addressed or is addressed too slowly for the effective maintenance of the goal. This 
creates oscillations of over and under correction causing instability and, if unaddressed, 
chaos. Where error persists it may over time come to dominate the system, setting off a 
positive feedback cycle.9 
One key way that error persists in a system is if it remains for a time (a lag) undetected. 
While, as Bateson observes, there is ‘always a lag in these affairs’ since systems operate 
                                                 
7 Donella Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green 
Publishing, 2008), 149. Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind. 
8 For further explanation, see Meadows, Thinking in Systems. Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, 
309-337. 
9 Meadows observes that the significance of the strength or efficacy of a feedback loop depends 
on the situation it needs to manage/correct – if the situation is one of low stakes, error is 
unlikely to dominate or if it does another correcting loop will kick in to restore stability (if the 
thermostat has gone awry – a person can step in to address it – in this case, person-heat-
thermostat functions as a negative feedback cycle), if however the situation is complex, of high 
impact and prone to runaway it is crucial the feedback and the response are timely, accurate and 
efficacious, otherwise destruction and the onset of positive feedback loops are likely. Meadows, 
Thinking in Systems. 
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in time and it takes time to transmit news, awareness is not immediate, if there is too 
much lag it can impair the communications of the system. Lags, impediments, and faults 
in communication can have various sources. They arise when the system loses flexibility, 
and in turn produce a loss of flexibility – the capacity to respond to difference (to react 
to change) in a timely manner. They are also caused by loss of difference (capacity for 
change) itself. Indeed these two losses function in a self-reinforcing manner, since a loss 
of difference (capacity for change) implies less room to move (a loss of flexibility), and 
likewise a loss of flexibility will ensure over time the domination of certain variables at 
the expense of others – eradicating possibility for difference.  
Further, as Meadows suggests, a system may also lose flexibility (and thus create delays 
in communication) when buffers (often stocks) that stabilise a system against 
unexpected change become too large, inhibiting the system’s capacity to respond to 
change per-se. Some examples of buffers that inhibit movement in late modernity are 
the social and legal buffers implemented to mitigate against uncertainty, accident and 
contingency. These include requirements to transport children and animals in a certain 
way, serve food or drink only in licensed premises or where a license has been 
purchased, change houses or put up houses under a set of approved restrictions, play 
music only in certain places at certain times, hold public events only under a certain set 
of conditions, the list goes on. Where the buffer against chance, contingency, accident, 
and change is large, as it is here, there is a loss of capacity for the system to receive and 
respond to difference – anecdotal knowledge, personal safety decisions, organic 
impromptu food vendors, to name but a few examples. This can create a kind of 
cultural cramp – a lack of capacity for change and a lack of capacity to respond to 
change.10  
Another way a system loses flexibility is when key variables within the system move out 
of optimal range (a stable state) and become maximised. As Bateson tells us, this is an 
ongoing possibility for ecological systems whose elasticity implies the potential for 
runaway. Indeed the potential for runaway is built into ecological systems not only 
because all (and only) such systems are capable of error but because: 
                                                 
10 It is interesting to observe that from this perspective the time that gave birth to the French 
revolution presents as a healthier system state insofar as this system was prone to and was, as is 
historically evident, capable of significant change. 
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They are generally ‘set’ to maintain some variables at excessive levels: [for example] 
all species produce more young than are needed for replacement in a constant 
population, young that [in a stable system] are weeded out later.11  
When a system moves out of a stable system state, where all variables are maintained at 
optimal levels, to an unstable state where the system orientates towards the 
maximisation of one or more given variable(s) these variables dominate and the system 
loses diversity. This loss of diversity in removing options for change produces a further 
loss of flexibility. If this is not corrected, pathology occurs. Before long the system 
orientates itself towards maintaining the maximisation of one dominant (or few) 
variable(s). In other words, the system self-corrects to maintain the truth of a new bias – 
much as a cockroach when under threat or maimed will reproduce to maintain the 
population base of survival, an adaptation that becomes pathological when predator 
populations are not present to ‘check’ the population swell. In such circumstances the 
survival of the one variable overrides the survival of the system, even though this may 
imply the death of both. A fitting example Bateson uses to illustrate this is that of an 
overpopulated society such as our own. Where population, or human life and wellbeing, 
is maximised, the (cultural) system will work to make the conditions of overpopulation 
more comfortable rather than accepting changes (disease, warfare, unmediated disability, 
illness and old age) which would recalibrate population to sustainable limits. This is even 
though the long term maximisation of human population threatens the survival of the 
human species, most other species and the tenability of life on earth.  
When the variable under question is maximised, it comes under stress and “must take a 
value up to its upper or lower limit of tolerance.”12 As a result it is operating close to its 
threshold. Since a variable does not exist in isolation but in relationship to other 
variables, the operation of one variable at its upper or lower limit of tolerance will mean 
that any change in the associated variables, rather than minimising or recalibrating the 
maximised variable, will stress the maximised variable further. In this way a loss of 
flexibility spreads throughout the system to avert violation of the truth (the norm or the 
goal) of the system.13 The result herein is that the system will “only accept changes 
                                                 
11 Mary Catherine Bateson, With a Daughter’s Eye: A Memoir of Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson 
(New York: William Morrow and Company, 1984), 184. 
12 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, 505. 
13 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, 504-505. 
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which change the tolerance limits for the uptight variable,”14 perpetuating further the 
pathology. Any change in this instance is made in the inverse direction to that which is 
required for the stability of the system. This we see in such phenomena as the 
proliferation of disposable cups when recycling is key, likewise the time spent behind 
screens intensifies, and as seen in Chapter Four, reproduction of the non-relational self 
becomes pathological, at a time when relationship with the other-than-human world is 
crucial, whilst the mining of gas and oil forges forth at the very time when greenhouse 
gases need to be radically reduced. Seen from this perspective, the limiting and 
maximisation of variables in our cultural system, unsurprisingly, results in the experience 
of an immovable, unchangeable world whose fundamental forms cannot be altered or 
influenced except in the direction of embellishment. 
What tends to happen when a variable in a system is maximised is that it becomes fixed 
to its new position. In such fixing the system loses further flexibility, it cannot as it were, 
communicate freely with other parts of the system and can no longer accept or integrate 
change. Bateson suggests this can be understood through considering the case of a man 
on a wire. For the acrobat on the wire to maintain his fundamental position, there must 
be great flexibility – freedom of communication – to other parts of the system, such as 
his arms and legs. If these are fixed, he will lose his stability and fall to his death. Like 
the acrobat, an ecological system, whether this implies an eyelid, a wetland, a 
conversation or a civilization, where variables are fixed will result in “discomfort, 
pathology and ultimately death.”15 Where  information, recognised as being a difference 
that makes a difference, is the nature of living systems, (as it is for Bateson) a failure to 
adapt to or integrate new information is the death of such systems.  
This failure – the lack of capacity to respond to difference – means the system cannot 
self-correct in any other direction other than the one it is headed, this, if left to its own 
momentum, produces a positive feedback cycle. A positive feedback cycle as defined by 
Meadows and Bateson is a self-reinforcing cycle where the more it works the more it 
                                                 
14 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, 505. 
15 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, 505. This is commonly experienced in the ecology of 
conversations, which become uncomfortable, overheated and eventually terminate when one 
person maintains a rigid and inflexible stance and the possibility of ‘conversing’ or in Bateson’s 
terminology receiving news of difference, fails. Generally there are first oscillations, rising 
voices, aggressive tones, silence, and then the eventual breaking of conversation and 
accompanying failure in communication. 
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has power to work some more. The danger of positive feedback cycles is that, rather 
than self-correcting to sustain balance, the system in seeking to maximise its truth 
‘corrects’ in the direction of error. Examples of positive feedback loops are the rich 
getting richer (more money in the bank, more interest, more money in the bank, more 
interest),16 likewise the poor getting poorer is also a positive feedback loop (less money, 
more debt, more interest on debt, more debt, less money), which, if left uncorrected, 
will result in a loss of social cohesion and order, as has been historically evident in social 
models where extreme inequity exists. Another example that Meadows uses to illustrate 
this cycle is the erosion of topsoil, where “the more the soil erodes, the less vegetation it 
can support, the fewer roots and leaves to soften rain and runoff, the more soil 
erodes.”17 In positive feedback cycles unless there is interference in the form of negative 
feedback loops to break the cycle, pathology will ensue and the system will head 
towards runaway and eventually, death: “reinforcing feedback loops are sources of 
growth, explosion, erosion, and collapse in systems. A system with an unchecked positive loop 
will ultimately destroy itself”18 (italics added).  
If we examine the shifts in the baseline of embedded, relational knowing from a systems 
perspective and from the insight of Bateson’s ecological epistemology we can see that 
the consequences of unchecked ontological error have caught us in a positive feedback 
cycle, which is taking us towards an epistemological crisis – a failure to know of loss of 
knowing and loss thus of the capacity for human being. In fact, all our (apparent) 
machinations toward change are reproducing a fixed and rigid system, incapable of re-
cognising difference, and thus incapable of change except in the direction of ontological 
and epistemological error.  
 
 
The Advance of Error 
This thesis has argued that the fundamental error that defines our culture is ontological. 
This is the belief that to be human is to be not merely different, but separate, from the 
earth and its creatures. I have suggested that when this error (first) emerged there was a 
                                                 
16 Meadows, Thinking in Systems. 
17 Meadows, Thinking in Systems, 155. 
18 Meadows, Thinking in Systems, 155. 
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shift in the baseline of what it was to be human and what it was to know oneself as 
human. No longer was it to be embedded in deep relationship with the flesh and 
finitude of the earth but to be human was to know oneself against this material world. 
While ontology and epistemology are systemically related, if not, as Bateson says, in 
some way the same, it is important to note that the nature of this error when it was first 
made was not epistemological – a community and culture cannot know itself as separate 
from the earth when one’s modes of knowing are woven in intimate relationship with 
the other-than-human world. And indeed separation is not the nature of reality. 
However, the perpetuation of this error over time bred changes in ways of being that 
bred changes in ways of knowing, that gave false information about the nature of reality 
whose consistent reinforcement produced and continues to produce epistemological 
error and ultimately a failure in knowing of what it is to be human.  
One of the outcomes of this error, as traced in the first three chapters, is the loss of 
ecological consciousness, a loss that deepens as the path of error deepens. However, 
despite error existing in the system since the approximate beginnings of western culture, 
ecological consciousness, it has been argued, was still present in early civilisation. Error 
was not in this instance dominant. The system stayed within healthy parameters, 
conserved by processes of self-correction that maintained stability and balance. This 
balance  was in large part sustained by the power and presence of the natural world and 
the intimate relations with this world that were endemic to agrarian and village life.19 If 
we consider any one of many communities in antiquity whose day to day living was 
spent in deep symbiosis with the land, we must surmise that changes in the populations 
or habits of a local species of flora or fauna, would have to have been noticed. Such a 
change would, for the population, carry news of a difference. Given the lack of buffers 
or blocks between the human and other-than-human communities, such news could 
circulate relatively unimpeded. This flow of information implies that the system 
maintained flexibility (the capacity to respond to a change in a timely manner) and 
diversity (options for change):20 it maintained ecological consciousness. 
                                                 
19 As Davies notes, medieval society was overwhelmingly rural and remained so up until very 
late in its development. Norman Davies, Europe: A History (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), 331. 
20 This is not the claim all forms of rural or indigenous life necessarily operate in complete 
synthesis with their environment. It is the claim that, at the level of pattern (not exception), 
where symbiosis with the land exists – error is less likely to dominate – given the correction 
such symbiosis affords. Further the relatively unchanging nature of these communities is, from a 
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That ecological consciousness was heightened in this period is evidenced, as we saw in 
Chapters One and Two, by the fact that while incursions on place, were by today’s 
standards relatively insignificant, the distress at such change was, in terms of population, 
the relatively integrity of the land, and survival of such distress on the historical record, 
relatively extreme. Such distress also bore the signature of a personal lament. Exampling 
such concern is the metaphor Plato uses of a dying man, to describe the damaged land, 
“what now remains compared with what then existed is like the skeleton of a sick man, 
all the fat and soft earth having wasted away.”21 Conveyed here is the sense not of ‘the 
environment’ being damaged but the very flesh and soul of life. This personal 
supplication born of embedded relation was to be revisited by the conservationists some 
2000 years later albeit in a maladaptive system where change (except in the direction of 
error) was increasingly implausible and ecological consciousness was largely lost to the 
system.22 
As I have argued in this thesis, ecological consciousness is something distinct from what 
we today tend to imply by this term. It is not ‘environmental’ knowledge, of the kind 
that is currently sought and accumulated. This latter sort of knowledge is the product of 
what Gregory Bateson calls, purposive consciousness. By purposive consciousness, he 
means consciousness or knowing that is driven by conscious intent and purpose, the 
kind of thinking that characterises day-to-day life. This consciousness is non-recursive 
and thus not aware of itself as part of a system. By contrast, ecological consciousness is 
a form of recursive, or what I would name as relational, knowing – a knowing that 
emerges through deep relation and one whose relational processes take place primarily 
in the non-conscious sphere of being. As I will discuss in more detail later, this mode of 
being is necessarily non-conscious, for such relations are mutually compositional – they 
bring the human into being as much as the human in this setting composes the elk, the 
hound, the landscape. Deborah Bird-Rose in her time with the Yarralin people, observes 
                                                                                                                                          
systems perspective, evidence of processes of negative feedback (self-correction) that advance 
system stability –– if error does however come to dominate and a closed system evolves then 
the usual result is that collapse of the system will ensue, as was the case with the Easter 
Islanders. It is not difficult to draw from the Easter Island experience an analogy to our own 
closed, self-reinforcing system, which suggests that our imminent fate may be that of the 
Islanders. See, Jared Diamond Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (United States: Viking 
Press, 2005) 
21 Eliza Marian Butler, The Tyranny of Greece over Germany (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University 
Press, 1935), 43-48, 99. 
22 See Chapter Three. 
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in this regard, that it is ‘the dingo that makes us human’,23 (italics added). The ‘making’ 
of the human does not emerge through individual intent or will, nor is it made possible 
by any exclusive or particular quality of the human. From this perspective one cannot 
consciously set about to construct one’s identity or self-hood, nor one’s sense of what it 
is to be human in the world. This is of crucial significance given that the error that 
defines our culture also exists at the non-conscious level, as a response and resistance to 
the existential anxieties and mysterious, finite conditions of mortal life. Because this 
error is non-conscious, so too is its redress – this being the non-conscious, non-
purposive, knowing that emerges from embedded relation. This form of knowing was 
historically found in relationship with the other-than-human earth and was often 
accessed through ritualistic, sometimes religious, practise that paid tribute to the mystery 
and wonder of the universe. It was one that the Romantics attempted to reinstate, 
except that by this time the advance of error meant such knowing was only available to 
the individual and not to the culture as a system.24  
While this knowing, this ecological consciousness, persisted through the medieval 
period and perhaps to some extent and in some places in early modernity, and while 
error for this time did not dominate, it nonetheless remained in the system. For a long 
historical chapter the chief mechanism for its advance was the invocation of a Christian 
God. To be human during this long stretch of time was to know of God, his word and 
his way. Likewise to know of God was to know of one’s humanity.25 This knowing was 
both conscious – as practised through scripture, prayer, public invocations of belief, and 
non-conscious – premised on faith, communion, mystery and the noumenal sense of the 
                                                 
23 Deborah Bird Rose, Dingo Makes Us Human (Oakleigh, VIC: Cambridge University Press, 
2000). 
24 It is interesting to observe that with the loss of such mystery and the diminished access to and 
experience of the sacred, the wondrous, comes the reduction of ritual to a practise and process 
of consumption. This is the reign of the object and objective conscious knowing. Thus we find 
that where the sacred is sought it is most commonly done through the purchase, collection and 
reification of objects. North American dream webs hanging over suburban beds, assembly line 
concrete Buddha’s propped in gardens and courtyards, proliferation of indigenous Australian 
dot paintings in galleries worldwide are but a few of the fraught and failed attempts to purchase 
the sacred through the culturally dominant epistemology, even though this is a form within 
which the sacred does not inhere. See Chapter Four for further exploration of the attempt to 
find proof in the object. 
25 As Davies writes, “medieval civilization is frequently called ‘theocratic’ that is, it was governed 
by the all-pervasive concept of the Christian God. God’s will was sufficient to explain all 
phenomena. The service of God was seen as the sole legitimate purpose of all human enterprise. 




divine as immanent in the ‘heavens’ and in earth. Central to this epistemology and the 
advancement of error was the casting of the material and other than human world, the 
casting of nature, as epistemologically other. Nature in this setting became the unknown 
and more significantly unknowable realm, as we saw in Chapter Two, it became the 
wilderness and the wild – it was all that stood outside of and was defined against the 
garden. This was a logical move, in the sense that to intimately know the fleshy, finite, 
other-than-human world is to be part of this world and this was to the western psyche 
everything that the human was not. True human ‘being’ was not to be found in this 
mortal ground but was to be found in the realm of immaterial, changeless and eternal 
forms. As I have argued, to make an ontological error is to ultimately breed 
epistemological error, for ideas or perceptions about the nature of human being will 
produce a search for knowledge that confirms such ideas or perceptions. These exist in 
a feedback relation to each other, such that with the progression of such knowledge, 
with each shift in the baseline, alternative ways of knowing and being have become less 
and less available. The continued search therefore for being, in the fixed and changeless 
world, meant that the search for knowing became a search for a fixed, inviolable – 
‘objective’ form of knowledge. 
It could be pointed out that even in less science dominated eras the natural world was 
certainly known of and about. This is true. It is important however to not conflate 
modes of knowing. What was sanctioned through the age of Christianity was a cerebral, 
purpose driven investigation into nature but that which was avoided, disapprobated (and 
over time diminished) was ethical and existential communion with the other-than-
human world. Nature throughout this period, and more so in the subsequent 
Enlightenment era, could be researched, investigated, speculated about, spread bare and 
probed. Yet past the point where it became other it was to be increasingly not entered 
into or known in any empathic or relational sense. In this vein Worster argues that it 
was Christianity that made the, “detached, external view of nature possible by 
overthrowing pagan animism, in which the human mind was submerged in communion 
with the inner spirit of the natural world.”26 Likewise he quotes Berdyaeu, as proposing 
that it is the Christian faith that was the cause of man’s (sic) emotional severance from 
the natural world.27 While I do not agree that Christianity initiated detachment, but 
                                                 
26 Donald Worster, Nature’s Economy (San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books, 1977), 28-29. 
27 Worster, Nature’s Economy, 29. 
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rather pose that its advance represents a baseline shift issuing from an earlier ontological 
error, the significance of Christianity as illuminated by Worster and other theorists 
signposts an important transition. As we saw in Chapters One and Two, under the 
Christian gaze nature in its raw undomesticated form became either a vulgar, inhuman, 
morally devious place or else the idealised site of spiritual and ethical cleansing away 
from the competing desires and temptations of civilised life. In either setting it was not 
kin, nor was it home, it was rather a place to flee from and destroy, (and thus maintain 
the ‘truth’ of the system) or return to in pilgrimage in order that (moral) insight, or from 
a systems perspective ‘correction’, be given to the culture at large. Bear in mind this 
insight was not of system error but of error within the system whose correction would 
enable the system to return to its given ‘truth’. What this distance and this duality 
produced was the ethical license to destroy nature as the populace saw fit and in so doing 
extend God – and as a consequence humankind’s kingdom.  
In heralding another shift in the baseline this distancing meant that another level of 
knowing was lost to the system. This, as discussed, was a loss of ethical and existential 
knowing. However the loss was not yet pathological, that an ethical relationship, albeit 
distorted still existed with the other-than-human world indicates the extent to which the 
ethical at this time remained a culturally viable form of knowing. This, I suggest, is due 
in part to the force of Christianity as an ethically binding text. Medieval ethics, as Davies 
writes were “expounded by the Church … governed by hierarchical notions both of the 
social order and the moral code… betrayal of God was the ultimate evil.”28 The 
significance of Christianity in this context is that while ideas of what it was to be human 
were part of a collective conversation and practise then so too were ideas of the good 
part of such conversation and practise – part of ‘being’ itself. The presence of 
alternative knowing was, I suggest, here available because purposive consciousness was 
not at this point dominant, consequently the system was still both theologically 
structured and to a considerable extent enchanted. As Berman writes, this period was 
one, characterised by unity, meaning and purpose.29 Life in this setting was too 
mysterious, meaning that alternative knowing and unknowing were immanent. This was 
not a mystery in need of ‘correction’ by science nor did it need to be consciously 
accounted for. Indeed this was not at all the point, for in this period, despite the idea of 
separation, unity still persisted as a form of being-in-world: 
                                                 
28 Davies, Europe, 438. 
29 Berman, The Reenchantment of the World, 50-51. 
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Tiny isolated settlements existed in an overpowering wilderness of forest and heath 
… people’s perceptions of these surroundings lacked any strong sense of 
discrimination between what later times would call the natural and the 
supernatural, between fact and fiction, between the present and the past.30 
When, however, as we saw, error intensified and the domination of objective, purposive 
consciousness prevailed, the ethical (along with the mysterious and noumenal) was no 
longer available to culture as an alternative form of knowing but was only available as an 
object of purposive consciousness – a product of the dominant epistemology whereby it 
reinforced this epistemology.31 Likewise knowing of being-in-place also dissipated at the 
level of culture.32 Yet, prior to this shift, the corrective power of nature presided. This is 
not merely the claim that nature, in her abundance and glory, was in antiquity and 
medieval periods more dominant than the dispersed human communities. While this is 
true the more important truth is that the presence of nature in this form posed an 
epistemological alternative to the error characterising the system. Insofar as ontological 
error and the knowing that emerges from being in relation with the other-than-human 
world are primarily non-conscious processes, human communities that exist through no 
will of their own, in a context where life is oriented around the power and presence of 
the other-than-human world must have epistemological error at least partially corrected 
by this presence. The world does not and cannot in such a setting conform to or 
confirm the premise of human separation.33  
In this setting human being cannot be realised separately from relations with other-than-
human lives, thus knowing ones’ humanity in this context means delineating oneself 
amidst difference (non-human others) and, as we will see when considering Bateson’s 
ecology of mind, it is only difference that allows human being to be realised, it is, again, 
the dingo that makes us human. It is in the same way only relationship to difference that 
makes knowing of human being available to the experience of the self. What these 
diverse ways of knowing imply from a systems perspective is that the system, at this 
time, was able to maintain flexibility and responsiveness to change. Consequently, the 
                                                 
30 Davies, Europe, 432. 
31 See Chapter Three. 
32 See Chapter Three. 
33 Again connection may not always breed care- even, as is patently apparent, within inter-
human relations, I would suggest where it does not there is some pathology at work – 
nonetheless the observation of error corrected is not an argument for or against consequent 
human behaviour, the key point rather is that potential for change exists where error has not 
transmuted into pathology. 
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system could maintain stability. It is unsurprising in this regard that from antiquity to the 
end of the medieval period relatively few changes emerged in the style and mode of 
living as conducted between human and other-than-human communities. Revealingly 
the historically prescribed ‘darkness’ of this time refers to this lack of change, the 
constancy of the period, unmarked by any rapid technological, scientific ‘advance.’ As 
Davies narrates “there is an air of immobility about many descriptions of the medieval 
world … what is represented is physical immobility, social immobility, intellectual 
immobility.”34 The irony in this critique of immobility is that it is considered to 
represent a state of impaired growth rather than a stable system state and accordingly it 
is assumed that the contemporary world is much more dynamic and capable of change 
than the medieval world, when from a systems perspective, the opposite is the case. The 
modern world is approaching changelessness in its key features, approaching a state of 
entropy. 
The danger of each baseline shift is that the loss of knowing is two-fold. It is the loss of 
knowing of what was – in this instance communion with the other than human world at 
the level of culture, and it is also, past the threshold where the new baseline is established, a 
loss of knowing of this loss – loss of the sense that things were or could be otherwise. 
Once the new norm or truth is established, the former truth is lost to the system – as 
the system orientates its processes to ensure the survival of the new norm. There is, as 
Bateson describes, a formal causality to these processes for: 
We become what we pretend. And something like that, some sort of self-fulfilment 
occurs in all organisations and human cultures. What people presume to be 
‘human’ is what they will build in as premises of their social arrangements, and 
what they build in is sure to be learned, is sure to become a part of the character of 
those who participate … any answer which we promote as it becomes partly true though our 
promoting of it, becomes partly irreversible. There is a lag in these affairs35 (italics added). 
The error thus becomes built into the system. Further, as we have seen, each shift in the 
baseline reinforces the error more deeply. This means the longer the error remains 
                                                 
34 Davies, Europe, 291. Notably this time was characterised by mass human loss in the shape of 
plague, famine and religious crusades. However this loss from the systems perspective does not 
suggest a change in the system itself – it does not alter the key variables and in fact can be seen 
as a stabilising factor – protecting the system against excessive dominance of human population. 
The kind of change that is key here to the advancement of error – is change between the human 
and other-than-human communities, not that affecting solely human populations. 
35 Gregory Bateson and Mary Catherine Bateson, Angels Fear: Towards an Epistemology of the Sacred 
(New York: Bantam Books, 1988), 178. 
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undetected the less potential there remains for it to be detected. Further, the longer it is 
undetected the more it escalates. From such escalation issues the domination of one 
variable – one form of knowing – and the suppression and eradication of other variables 
– other forms of knowing. By eradicating these alternatives the potential to check error, 
the potential thus for a system correction is lost. Left uncorrected a positive feedback 
(self-reinforcing) cycle emerges. Here pathology and ultimately crisis result, with the 
system oscillating towards recovery or death. 
 
A Difference which makes a Difference 
While I have been suggesting that the loss of relationship with the other than human 
world implies a loss of knowing of what it is to be human and thus a loss of capacity for 
human being, in its existential and ethical forms, the connection between loss of 
difference and loss of knowing is a literal one when seen from the perspective of 
Bateson’s ecology of mind. If we consider ecological loss from this perspective it 
becomes startlingly apparent that the loss of knowing (correction of error) that attends 
ecological destruction has created a positive feedback loop that is moving not towards 
recovery but towards death of the system.  
Mind, for Bateson, is not to be understood as a purely material phenomenon – a set of 
nerve endings and synapses, nor as an immaterial free-floating entity but is first and 
foremost a system, an ecological system. As an ecological system, mind is inseparable 
from its material base and has the capacity to process and respond to information in self 
corrective ways. It is through such organisation of information, through processes, 
patterns and flows that mind is active. In this definition, mind can and usually does 
include “non-living elements as well as multiple organisms, may function for brief as 
well as extended periods, is not necessarily defined by a boundary such as an envelope 
of skin, and consciousness, if present at all, is always only partial.”36  
The nature of this mental form, pattern and process is difference, to be precise – a 
difference which makes a difference travelling in a circuit. An example Bateson uses to 
                                                 
36 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, xi. Abram here concurs suggesting that, “the modern, 
civilized understanding of mind as a purely immaterial power has been born by a process of 
subtraction, slowly and by increments, from the ancestral experience of the invisible atmosphere 
as a thick, meaning-filled plenum in which we’re immersed – as a living field of intelligence in 
which we participate.” Abram, Becoming Animal, 273. 
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illustrate this is the instance of a ‘man’ cutting down a ‘tree’. The common interpretation 
of this event describes the action in terms of a subject – the man cutting down the 
object – the tree. The man is driven towards this action by conscious, purposive, intent. 
This understanding of mind presents mental process as linear, bound by a skull like 
form, non-recursive and not part of a cybernetic system – the conventional 
understanding of mental process. Conversely Bateson suggests that mental pattern and 
process consists not of a separate ‘I’ against a separate ‘it’ but consists in transforms of 
difference, where: 
Each stroke of the axe is modified or corrected, according to the shape of the cut 
face of the tree left by the previous stroke. This self-corrective (i.e., mental) 
process is brought about by a total system, trees-eyes-brain-muscles-axe-stroke-
tree; and it is this total system that has the characteristics of immanent mind. 
More correctly, we should spell the matter out as: (differences in tree) – 
(differences in retina) – (differences in brain) – (differences in muscles) – 
(differences in movement of axe) – (differences in tree), etc. What is transmitted 
around the circuit is transforms of differences. And … a difference which makes a 
difference is an idea or unit of information.37  
This theory of mind is completely at odds with the common perception that identifies  
mind as a property pertaining to human being and relegates all that is outside of such to 
the opposing and inferior status of matter.38 Given that mind is a property not of the 
person but of relations between difference and if all we39 can ever know is difference, 
never the ding an sich, then it is apparent that the possibilities for knowing depends on 
the possibilities for difference. The eradication of difference is therefore the eradication 
of the potential for knowing, it is in a very real sense, the loss of mind. It is perhaps for 
                                                 
37 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, 317-318. Interestingly from a phenomenological 
perspective David Abram also elucidates the insoluble union of person and place: “To directly 
perceive any phenomenon is to enter into relation with it, to feel oneself in a living interaction 
with another being. To define the phenomenon as an inert object, to deny the ability of the tree 
to inform and even instruct one’s awareness, is to have turned one’s senses away from the 
phenomenon.” Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous, 117. 
38 This conventional perception of the opposing realms of mind and matter is what Val 
Plumwood critiques. Here she refers to the logic of dualism that underwrites western culture. 
This she describes as one where the master consciousness, to maintain power and to define 
itself, makes inferior, submissive and undefined (without identity) the ‘other’. In our culture the 
other of the male, white, cerebral, mechanical world has been women, blacks, nature the 
emotive and organic worlds. Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London: 
Routledge, 1993). 
39 By ‘we’ Bateson is not referring to any one aggregate of humans but the ‘we’ of the 
community of life through which mental pattern and process subsist, this may thus include the 
grasshopper, the senate, the tree frog, the bill of rights, Barack Obama and rainfall. 
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this reason that, as Meadows suggests, loss of bio-diversity is for systems theorists a 
crime of the highest order.40 A mindless system is in this regard an ignorant, unknowing 
system – one that is not equipped for survival. Indeed, Bateson suggests, the 
mindlessness that characterises our cultural system also reveals itself in the choice, as a 
culture, of the wrong unit of survival. Rather than choosing organism plus environment 
– allowing thus for self-corrective processes to be maintained – we have chosen simply 
(human) organism, eradicating in the process the environment and thus we end up with, 
“[one] species versus the other species around it or versus the environment in which it 
operates. Man against nature. You end up, in fact, with Kaneohe Bay polluted, Lake 
Erie a slimy, green mess and ‘Let’s build bigger atom bombs to kill off the next door 
neighbours.”41 Bateson was here writing in 1976, since then things have not improved, 
eighty eight percent of the oceans are saturated in plastic, wars and terror are escalating, 
anthropogenic species extinction is killing off the source of all wonder, beauty and 
mystery and the vast percentage of children and adolescents are addicted to social media 
and media itself, while the outdoors becomes fundamentally ‘unknown.’42  
Revealingly, the destruction of nature is often colloquially referred to as ‘mindless’, 
implying a loss of knowing, thought or care. Indeed, as we have seen with Bateson’s 
ecology of mind and the loss of knowing revealed by the shifting baseline mindlessness 
past a certain point is built into such destruction, whereby with continuing loss of 
diversity the capacity to know of loss of mind becomes increasingly unavailable. Again 
the system danger of loss of knowing in this instance is not a failure to identify or 
comprehend what or how many of which species are disappearing. This knowledge, 
while important on certain levels, is not that which, if diminished, advances system 
                                                 
40 “…the ability to survive by changing … the wildly varied stock of DNA, evolved and 
accumulated over billions of years, is the source of evolutionary potential, just as science 
libraries and labs and scientists are the source of technological potential. Allowing species to go 
extinct is a systems crime , just as randomly eliminating all copies of particular science journals, 
or particular kinds of scientists [or one may say, poets] would be … the same could be said of 
human cultures, which are the store of behavioural repertoires accumulated over not billions but 
hundreds of thousands of years. They are a stock out of which social evolution can arise … 
without such social evolution there is no chance for adaptation, survival, life.” Meadows, 
Thinking in Systems, 160. 
41 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, 491-492. In a similar vein Paul Shepard argues that our 
alienation from and destruction of the other than human world, in alienating us from what is 
meaningful and spiritually and ethically necessary in life has created a culture of madness. Paul 
Shepard, Nature and Madness (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1982). 
42 See Chapter One, in particular Gary Paul Nabhan and Stephen Trimble, The Geography of 
Childhood (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1994). 
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error. In fact the inverse is the case, for this type of knowing, that tells of the world as a 
calculable, measurable object, is a product of such error and is exactly that which in 
dominating the system advances pathology.43 What continues to be unavailable to the 
system is the ethical and existential knowing that would otherwise enable the system to 
self-correct and stabilise. As Meadows would suggest, where buffers or stocks are low 
stabilising influences are lost – if we think of this knowing as ‘stock’, found in the 
integrity of nature and in relationship with nature, then it is clear that it is not at a 
sufficient level to stem ongoing patterns of destruction.44 Instead what is advanced is a 
pathological error that is, in its own pattern of self-validation, driven against earthy 
being and belonging and is formally predicated to destroy the earth. It follows that if the 
earth becomes unfit for human life then the premise of separation is correct, earth is not 
the appropriate place for human being. There is a formal relationship here, a 
relationship of ‘erroneous’ ideas.  
While for a time error failed to dominate, due to the system maintaining self-corrective 
processes, fed by the diverse ways of knowing found through ethical and existential 
relations with nature and the sacred, error has now become pathological and the system 
is headed towards death rather than recovery. These conditions were set in place by the 
turning point that signified departure from the medieval period to the rise of 
Enlightenment science and the Industrial and French revolutions. This period has 
received much historical scrutiny for the changes it has borne witness to.45 However by 
and large this scrutiny has been for, what I believe are, entirely the wrong reasons. The 
mistake many theorists have made in looking at the period of cultural translation from 
medieval times – often named as the mysterious ‘dark’ ages – to the time of 
en‘light’enment science, is to assume that the technological, industrial and scientific 
changes that precipitated and characterised the enlightenment period indicated 
significant cultural change. Adherence to this thinking is part of the reason why most 
cultural theorists remain unaware of the marginalisation or absence of place in accounts 
                                                 
43 Further, as Meadows points out information about quantity is a low leverage point from 
which to change systems. Changes, in quantity or degree, do not alter the structure of a system 
or affect its core values, paradigms or epistemology, neither can a change in numbers work 
effectively or quickly enough to avert disaster if a system is headed for runaway. Meadows, 
Thinking in Systems, 147. 
44 Meadows, Thinking in Systems, 150-151. 
45 Davies writes that, “the fifteenth century is generally taken as the century of transition 
between the medieval and the modern periods. In certain spheres the quickening pace of change 
led to a decisive break with the medieval tradition.” Davies, Europe, 444. 
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of late or post-modernity, for implicit to such accounts is the premise that whatever 
went before the eruption that was modernity is now irrelevant to any understanding of 
culture or the self.46 Yet as I have argued in this thesis the changes to which the 
revolutions gave rise, rather than signifying cultural change have, to the contrary, more 
deeply and dramatically reinforced the core tenets of our culture and the possibility of 
building these tenets into the world. The error, which to this point had consistently 
advanced with each shift in the baseline, making the system increasingly limited in its 
capacity to self-correct (except in the direction of error), became with this transition, 
pathological. To thus suggest that something new and unprecedented happened in this 
time is to fail to apprehend the deeply engrained ontological error that made the 
epistemological and investigative method of enlightenment science plausible. This world 
orientation could only have emerged out of a thinking that was grounded in the false 
notion of human separation, one which was relentlessly shaping the world to these 
premises. In the move towards enlightenment science the ontological error was given 
the means, the technique and the license to multiply. As Bateson warns:  
…when you have effective enough technology so that you can really act upon your 
epistemological errors and can create havoc in the world you live, then the error is 
lethal. Epistemological error is all right, it is fine up to the point at which you 
create around yourself a universe in which that error becomes immanent in 
monstrous changes of the universe that you have created and now try to live in.47  
Emerging during the post-enlightenment years was, I contend, not an unprecedented 
development but another baseline shift in a pre-existent pattern. Nature, formerly a 
source of moral repulsion (or sanctification) was in the new world order rid of moral 
weight altogether, becoming instead an object of scientific, environmental or personal 
discourse. Nature thus became more and more alienated from human experience, a 
retreating moral landscape interacted with only by personal choice. When such choice 
was made, it was made as an individual preference, sanctified neither by God nor the 
culture at large.48 The point here is not simply that nature became an ‘amoral’ ground 
but that with the domination of objective knowing (in the framework of purposive 
consciousness) moral knowing itself dissipated except as an object of the dominant 
                                                 
46 See Chapter Five. 
47 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, 493. 
48 It is no surprise therefore that God who was formerly evidence of human being, became in 




epistemology. As part of the dominant epistemology it took the incontestable form of a 
right, a fixed object of political, social and individual discourse that could in no way 
threaten the reign of the object. Outside of this the ethical became relegated to the 
culturally peripheral form of subjective knowing, the changing sea of personal opinion, 
choice, preference. Yet subjectivity, itself a casualty of system pathology, can in no way 
‘correct’ the system, subjective choices and stances, in their current form, cannot effect 
any ethical change at the level of culture. For to be subsumed by the dominant knowing 
is to share its self-reinforcing form – and this is the form of the object, one that does 
not imply cultural change but simply reproduces error and ways of managing this error.  
The first effect of this system shift was the capacity to epistemologically (and thus 
ethically) distance oneself from the other-than-human world. Ultimately this distance 
has meant a separation of the self from subjective relations with the other-than-human 
world and a loss of capacity to know of human ‘being’, at the level of culture. Yet even 
if, or where, ‘subjective knowing’ was available it could not effect system change for in 
failing the test of, and being defined against, the dominant knowing – the test and 
definition of proof – it was shaved of cultural validity. As we saw in Chapter Four this 
transition and loss was symbolised by the decline of the Gilbert White way of being in 
the world: a fusion of self, God and nature. Married to the decline of theology as a 
world-orienting presence was the rise of industrialisation, liberalism, individualism and 
rights discourse, the life of Gilbert White past this point would no longer be available as 
a cultural alternative while the lament for such loss would be henceforth an individual cry 
in the dark. This was in effect the domination of purposive consciousness. 
What this change meant was that where choices surrounding relationship to the natural 
world, or for that matter choices surrounding religion were made, these choices bore no 
system effect. In this setting despite valiant attempts at saving nature made by 
naturalists, conservationists and environmentalists, the knowing that would precipitate 
change was not available to the system – except as an object of purposive 
consciousness, whereby it inadvertently perpetuated the pathology. For this reason as 
error intensified attempts to ‘save the earth’ while, for a time, becoming more prevalent, 
proceeded in inverse proportions to their effectiveness, the more these attempts 
multiplied the greater destruction rose.49 This is not to suggest that such outcries caused 
                                                 
49 As has been noted, numbers and quantity are a low point of leverage in any system – by 
themselves they are not effective in creating system change, hence the fact that rallies attracted 
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destruction in a linear cause-effect fashion. The logic is systemic. Such attempts in being 
embedded in epistemological error cannot but reinforce such error. This is particularly 
so when the self is referenced as the epistemological and moral centre thus objectifying 
the other-than-human world as a site of moral concern and discourse. In so doing, 
protestors also unintentionally (remembering that the operations of this system are a 
non-conscious process) perpetuate the idea that cultural change is in this way available 
and in such conceal from collective understanding the dissolution of the ethical as a 
cultural form of knowing. In declaring and displaying collective action – albeit a 
collection of discrete and separate individuals – the loss of ethical knowing available to 
the system becomes less apparent, while the idea of cultural transformation is perceived 
by such action as viable.  
As we have seen with the conservationists, even where real attempts at reintegration 
with the land and an authentic moral/spiritual relationship are made– the error was here 
at the level of culture too advanced to allow for the sustained presence of alternative 
knowing, a difference which makes a difference. Instead this difference was fed back into 
the system to produce a ‘solution’ that perpetuated the dominant form of knowing and 
being. The dominant epistemology with every outcry continued to be maximised, and 
was pushed closer and closer to its threshold limit. Consistent with a positive feedback 
cycle, the domination of one variable (that of purposive knowing) means that changes in 
relationship to place and changes to these very places, rather than driving a correction in 
relationship to place, drove the search for purposive, ‘objective’ knowing further and 
further forth. Hence conversation became increasingly not about subjectively known 
places (where these relationships still existed, as these too started to rapidly decline) but 
about ecology and the ‘environment’, while the focus on communities of species, as 
favoured by the early day naturalists, gave way to specialist scrutiny and discourse 
whereby a species is studied in isolation from the community within which it inheres. 
The very retrospective emphasis on conservationists’ discourse, as I have argued, as more 
                                                                                                                                          
more people or that more people signed petitions or ‘knew’ about ecological degradation is not 
an indicator of the kind of awareness that is required for system change – it does not indicate an 
epistemological shift – and does not thus indicate ecological consciousness. Meadows however 
makes it clear that past a certain point numbers can create leverage. This is when they reach a 
threshold that tips off another leverage point higher in the system, for instance interest rates 
control the gains around positive feedback loops – what this means is that if, for example, 
interest rates are sufficiently low, the ‘rich getting richer’ feedback loop may be to some extent 
corrected or slowed allowing the system to generate a negative feedback pattern. Meadows, 
Thinking in Systems, 148-149. 
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indicative of their sentiment than of their relationship to the places they fought to 
conserve, is testimony to the continuing advance of error and consistent shifts in the 
baseline over the last sixty years. So even while the ‘ecological crisis’, so named, marks 
not human exclusivity, but our own fate, our frailty, vulnerability and dependence, this 
‘awareness’ is not used to check our mode of being human, to reassess the implications 
of our excess but, to the contrary, is taken as an opportunity to all the more demonstrate, 
and prove, our humanity. The ‘ecological’ crisis has thus become a forum for cultural 
reproduction. Given this, technological ‘solutions’ abound: the frenzy to find cures, 
draw graphs, chart predictions, genetically manage and modify food sources, seed 
clouds, develop warning systems, communicate breakthroughs, is rife. The search for 
proof continues.  
 Subsequent iterations of environmentalism have necessarily perpetuated error as the 
system has already lost the diversity and flexibility – the knowing – to integrate a 
difference which makes a difference. By now, the twenty first century, as discussed, 
ethical knowing has on the one hand been subsumed by the dominant objective 
knowing and on the other hand been relegated to the culturally ineffectual space of 
subjective knowing. From neither setting can it foster or change relations with the 
other-than-human world. This does not imply that alternative attempts to redress this 
error have not been made. Deep ecology, as discussed in Chapter Three, was one such 
attempt. Rather than reinforce technological solution and materialist reform, deep 
ecology attempted to challenge our way of relating to and with the natural world, 
naming broken relation as the core source of ecological malaise. But, as we have seen, 
the reproduction of error persisted – for deep ecologists still relied on the assumption 
that the nexus point of solution began with the individual self and the corollary but 
unstated premise that this self, despite an ailing world, is somehow still intact. Indeed 
the implicit premise is that it is the integrity of the self that allows the self to access and 
aid a broken world. Yet the notion that heretics maintain agency and that this agency 
increases in direct ratio to the capacity for self-expression, irrespective of the health, 
stability and integrity, of the ecological and cultural system of which they are part, is 
itself a symptom of the pathology of the system.  Embedded herein is the assumption 
that the individual is sufficiently separate from other-than-human contexts – the earth’s 
fate is again not our own. To admit otherwise is to admit that we may not possibly 
know how or what is needed and indeed that the acceptance of not –knowing may be a 
step towards correction. 
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The irony herein is that the modern shift to the individual as the key moral authority is 
considered culturally to be an advance, a gain from revolutionary France. Indeed it is an 
advance but one of advancing error. In this development the culture of separation is 
heightened in a way that is non-cognizant of the synthesis between world and self. 
Given that ‘what we believe of ourselves should be compatible with what we believe of 
the world around us’,50 if we make of the world an epistemological object so too do 
alternate ways of knowing become objectified – bearing no inherent subjectival relation 
to self or world. When we transform being human and knowing of this being into 
knowing of object as proof of being – we too become object. From this the place for 
subjectival relation is lost. 
The pathological development is, as we have seen, the onset of a positive feedback cycle 
in the direction of ontological and epistemological error and with this the loss of system 
correctives (diverse ways of knowing) and an associated loss of the capacity to know of 
this loss. This is dangerous enough on its own but is further exacerbated by ongoing 
belief in the ethical as an efficacious form of cultural transformation. Such belief 
commits a category mistake. Albert Borgmann, as discussed in Chapter Five, observes 
that not all choices are made on the same level, some choices pre-form the possibility 
(or lack of) for other choices. For example, once a cultural choice has been made 
around automobile production and use, the choice to travel to work by donkey, horse or 
by foot is largely unavailable. Instead the choice becomes – ‘should I catch the bus or 
drive to work, or which sort of car best suits my transport needs?’ In analogous fashion, 
Bateson argues that learning does not all occur on the same level. There are different 
levels of learning with some being of a higher and some being of a lower logical type. 
For instance, the learning that takes place when a rat encounters an electrical shock 
inside a box, is of a lower level than the hard wired learning that the rat has about 
exploration. People, Bateson suggests, make a category mistake when they map learning 
of a lower level or type onto a higher level. In the example cited, such a mistake is made 
when it is perceived that the rats are not ‘learning’ when they re-enter boxes after the 
shock. Bateson suggests that the inverse is in fact the case, the experience of the shock 
corresponds to and reinforces the higher level learning that exploration provides 
information about the world – it teaches you about your environment and that 
exploration is needed for survival in this environment. The shock is helpful information 
                                                 
50 Bateson and Bateson, Angels Fear, 177. 
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and not a disincentive to continue exploring. As Bateson observes, much “can be 
learned from a single instance but not certain things about the class of such trials or 
experiences.”51 The class of things or experiences is always of a higher logical type than 
the member of the class. 
The more embedded, higher level learning is what is often referred to as the hard-wiring 
of a person, a system, a machine. It is the nature of the nature of things. As I have 
argued in this thesis, ontological and epistemological error exist in the hard-wiring of 
our culture. In proceeding uncorrected, this error has been hardwired into our modes of 
being and knowing. This is not consciously penetrable, it has become the nature of our 
‘exploration’, and is of a higher logical type than any ‘choice’, ‘idea’, ‘preference,’ made 
in the single instance. What I suggest is taking place with the endless forums for and 
sharing of opinion, choice, preference, ideas is that this information is being mistaken 
for information representing change in the character of the knowing that defines the 
system, when it is not, because the difference between opinions is not a difference that 
makes a difference. Here, phenomena of a lower logical type (the ideas of the given 
conversation) are mapped on to phenomena/knowing that belong to a higher logical 
type (the hardwired ideational framework). In this mapping pathology occurs. The 
nature of this pathology is misunderstanding and further epistemological error. In this 
mapping we believe that change is galvanised through such expression and is more 
viable the more such expression multiplies – when neither of these are the case. We can 
as a consequence spend our whole life debating these questions - what is it to do or be 
good? Is it innate or socially imposed? How can one define virtue? - as many have, and 
come no closer to ethical knowing.52 Again the lack of efficacy of environmental 
activism is testimony to this lack of feedback. The domination of ontological and 
epistemological error is not affected; it is reinforced by the fluctuations of this lower 
level of learning. Like the rat whose experiences from exploration reinforces the value 
of exploration individual expressions of rights, choice, opinion reinforce the value of the 
individual as a separate entity with claims to cultural objects. To challenge or transform 
the cultural error what is required is a paradigm shift. However, as Meadows notes, 
                                                 
51 Bateson, Mind and Nature, 123. 
52 Obviously these kinds of conversations have always transpired – since ethics had civic and 
legal implications and perhaps even before. The point is however that these earlier 
conversations did not commit a category mistake as such a mistake can only be made when 
ethical knowing is not available to the system and these kind of discussions pre-suppose that it is 
– or indeed ‘stand-in’ for or are taken as evidence of such knowing. 
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paradigm change is the highest leverage point in a system and is astoundingly difficult. 
As we have seen from the effects of the shifting baseline syndrome and the dissolution 
of system correctives, this change presents as nearly impossible, when the knowing that 
might drive such a change is increasingly not available to the system. Instead, the given 
paradigm is advanced as the solution to any (human or ecological) problem that arises.  
The ecological effect of this epistemological crisis is the ongoing, mindless destruction 
of the other-than-human world, driven not primarily by purposive intent.53 The belief 
that ongoing destruction is simply a result of conscious and careless human behaviour is 
a product of the pathology of the system, as is the idea that such destruction can be 
stemmed by technological/scientific solution. Trapping us in this illusion is the 
domination of ontological error and the domination of purposive knowing and in it the 
loss of other ways of knowing and being human. It is important to remember here, 
however, that it is the domination of this knowing (married to ontological error) that is 
the problem, not the knowing in and of itself, which, in a stable system would be 
recalibrated to an acceptable level.  
As we saw in Chapters Four and Five, the further key implication of this error is the loss 
of subjectivity and the consequent search for self in the forms where subjective relation 
is unavailable – the form of the object; a search that in taking one further away from 
relationship with the other-than-human world and in destroying this world to resource 
objects, further intensifies ecological destruction. Loss of subjectivity is two-fold, it 
issues from the desecration and marginalisation of the other-than-human world through 
which knowing of human being and self is realised. As we have seen, this is because it is 
difference which enables knowing. Subjectivity is also lost due to the domination of 
purposive objective knowing. Given this domination the doubting anxious self is caught 
in a restless search for proof, and searches precisely where proof cannot be found – in 
the realm of ‘objective’ knowing as found in the object. This has produced a positive 
                                                 
53 Though of course this is sometimes the case the main point is that this logic is not in any way 
conscious and that the will towards ecological destruction is not one of individual conscious 
intent, in the common usage and understanding of the term ‘conscious’. Indeed if this were the 
case we would be looking at quite a different kind of system, a newer, less dangerous and less 
pathological one than the one we now inhabit. Rather, the ‘intent’ in this logic is subterranean. 
And the non-conscious operation of this system is itself part of the reason for the self-
reinforcing circularity and immanent disaster to which it is leading us, as this very system is 
dominated by purposive consciousness and as a system has blocked access to non-purposive 




feedback loop such that the more proof of human being is sought in the realm of non-
living objects the less the experience of, and thus knowing of, human being is available. 
The less knowing is available the more proof is sought, the more it is (in this way) 
sought the more subjectivity recedes. Consequently we inhabit a world obsessed with 
the self and replete with technologies that mirror, adorn and visually reinforce and 
reproduce the individual self, all the while desecrating and crowding out spaces for 
other-than-human being. The self, as cultural theorists identify, is in crisis – lost, sullen, 
desolate, unanchored and desperate. This is evidenced both by the destructive impulses 
apparent in an excessively individualised culture (crime, drug addiction, excessive 
consumption) and the constructive impulses (obsession with viewing and reproducing 
the self. … ‘selfies’, Myspace, Twitter, Facebook etc.) The mistake is made in returning 
to the same self for solution – this again rather than redressing system error continues 
to maximise the dominant variable, to focus on the ‘self’ to fix the self is to further 
advance pathology and crisis. Thus we see brilliant analyses of the saturated, despairing 
self, pursued separately from any analyses of the self in the context of a desecrated 
other- than-human world. The fate of place is still seen to have no bearing on the fate of 
the self and the malady of the self is seen to bear no relation to ecological destruction. 
Indeed, to the contrary, it is collections of selves mobilising the dominant epistemology 
that are seen as that which will fix the ‘ecological’ crisis. It is from this system that the 
impermeable self emerges and ecological destruction escalates. 
The dangerous turn, the point of crisis we have now reached, is that the separation 
which has characterised western culture from the beginning, is becoming increasingly 
concrete. In having structured such separation into our ways of knowing, our ways of 
being, we have not only created a self-reinforcing system invariably caught in a positive 
feedback cycle where each search further exacerbates anxiety, loss, and crisis but in the 
process have near annihilated the ‘checks’ which have for so long staved off the 
pathology and death of this system. In losing so many of our other-than-human kin with 
whom we have shared a well-trodden, formerly cherished, evolutionary path, in further 
losing relationship with these creatures and places, with the ethical and the sacred – 
which are as Rodney Donaldson says perhaps the same thing54 – and in building closure 
into our system we are creating an impermeable self, caught in an impermeable world. 
This is a self and a world not subject to change. It is a closed, fixed system, a veritable 
                                                 




chreod from which further shifts in the baseline are not possible. In fact the only change 
likely is complete breakdown – an unrecognisable planet. The most disturbing and tragic 
aspect of this is that the inability to re-cognise is real in every sense. We may not only be 
meeting a planet that is geo-physically unrecognisable but at the same time are caught in 
the incapacity to be cognizant of this loss. Herein is the logical and epistemological 
outcome for a culture that is driven by the error of separation, if no other proof suffices 
then the very destruction of the earth itself will prove human supremacy.  
In 1967, with such concerns in mind, Gregory Bateson agreed to lead a conference 
focused on the habits of thought characterising western culture. Here at Burg 
Wartenstein in the Austrian Alps cybernetic theorists, mathematicians, anthropologists 
gathered together. Deep in thought and conversation this diverse but kindred group in 
“the beauty and natural peace of the environment … realised for the first time that it is 
truly likely that in one way or another human actions would destroy life on this 
planet.”55  
Let us know otherwise. 
 
 
                                                 







Abram, David. The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human 
World. New York: Vintage Books, 1997. 
_______. Becoming Animal: An Earthly Cosmology. New York: Vintage Books, 2011. 
Adorno, Theodor W. The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture. Ed. J. M. 
Bernstein. New York: Routledge, 1991. 
Aldridge, Alan. Consumption. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2003. 
Auge, Marc. Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Super Modernity. Translated by 
John Howe. New York: Verso, 1995. 
Barratt Brown, Michael, Tony Emerson and Colin Stoneman, eds. Resources and the 
Environment: A Socialist Perspective. Nottingham, UK: Spokesman Books, 1976. 
Barthes, Roland. Mythologies. London: Paladin Books, 1973. 
Bates, J. Leonard. “Fulfilling American Democracy: The Conservation Movement, 1907 
to 1921.” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 44, no. 1 (1957): 29-57. 
Bateson, Gregory. Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1979. 
_______. Sacred Unity: Further Steps to an Ecology of Mind. Ed. Rodney E. Donaldson. New 
York: Harper Collins, 1991. 
_______. Steps to an Ecology of Mind. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000. 
Bateson, Gregory and Mary Catherine Bateson. Angels Fear: Towards an Epistemology of the 
Sacred. New York: Bantam Books, 1988. 
Bateson, Mary Catherine. With a Daughter’s Eye: A Memoir of Margaret Mead and Gregory 
Bateson. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1984. 
Baudrillard, Jean. The Mirror of Production. Translated by Mark Poster. St Louis, MO: 
Telos Press, 1975. 
 
206 
Bauman, Zygmunt. Globalization: The Human Consequences. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1998. 
_______. Liquid Modernity. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2000. 
_______. The Individualized Society. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2001. 
_______. “Chasing Elusive Society.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 18, 
no. 3-4 (2005): 123-141. 
_______. Does Ethics Have a Chance in a World of Consumers? Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2008. 
_______. Collateral Damage: Social Inequalities in a Global Age. Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press, 2011. 
_______. Culture in a Liquid Modern World. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2011. 
_______. “Privacy, Secrecy, Intimacy, Human Bonds and Other Collateral Casualties of 
Liquid Modernity.” The Hedgehog Review 13, no. 1 (2011): 20. 
Bayly, Christopher Allan. The Birth of the Modern World: 1780-1914. Oxford, UK: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2004. 
Beattie, Andrew and Paul R. Ehrlich. Wild Solutions. Melbourne, VIC: Melbourne 
University Press, 2001. 
Beatty, Robert O. “The Conservation Movement.” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 281 (1952): 10-19. 
Bellwood, Peter. First Farmers: The Origins of Agricultural Societies. Oxford, UK: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2005. 
Berman, Morris. The Reenchantment of the World. London: Cornell University Press, 1981. 
Bernheimer, Richard. Wild Men in the Middle Ages: A Study in Art, Sentiment and 
Demonology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952. 
Berthold-Bond, Daniel B. “The Ethics of ‘Place’: Reflections on Bioregionalism.” 
Environmental Ethics 22, no. 1 (2000): 5-24. 
 
207 
Blaschke, Karl. “Environmental History: Some Questions for a New Sub discipline of 
History.” In The Silent Countdown: Essays in European Environmental History, edited 
by Peter Brimblecrombe and Christian Pfister, 68-72. New York: Springer-
Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 1990. 
Bloom Allan. The Closing of the American Mind. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.  
Bohm, David. Wholeness and the Implicate Order. New York: Routledge, 2002. 
Bookchin, Murray. Post-Scarcity Anarchism. Stirling, Scotland: AK Press, 2004. 
_______. The Ecology of Freedom. Stirling, Scotland: AK Press, 2005. 
Borgmann, Albert. Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life: A Philosophical Inquiry. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984. 
_______. Crossing the Postmodern Divide. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 
_______. Holding On to Reality: The Nature of Information at the Turn of the Millennium. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999. 
Bradbury, Ray. Fahrenheit 451. London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1996. 
Brimblecrombe, Peter and Christian Pfister, eds. The Silent Countdown: Essays in European 
Environmental History. New York: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 1990. 
Buchanan, Ian. “Enjoying ‘Reality TV’.” Australian Humanities Review 22 (2001): 1-8. 
http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-June-
2001/buchanan3.html. 
Butler, Eliza Marian. The Tyranny of Greece over Germany. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press, 1935. 
Cahoone, Lawrence, ed. From Modernism to Postmodernism: An Anthology. Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1996. 
Callicott, Baird J and Susan L. Flader, eds. The River of the Mother of God and Other Essays 
by Aldo Leopold. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1991. 
Campbell, Joseph. Myths to Live By. London: Souvenir Press, 1973. 
 
208 
Carson, Rachel. Silent Spring. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1962. 
Casey, Edward. Getting Back into Place. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993. 
_______. The Fate of Place. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997. 
Charbonnier, George. Conversations with Claude Levi-Strauss. London: Jonathan Cape, 
1969. 
Cheney, Jim. “The Journey Home.” In An Invitation to Environmental Philosophy, edited by 
Anthony Weston, 141-167. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Cohen, I. Bernard. The Newtonian Revolution: With Illustrations of the Transformation of 
Scientific Ideas. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1980. 
Cohen, Mark Nathan. The Food Crisis in Prehistory: Overpopulation and the Origins of 
Agriculture. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977. 
Cohen, Sande and R. L. Rutsky, eds. Consumption in an Age of Information. New York: 
Berg, 2005. 
Collingwood, R. G. An Essay on Metaphysics. Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1940. 
Cranston, Maurice. The Romantic Movement. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994. 
Cronon, William, ed. Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature. New York: 
W. W. Norton and Company, 1996. 
Crouse, Robert D. “The Earth as Wilderness and Paradise in Medieval Christian 
Thought.” In Replenish the Earth: The Christian Theology of Nature. A Theological 
Conference Held at Christchurch Cathedral Hall, Fredericton, New Brunswick, June 9-12, 
1991, edited by Susan Harris. Charlottetown, PE: St Peter’s Publications, 1992. 
http://www.stpeter.org/crouse/writings/wilderness.htm.  
Cushman, Phillip. “Why the Self is Empty: Toward a Historically Situated Psychology.” 
American Psychologist 45, no. 5 (1990): 599-611. 
Davies, Norman. Europe: A History. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
De Botton, Alain. The Consolations of Philosophy. London: Penguin Books, 2000. 
 
209 
De Certeau, Michel. The Practise of Everyday Life. Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1988. 
Deleuze, Gilles. Negotiations. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. 
Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. New 
York: Continuum, 1987. 
Deloria, Barbara, Kristen Foehner and Sam Scinta, eds. Spirit and Reason: The Vine 
Deloria, Jr., Reader. Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing, 1999. 
Descartes, Rene. Discourse on Method and Meditations. Translated by Laurence J. Lafleur. 
New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1960. 
Devall, Bill and George Sessions. Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered. Salt Lake City, 
UT: Gibb Smith Publishing, 1985. 
Diamond, Jared. Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. New York: Viking Press, 
2005. 
Dorson, Richard M. Folklore: Selected Essays. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1972. 
Dray, W. H. History as Re-enactment: R. G. Collingwood’s Idea of History. Oxford, UK: 
Clarendon Press, 1995. 
Drengson, Alan. Foundations for Deep Ecology; “Some Thought on the Deep Ecology Movement.” 
Last modified September 17, 2012. 
http://www.deepecology.org/deepecology.htm. 
Dugatkin Lee Alan. Mr Jefferson and the Giant Moose: Natural History in Early America. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009. 
Dundes, Alan, ed. Sacred Narrative: Reading in the Theory of Myth. Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 1984. 
ecoAmerica. American Environmental Values Survey: American Views on the Environment in an 
Era of Polarization and Conflicting Priorities. Washington DC: ecoAmerica, SRI 
 
210 
Consulting – Business Intelligence, 2006. http://ecoamerica.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/AEVS_Report.pdf.  
Erikson, Erik H. Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History. London: W. W. 
Norton and Company, 1993. 
Escobar, Arturo. “Culture Sits in Places: Reflections on Globalism and Subaltern 
Strategies of Localization.” Political Geography 20 (2001): 139-174. 
Fauvel, John, Raymond Flood, Michael Shortland and Robin Wilson, eds. Let Newton Be! 
A New Perspective on His Life and Works. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1988. 
Featherstone, Mike. Consumer Culture and Postmodernism. 2nd ed. London: Sage 
Publications, 2000. 
Ferre, Frederick and Peter Hartel, eds. Ethics and Environmental Policy: Theory Meets Practice. 
Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1994. 
Flood, Josephine. Archaeology of the Dreamtime: The Story of Prehistoric Australia and its People. 
Pymble, NSW: Angus and Robertson, 1995. 
Forstater, Mark. The Living Wisdom of Socrates. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2004. 
Foucault, Michel. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. London: 
Routledge, 1989. 
Fox, Warwick. Approaching Deep Ecology: A Response to Richard Sylvan’s Critique of Deep 
Ecology. Hobart, TAS: Board of Environmental Studies, 1986. 
_______. A Theory of General Ethics: Human Relationships, Nature and the Built Environment. 
Cambridge, Mass: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2006. 
_______. Towards a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism. 
Boston, MA: Shambhala, 1990. 
Gare, Arran E. Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis. London: Routledge, 1995. 
Gergen, Kenneth J. The Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity in Contemporary Life. New York: 
Basic Books, 2000. 
 
211 
Geyer-Ryan, Helger, Paul Koupman and Klaas Yntema, eds. Benjamin Studies: Perception 
and Experience in Modernity. New York: Rodopi, 2002. 
Giddens, Anthony. The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1990. 
Green, John Richard. A Short History of the English People, Volume 1. London: The Home 
Library Book Company, 1915. 
Grenville, Kate and Sue Woolfe, eds. Making Stories. Sydney, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 
1993. 
Griffiths, Jay. Pip Pip: A Sideways Look at Time. London: Flamingo, 1999. 
_______. Wild: An Elemental Journey. London: Penguin Books, 2006. 
Grindstaff, Laura. “Trashy or Transgressive? ‘Reality TV’ and the Politics of Social 
Control.” Thresholds: Viewing Culture 9 (1995). 
http://nideffer.net/proj/Tvc/section3/11.Tvc.v9.sect3.Grindstaff.html. 
Guattari, Felix. The Three Ecologies. London: The Athlone Press, 1989. 
Hamilton, Clive. Clive Hamilton; “Reclaiming Morality from Conservative Dogma and Post-
Modern Indifference.” Last modified August 12, 2008. 
http://clivehamilton.com/reclaiming-morality-from-conservative-dogma-and-
post-modern-indifference/. 
_______. The Freedom Paradox: Towards a Post-secular Ethics. New South Wales: Allen and 
Unwin, 2008. 
Hardin, Garret. Living within Limits: Ecology, Economics, and Population Taboos. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993. 
Harlan, Jack R. Crops and Man: Views on Agricultural Origins. Madison, WI: American 
Society of Agronomy, 1992. 
Harries Jones, Peter. A Recursive Vision: Ecological Understanding and Gregory Bateson. 
Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2002. 
 
212 
Hayward, Jennifer. Consuming Pleasures: Active Audiences and Serial Fictions from Dickens to 
Soap Opera. Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1997. 
Hays, Samuel P. Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 
1890-1920. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959. 
Heywood, Andrew. Political Ideologies. London: Macmillan Press, 1992. 
Hickory, Shagbark. “Environmental Etiquette/Environmental Practice: American 
Indian Challenges to Mainstream Environmental Ethics.” In The Company of 
Others: Essays in Celebration of Paul Shepard, edited by Max Oelschlaeger, 109-126. 
Durago, CO: Kiuaki Press, 1995. 
Holmes, Madelyn. American Women Conservationists: Twelve Profiles. London: Mc Farland 
and Company, 2004. 
Hougan, Jim. Decadence: Radical Nostalgia, Narcissism and Decline in the Seventies. New York: 
William Morrow and Company, 1975. 
Hughes, J. Donald. An Environmental History of the World: Humankind’s Changing Role in the 
Community of Life. London: Routledge, 2001. 
_______. What is Environmental History? Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2006. 
Huxley, Aldous. Brave New World. London: Flamingo, 1994. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). IPCC; “Organization.” Last 
modified January 29, 2015. http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization. 
shtml. 
IUCN (International Union for Conservation of Nature). About IUCN; “Conserving 
Nature: WCPA Biomes – Wilderness.” Last modified January 16, 2014. 
http://www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/gpap_home/gpap_biodiversi
ty/gpap_wcpabiodiv/gpap_wilderness/.  
_______. The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species; “Canis Lupus.” Last modified January 
29, 2015. http://www.iucnredlist.org/details/3746/0.  
 
213 
Jacob, Margaret C. The Newtonians and the English Revolution, 1689-1720. Sussex, UK: 
Harvester Press, 1976. 
Judd, Richard W. Common Lands, Common People: The Origins of Conservation in Northern New 
England. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997.  
_______. The Untilled Garden: Natural History and the Spirit of Conservation in America. 
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2009.  
Katz, Eric. “Authenticity and Place. The Authenticity of Place in Culture and Nature: 
Thoughts on the Holocaust in the Spanish Synagogue of Venice.” Philosophy 
and Geography 5, no. 2 (2002): 195-211. 
Kilminster, Richard and Ian Varcoe, eds. Culture, Modernity and Revolution: Essays in 
Honour of Zygmunt Bauman. London: Routledge, 1996. 
La Chapelle, Dolores. Sacred Land, Sacred Sex: Rapture of the Deep. Durango, CO: Kivaki 
Press, 1988. 
Le Goff, Jacques. Saint Francis of Assisi. Translated by Christine Rhone. London: 
Routledge, 2004. 
Lear, Linda. Rachel Carson: Witness for Nature. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 
1997. 
Leersen, Joep. “Wildness, Wilderness and Ireland: Medieval and Early Modern Patterns 
in the Demarcation of Civility.” Journal of the History of Ideas 56, no. 1 (1995): 25-
39. 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom on Man and 
the Origin of Evil. Translated by E. M. Huggard. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1985. 
_______. Discourse on Metaphysics and the Monadology. Translated by George R. 
Montgomery. New York: Prometheus Books, 1992. 
Lemons, John, Laura Westra and Robert Goodland, eds. Ecological Sustainability and 
Integrity: Concepts and Approaches. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1998. 
 
214 
Leopold, Aldo. A Sand County Almanac: With Other Essays on Conservation from Round River. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. 
Levinas, Emmanuel. “The Paradox of Morality: An Interview with Emmanuel Levinas 
by Tamara Wright, Peter Hayes and Alison Ainley.” In The Provocation of Levinas: 
Rethinking the Other, edited by Robert Bernesconi and David Wood, 168-180. 
London: Routledge, 1988. 
Lewis, Martin W. Green Delusions: An Environmentalist Critique of Radical Environmentalism. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992. 
Light, Andrew and Jonathan M. Smith, eds. Space, Place, and Environmental Ethics. 
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1997. 
Lovejoy, Arthur O. The Great Chain of Being. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1974. 
Mabey, Richard, ed. The Oxford Book of Nature Writing. Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 1995. 
Macfarlane, Robert. The Wild Places. London: Granta, 2007. 
_______. The Old Ways: A Journey on Foot. London: Hamish Hamilton, 2012. 
Madison, Mark G. “Green Fields: The Agrarian Conservation Movement in America, 
1890-1990.” PhD diss., Harvard University, 1995. 
Malouf, David. The Happy Life: The Search for Contentment in the Modern World. Quarterly 
Essay 41. Collingwood, VIC: Black Inc., 2011. 
Malpas, Jeff. “Finding Place: Spatiality, Locality, and Subjectivity.” In Philosophy and 
Geography III: Philosophies of Place, edited by Andrew Light and Jonathan M. 
Smith, 31-32. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998. 
_______. Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999. 
Mandel, Ernest. Late Capitalism. New York: Verso, 1978. 
 
215 
Marshall, Peter. Nature’s Web: An Exploration of Ecological Thinking. London: Simon and 
Schuster, 1992. 
Mathews, Freya. The Ecological Self. London: Routledge, 1991. 
_______. Reinhabiting Reality: Towards a Recovery of Culture. Sydney, NSW: University of 
New South Wales Press, 2005. 
McGilchrist, Ian. The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the 
Western World. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009. 
McGrayne, Sharon Bertsch. Prometheans in the Lab: Chemistry and the Making of the Modern 
World. New York: McGraw Hill, 2001. 
McLuhan, Marshall. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1968. 
McNeill, John R. Something New Under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth 
Century World. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001. 
Meadows, Donella. Thinking in Systems: A Primer. White River Junction, CT: Chelsea 
Green Publishing, 2008. 
Meeker, Joseph W. The Comedy of Survival. Tuscon, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 
1997. 
Mellencamp, Patricia. High Anxiety: Catastrophe, Scandal, Age, and Comedy. Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 1992. 
Mendieta, Eduardo. “The City and the Philosopher: On the Urbanism of 
Phenomenology.” Philosophy and Geography 4, no. 2 (2001): 203-218. 
Merchant, Carolyn. The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution. San 
Francisco, CA: Harper and Row Publishers, 1980. 
_______. Ecological Revolutions: Nature, Gender, and Science in New England. Chapel Hill, 
NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989. 




_______. Science and Salvation: A Modern Myth and its Meaning. London: Routledge, 1992. 
_______. The Myths We Live By. London: Routledge, 2004. 
Miller, Arthur. Timebends: A Life. New York: Grove Press, 1987. 
Mink, Louis O. Mind, History and Dialectic: The Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood. 
Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1969. 
Muir, John. The Story of My Boyhood and Youth. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1965. 
Nabhan, Gary Paul and Stephen Trimble. The Geography of Childhood. Boston, MA: 
Beacon Press, 1994. 
Naess, Arne. Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. Translated by David Rothenberg. 
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1989.  
Nash, Roderick. Wilderness and the American Mind. Revised ed. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1973. 
_______. The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics. Madison, WI: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1989. 
Nemoianu, Virgil. The Taming of Romanticism: European Literature and the Age of Biedermeier. 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1984. 
Nicholls, Bill. Blurred Boundaries: Questions of Meaning in Contemporary Culture. Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press. 
Nicholson-Lord, David. “Blind Spot.” Resurgence 237 (2006): 21-22. 
Norris, Christopher. Derrida. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987. 
O’Donohue, John. Eternal Echoes: Exploring Our Hunger to Belong. London: Bantam Press, 
1998. 
O’Meare, Sylvia and Douglas A. West, eds. From Our Eyes: Learning From Indigenous 
Peoples. Toronto, ON: Garamond Press, 1996. 
 
217 
Oelschlaeger, Max. The Idea of Wilderness: From Prehistory to the Age of Ecology. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1991. 
_______, ed. The Company of Others: Essays in Celebration of Paul Shepard. Durango, CO: 
Kiuaki Press, 1995. 
Pagden, Anthony. European Encounters with the New World. New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1993. 
Parrish, Susan Scott. American Curiosity: Cultures of Natural History in the Colonial British 
Atlantic World. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006. 
Pascal, Blaise. Pensees and Other Writings. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Pauly, Daniel. “Anecdotes and the Shifting Baseline of Fisheries.” Trends in Ecology and 
Evolution 10, no. 10 (1995): 430. 
Peckham, Morse. The Triumph of Romanticism. Columbia, SC: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1970. 
Pepper, David. The Roots of Modern Environmentalism. London: Routledge, 1984. 
Pilkington, Ed. “How the Disney Dream Died in Celebration.” The Guardian, December 
14, 2010. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/13/celebration-
death-of-a-dream 
Plato. The Republic of Plato. Translated by Francis MacDonald Cornford. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 1941. 
Plumwood, Val. Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. London: Routledge, 1993. 
_______, Plumwood, Val. Environmental Culture: the Ecological Crisis of Reason. London: 
Routledge, 2002. 
Pretty, Jules. This Luminous Coast: Walking England's Eastern Edge. New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2011. 
Preston, Christopher J. “Environment and Belief: The Importance of Place in the 




Quinn, Daniel. Ishmael: An Adventure of the Mind and Spirit. New York: Bantam/Turner, 
1995. 
Rauschenbusch, Stephen. “Conservation is in Danger of Becoming a Lost Cause.” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 281 (1952): 1-9. 
Rehmann-Sutter, Christoph. “An Introduction to Places.” Worldviews: Global Religions, 
Culture, and Ecology 2, no. 3 (1998): 171-177. 
Renaut, Alain. The Era of the Individual: A Contribution to a History of Subjectivity. Translated 
by M. B. DeBevoise and Franklin Philip. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1997. 
Reynolds, Jack and Johnathan Roffe, eds. Understanding Derrida. New York: Continuum, 
2004. 
Rieber, Robert W. ed. The Individual, Communication and Society: Essays in Memory of Gregory 
Bateson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
Roosevelt, Nicholas. Conservation: Now or Never. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 
1970. 
Rose, Deborah Bird. Nourishing Terrains: Australian Aboriginal Views of Landscape and 
Wilderness. Canberra, ACT: Australian Heritage Commission, 1996. 
_______. Dingo Makes Us Human. Oakleigh, VIC: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
_______. Wild Dog Dreaming: Love and Extinction. Charlottesville, VA: University of 
Virginia Press, 2011. 
Rowlands, Mark. The Philosopher and the Wolf: Lessons from the Wild on Love, Death and 
Happiness. London: Granta Books, 2008. 
Russell, Bertrand. History of Western Philosophy: And its Connection with Political and Social 
Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day. London: Routledge, 1991. 
Schenk, Hans George Artur Viktor. The Mind of the European Romantics: An Essay in 
Cultural History. New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing, 1966. 
 
219 
Scheuering, Rachel White. Shapers of the Great Debate on Conservation: A Biographical 
Dictionary. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004. 
Seaton, Elizabeth. “Virtualities: Television, Media Art, and Cyberculture.” Canadian 
Journal of Communication 24, no. 2 (1999): http://www.cjc-
online.ca/index.php/journal/article/view/1103/1009.  
Seed, John. Thinking Like a Mountain: Towards a Council of All Beings. Philadelphia, PA: 
New Society Publishers, 1988. 
Seigel, Jerrod. The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe Since the 
Seventeenth Century. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Sessions, George, ed. Deep Ecology for the 21st Century. Boston, MA: Shambhala, 1995. 
_______. “Wildness, Cyborgs, and Our Ecological Future: Reassessing the Deep 
Ecology Movement.” Trumpeter 22, no. 2 (2006): 121-182.  
Shepard, Paul. Nature and Madness. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1982. 
Shumway, David R. Michel Foucault. Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 
1992. 
Sierra Club. Sierra Club. “John Muir: A Brief Biography.” Last modified April 29, 2013. 
http://vault.sierraclub.org/john_muir_exhibit/life/muir_biography.aspx. 
_______. Sierra Club. “Policies: Conservation Policies.” Last modified January 29, 2015. 
http://www.sierraclub.org/policy. 
Singer, Charles. A Short History of Scientific Ideas to 1900. Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 1959. 
Skolimowski, Henryk. Eco-philosophy. London: Marion Boyers, 1981. 
_______. A Sacred Place to Dwell: Living with Reverence Upon the Earth. Rockport, MA: 
Element Books, 1993. 




Snyder, Gary. The Practice of the Wild. New York: North Point Press, 1990. 
Stephens, Mitchell. The Rise of the Image the Fall of the Word. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1998. 
Strauss, Claude Levi. Structural Anthropology. London: Penguin Books, 1963. 
_______. Myth and Meaning. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1978. 
Tallis, Raymond. Newton’s Sleep: Two Cultures and Two Kingdoms. New York: St Martin’s 
Press, 1995. 
“Tasmania’s Anti-Protest Laws Pass Upper House Hurdle.” ABC News, October 30, 
2014. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-10-30/tasmania27s-anti-protest-
laws-pass-upper-house-hurdle/5852722. 
Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1989. 
The WILD Foundation. The WILD Foundation: How We Work. “What is a Wilderness 
Area.” Last modified May 1, 2013. http://www.wild.org/main/how-wild-
works/policy-research/what-is-a-wilderness-area/. 
Thomas. Keith. Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England, 1500-1800. 
London: Allen Lane, 1983. 
Thoreau, Henry David. Civil Disobedience and Other Essays. New York: Dover 
Publications, 1993. 
Thrift, Nigel. Non-Representational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect. London: Routledge, 2008. 
Thurley, Geoffrey. The Romantic Predicament. London: MacMillan Press, 1983. 
Tobias, Michael, ed. Deep Ecology. San Diego, CA: Avant Books, 1995. 
Tully, James, ed. Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: The Philosophy of Charles Taylor in Question. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
Turner, Bryan S., ed. Citizenship and Social Theory. London: Sage Publications, 1993. 
 
221 
Visser, Thomas D. “Common Lands, Common People: The Origins of Conservation in 
Northern New England by Richard W. Judd.” The New England Quarterly 71, 
no. 2 (1998): 315-318. 
Walter, Francois. “The Evolution of Environmental Sensitivity 1750-1950.” In The Silent 
Countdown: Essays in European Environmental History, edited by Peter 
Brimblecrombe and Christian Pfister, 231-247. New York: Springer-Verlag 
Berlin Heidelberg, 1990. 
Warren, Karen J. Ecofeminist Philosophy: A Western Perspective on What it is and Why it 
Matters. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000. 
Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London: Routledge, 2001. 
Weston, Anthony. “Before Environmental Ethics.” Environmental Ethics 14 (1992): 323-
340. 
_______. Back to Earth: Tomorrow’s Environmentalism. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University 
Press, 1994. 
_______, ed. An Invitation to Environmental Philosophy. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999. 
_______. Jobs for Philosophers. Bloomington, IL: Xlibris, 2003. 
White, Gilbert. The Natural History of Selborne: With a Preface by Richard Jefferies. London: 
Walter Scott, 1789. 
_______. History of Selborne. London: Grant Richards, 1922.  
White Jr, Lynn. Medieval Religion and Technology: Collected Essays. Los Angeles, CA: 
University of California Press, 1978. 
Wightman, William P. D. Science and the Renaissance: Volume I. Edinburgh, UK: Oliver and 
Boyd, 1962. 
Williams, Rob. “Revealed: The Third Largest ‘Country’ in World – Facebook Hits One 






Wolf, Abraham. A History of Science, Technology and Philosophy in the 16th and 17th Centuries. 
London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968. 
Wolfe, Tom. “The ‘Me’ Decade and the Third Great Awakening.” New York Magazine, 
August 23, 1976: 26-40. http://nymag.com/news/features/45938/. 
Wood, Gordon S. The Radicalism of the American Revolution. New York: Vintage Books, 
1993. 
Worster, Donald. Nature’s Economy. San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books, 1977. 
_______. The Wealth of Nature: Environmental History and the Ecological Imagination. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
Zimmerman, Michael. E., J. Baird Callicott, George Sessions, Karen J. Warren and John 
Clark, eds. Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology. 2nd ed. 
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998. 
 
 
 
 
 
